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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Crazy people are not crazy if one accepts their reasoning 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez 
 
In 2003, the Midwest and Northwest of the United States and Ontario in Canada suffered one of 
the most catastrophic blackouts in the history. It was caused by a line fault that in normal conditions 
trips an alarm in the control center. However, operators were unaware of this condition and react too 
late because the alarm system failed few minutes before the electrical failure. This caused a cascade 
phenomenon that cost between US$7 and 10 billion (US-Canada Power System Outage task force 
2004) and affected almost 50 million customers. Today, 10 years later, a study conducted by Ventyx 
(Franko and Fahey 2013) showed that in the United States the electric utilities spend an average of 
16500€ per year on devices and station equipment per mile of transmission line, which shows the great 
investment on technologies to make the system stronger and more resilient. 
Moreover, not only hidden failures on ICT can affect power systems, but targeted attacks 
against power systems can also lead to catastrophic outages. According to the ICS-CERT, in the first 
half of fiscal year 2013 (October 1, 2012 – May 2013) the energy sector suffered 53% of cyberattacks 
against critical infrastructures (ICS-CERT April/May/June 2013), i.e. infrastructures that play an im-
portant and vital role in all main functions of modern societies, including: government facilities, ener-
gy systems, hospitals and banks (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001). These examples show a high 
impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on the performance of power sys-
tems. 
Last decades have been marked by a wide and pervasive deployment of Information and Com-
munication Technologies in many sectors. As technologies become cheaper and more powerful, new 
ideas are emerging, new projects are sponsored and new intelligent devices can be found in the mar-
ket, all of them promise to improve the efficiency, reliability and availability of infrastructures, charac-
terizing this digital age. Furthermore, these technologies pretend to prepare current power systems to 
the new challenges. Some of these challenges are large distributed generation deployment, systems 
operating limits, demand rising and the liberalized market. 
Nevertheless, the interaction and interdependencies of infrastructures are creating a highly inter-
connected complex System-of-Systems, where failure(s) in one infrastructure can have a catastrophic 
impact on other infrastructures. 
This problem has been addressed by the US Homeland Security Department and the European 
Commission (European Commission 2011), and new policies are being created in order to ensure the 
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service continuity of Critical Infrastructures. As a result, many projects have been initiated in order to 
understand the behavior of coupled infrastructures, one of these projects is the SINARI Project, spon-
sored by the ANR (Agence Nationale de la Recherche)-France. This project treats the impact of ICTs 
failures on the secure operation of the electrical distribution network. The present thesis was devel-
oped as a part of this project. 
Although various researchers have studied the vulnerability of power systems (mostly for 
Transmission Power Systems) and ICT infrastructures, those studies are still in an early stage and 
many questions remain unanswered. Some of these unanswered questions revolve around the mutual 
behavior of coupled infrastructures. This gap highlights the need of new innovative methods to under-
stand the interdependencies among and within critical infrastructures and consequently to improve the 
analysis of power systems security. This dissertation is focused on the particular case of distribution 
systems as they are experiencing tremendous changes with a wide deployment of ICTs. 
Therefore, the main problem that this dissertation addresses is the lack of methods to analyze 
and study coupled critical infrastructures, specifically to identify their interdependencies and vulnera-
bilities in the context of wide deployment of ICTs. The solution of this problem may provide a better 
vision of system-of-systems that will support reliability, security and risk analysis and should help to 
make power systems more secure. 
The main scientific and technical obstacles (or challenges) that this dissertation has to tackle 
are: 
 The need of a flexible model to be used for many heterogeneous infrastructures. Nowadays 
there is a growing interest within the scientific community to find a model that helps to de-
scribe the behavior of multiple interconnected infrastructures for a global system-of-systems 
vision and it is well known that such model does not exist yet. 
 New methods have to reflect the interactions among and within infrastructures. They have 
to consider several types of interdependencies and they have to be easy and simple to use. 
 Because the main problem of this dissertation covers three large domains: Power distribu-
tion systems, Communication networks and automation and control of power systems. It is 
needed to study each domain and understand their interdependencies. 
A review of the literature has resulted in identifying the most common and promising methods 
to model interdependent infrastructures, including: Agent-based modeling (Casalicchio, Galli and 
Tucci 2007), Petri Networks (Beccuti, et al. 2012), Combined Simulation (Rozel, et al. 2008) and 
Complex Networks Theory (Zio and Sansavini 2011). After comparing these methods with respect to 
the scientific objectives and challenges of this dissertation, it has been decided to focus specifically on 
the Complex Networks Theory for developing an integrated model for coupled power and ICT infra-
structures. 
Complex Networks enables the modeling of large systems as graphs. In addition, these networks 
have been extensively used to model, analyze, and understand large systems with non-trivial topolo-
gies and hidden interdependences. What is more, this approach allows systems topology characteris-
tics and connectivity properties to be known, as well as, fault and cascading phenomena analysis to be 
performed. This latter aspect is indeed important because these properties allow the role and the im-
portance of each component in the whole interconnected system to be identified. 
Therefore, in order to elaborate a single and integrated model, this dissertation proposes to adapt 
the theory of Complex Numbers to the theory of Complex Networks. The result of this symbiosis is a 
two-dimensional model, which allows inherent vulnerabilities of coupled infrastructures to be under-
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stood and identified. Some of the main properties of Complex Networks are analyzed in order to iden-
tify the most critical or most central elements in the system with respect to topology-driven analyses. 
The research is guided by the following propositions: 
 There is a close relationship between the structure of coupled infrastructures and its dynam-
ics, therefore, studying the systems’ topology will ultimately allow the unknown key-
properties to be found; 
 Asymmetrical communication patterns on multi-infrastructure systems can be represented 
by bi-directional edges on complex networks; 
 The global behavior of coupled infrastructures may reveal emergent unknown phenomena 
as a result of their interactions. 
This dissertation is organized in five Chapters and three appendices. CHAPTER I presents an 
overview of many concepts that involve the studied problem. Some of these concepts include: Critical 
Infrastructures, Interdependencies, Power Systems control and monitoring, and vulnerability of cou-
pled infrastructures. 
CHAPTER II presents a State-of-the-art on last modeling methods that address the problem of 
coupled infrastructures interdependencies. 
CHAPTER III proposes two approaches to model coupled infrastructures. 
CHAPTER IV applies the approaches chosen to a typical French Distribution Network. 
CHAPTER V analyses the problem from a System-of-Systems point of view. Evaluating the in-
teraction of different actors involved in the interconnected system. Additionally, it proposes a new 
methodology to model the interdependencies within Smart Grids. 
Appendix A presents a larger explanation on Complex Networks and presents some of the algo-
rithms and codes developed throughout this research project. 
Appendix B summarizes main outages and cyber-attacks on Power System facilities. These ex-
amples show that Power Systems are vulnerable to failures in the ICT infrastructure. 
Appendix C outlines the evolution of policies and projects over the last decade with regard to 
the interconnections between Power Systems and ICTs. 
Appendix D summarizes the publications arising from this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER I  
Context and Definitions 
What we do in life echoes in eternity. 
Maximus 
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Abstract 
The material in this chapter is intended to serve as a brief account of the context and the problem that re-
volve around this thesis. Power Systems and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are studied 
as Critical Infrastructures. These infrastructures are highly interconnected and are interdependent. Failures in 
one infrastructure can reach the other infrastructure originating cascades, common cause or emerging failures. 
Threats on ICTs, as lack of integrity, availability, confidentiality, authenticity and traceability, can affect the 
Power System behavior. As well, power system blackouts and auxiliary systems’ failures can critically affect the 
ICTs that control and monitor the power system through sensors and communication means. 
I.1 Introduction 
In the 18th century, scientists dedicated most of their attention to the study of electricity. In the 
early 1750’s, Benjamin Franklin had the famous anecdote about the metal key at the bottom of a kite 
string during a storm. After that, Alessandro Volta, André Ampère, Michael Faraday, George Ohm, 
James Maxwell, Nikola Tesla, Thomas Edison and other researchers developed different branches of 
electromagnetism physics that have allowed humanity to progress and to change its lifestyle. Today, 
we live in a world where industrial facilities, homes, schools, universities, hospitals, banks and other 
infrastructures depend on electricity, a world where an outage for a few minutes can have a devastat-
ing impact on nation’s economy and security (Halpin, et al. 2006). 
Nowadays, infrastructures that are vital for nations’ welfare and security are considered as 
“Critical Infrastructures” (CIs). Energy Infrastructure is one of them, which includes the production, 
refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power. Additionally, Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) are considered as a critical infrastructure. Although ICTs have only 
existed for a relatively short time, they have become so essential to the society that their incapacity 
would have a negative impact in many other infrastructures, including public health, defense systems 
and banking. 
Power Systems are not an exception of the influence of ICTs, since these technologies have 
been progressively deployed in power systems and nowadays they are a vital part of the remote con-
trol, protection and supervision systems, helping to increase the reliability, availability and safety of 
Power Systems. Moreover, future power networks will have a higher dependency on ICT networks, 
‘Smart Grids’ will exchange communication flows with control centers, electric wholesale market, 
transmission network, end-users, distributed storage and distributed generation; and internal commu-
nication flows between control, measure and protection components, e.g. Remote Terminal Units. 
Figure I:1 shows the main communication flows in Distribution Systems, including Internal and Ex-
ternal Communications (NIST 2012). 
However, the wide integration of ICTs within Power Systems adds complexity to an already 
complex field, as in the case of Power Systems. Recent events showed that failures in one infrastruc-
ture affect other infrastructures. For instance, the US 2003 blackout (US-Canada Power System 
Outage task force 2004) taught us that the electrical grids are vulnerable and that a failure in the ICT 
system can have catastrophic consequences on power systems. Another example is the Stuxnet worm 
(Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). It showed that cyber events can actually target specific energy 
infrastructures and that the level of security
i
 awareness in Power Systems is questionable. These and 
 
 
i
 Defined by the NERC as: “The ability of the power system to withstand sudden disturbances such electric 
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other cyber-physical events are summarized in Appendix B. 
In response to these events, diverse research centers and Universities addressed this issue in 
numerous ways, e.g. the SINARI French project “Infrastructures Security and Risk Analysis.”ii These 
studies are based on the idea that it is difficult to protect an infrastructure without identifying and un-
derstanding its interdependent vulnerabilities. As well, several standards have been developed in order 
to ensure the interoperability and security of coupled heterogeneous infrastructures, e.g. Standard 
IEEE 2030-2011 “Guide for the Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information 
Technology Operation with the Electric Power System, End-Use applications and loads.” 
The Critical Infrastructures Interdependencies have been addressed in the Grenoble Institute of 
Technology
iii
/G2ELAB (Grenoble Electrical Engineering Laboratory)
iv
 as early as late 90s through 
various research works, industry partnerships and European projects (GRID
v
 (GRID 2007), SYS-
GEEN-ICT
vi
). Among the PhDs works dealing with this subject, Dr. Rozel has compared different 
methods to model and study Critical Infrastructures Interdependencies (B. Rozel 2009) and Dr. 
Tranchita has studied the phenomenon of terrorism and developed a risk assessment for power systems 
security with regards to targeted events (Tranchita 2008). Currently, Critical Infrastructures studies are 
one of the main research axes at Grenoble Institute of Technology/G2ELAB. 
One of the main problems when it comes to evaluating and identifying vulnerabilities of ICTs 
and Power Systems is the modeling of their interdependencies. Therefore, in order to solve this prob-
lem, it is important to understand how Power Systems and Information and Communications Systems 
are interconnected. Specifically, in the context of this dissertation, it is important to understand the 
role of RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) or even IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) as part of the 
Power Systems – ICT interface, the SCADA System as the nervous system and Control Centers (CC) 
as the brain of this interconnected complex system. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
short-circuits or non-anticipated loss of system components.” 
ii
 In French Sécurité des Infrastructures et Analyse de Risques (http://www.sinari;org) 
iii
 In French Grenoble - Institut Nationale Polytechnique (http://www.grenoble-inp.fr) 
iv
 In French Grenoble Génie Electrique Laboratoire (http://www.g2elab.grenoble-inp.fr) 
v
 http://grid.jrc.it 
vi
 http://seesgen-ict.rse-web.it/  
 
Figure I:1 Distribution Domain (NIST 2012) 
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This Chapter is structured in the following sections:  
 Section I.2 offers a general overview of CIs and their interdependencies. 
 Section I.3 presents a brief introduction to Power Systems and the new paradigm of Liberal-
ized Power Systems. 
 Section I.4 addresses the control systems on electric power systems. 
 Section I.5 presents the interdependencies and threats between Power Systems and ICTs. 
 Section I.6 presents a summary and concludes with the key objectives of the dissertation. 
I.2 Critical Infrastructures (CIs) 
I.2.1 Definitions 
The term “Critical Infrastructure” (CI) is evolving, as indicated in (O'Rourke 2007). In the 
1980’s, it appeared in many policy debates. However, it was in 1996 that the term CI was used by the 
first time in terms of National Security (President of the US 1996). Currently, there are several defini-
tions of Critical Infrastructures. 
The Commission of the European Communities (European Union 2008) is defining a Critical 
infrastructure as: “an asset, system of part thereof located in Member States which are essential for 
the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of 
people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State 
as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.” 
European critical infrastructures classification includes (Commission of the European 
Communities 2004): 
 Energy installations and networks; 
 Communications and information technologies; 
 Finance (banking, securities and investment); 
 Health care; 
 Food; 
 Water (dams, storage, treatment and networks); 
 Transport (airports, ports, intermodal facilities, railway and mass transit networks and traf-
fic control systems); 
 Production, storage and transport of dangerous goods (e.g. chemical, biological, radiologi-
cal and nuclear materials); 
 Government (e.g. critical services, facilities, information networks, assets and key national 
sites and monuments). 
Likewise, the US Department of Homeland Security identified 18 Critical Infrastructure Sec-
tors, showed in Table I:1, and defined CIs as “assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or vir-
tual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating 
effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof ” 
(US Department of Homeland Security 2009). 
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Despite the different concepts of CIs, it is clear that CIs play an essential role in all main func-
tions of modern societies and it is important to understand their interactions and interdependencies to 
prevent catastrophic events caused by unknown vulnerabilities. Thereby, (Rinaldi, et al., 2001) 
proposed different dimensions for describing infrastructure’s interdependencies – see Figure I:2 – 
including coupling and response behavior, types of failures, infrastructure characteristics, state of 
operation, types of interdependencies and environment. This dissertation is engaged particulary to the 
study of the types of interdependencies and the types of failures, both subjets are described in Sections 
I.2.2 and I.2.3 respectively. 
I.2.2 Types of Interdependencies 
At first glance every infrastructure operates separately. However, there are linkages between 
them, either tangibles or intangibles that build a complex coupled System-of-Systems (SoS) (Gorod, 
Sauser and Boardman 2008). A SoS is characterized by highly automated networks with multiple 
complex interdependencies. For that, (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001) identified four types of 
interdependencies on critical infrastructures: 
 Physical: Represented by a physical linkage between the inputs and outputs of two agents in 
Table I:1 Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the United States 
Food and Agriculture Banking and Finance Chemical 
Commercial Facilities Communications Critical Manufacturing 
Dams Defense Industrial Base Emergency Services 
Energy Government Facilities Healthcare and Public Health 
Information Technology National Monuments and icons Nuclear Reactors, materials and waste 
Postal and Shipping Transportation systems Water 
 
 
Figure I:2 Dimensions of CIs interdependencies  
(Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001) 
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different infrastructures, e.g. power systems supply power to oil infrastructures for pump 
stations and control systems. 
 Cyber: connects the state of one infrastructure to others, depending on information transmit-
ted through the communications infrastructure, e.g. water facilities depend on ICT to super-
vise and monitor the water pumping and cooling. (Kröger and Zio 2011) proposed to call it 
“Informational,” in order to include hardware and software. 
 Geographic: Infrastructures geographically located at the same place, where a single event 
can negatively affect them, e.g. in power substations when a transformer explodes and the 
fire burns communication cables, affecting the information and communication system. 
(Kröger and Zio 2011) proposed to call it “geospatial.” 
 Logical: When the state of one infrastructure depends on the state of another infrastructure 
via a connection that is not physical, cyber nor geographic, e.g. the European outage in 
2006, despite it was a 30 minutes outage, French relief centers were inundated with calls 
(UCTE 2007). (D. Watts 2004) describes this type of interdependency in many areas be-
sides critical infrastructures. 
(De Porcellinis, et al. 2008) proposes a fifth interdependency called ‘Social’, when the function-
ing of the whole system relies on the human behavior and activities, e.g. when a worker’s strike blocks 
off train rails. 
I.2.3 Types of Failures 
Since CIs are interdependent, a failure on one infrastructure can have a catastrophic impact 
against other infrastructures in the System-of-Systems. Three types of failures are identified (Rinaldi, 
Peerenboom and Kelly 2001): 
 Common mode: Occurs when two or more infrastructures are affected simultaneously be-
cause of an external and common cause, e.g. tornado and earthquake. 
 Cascading: Occurs when a failure in one infrastructure causes a failure in a second infra-
structure. 
 Escalating: Occurs when a failure, resulting from the interaction between two infrastruc-
tures, exacerbates another failure. 
Table I:2 presents which CIs originated an event and which CIs are affected by the event. Data 
are from a database containing recordings of 2515 CI’s failures in multiple CIs around the world. The 
energy infrastructure has the higher number of incidents affecting other infrastructures. As well, indus-
try, telecom and water infrastructures have an impact on the energy infrastructure, illustrating the need 
to understand the causes of these incidents and how these infrastructures are linked. A complete analy-
sis is presented in (Luiijf, et al. 2009). 
Therefore, as mentioned in (Kröger 2008), it is needed to create new conceptual approaches and 
extended analytical tools to knowledge the critical linkages between CIs in order to prevent critical 
failures and to improve the Power Systems resilience. 
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Both issues, interdependencies and failures of CIs, are analyzed in Section I.4 for Power Sys-
tems and ICT infrastructures. 
I.3 Electric Power Systems (EPS) 
The main objective of Electric Power Systems, as we know them today, is to supply electrical 
energy to clients on wide territories. In order to achieve this objective, Power Systems are structurally 
divided into generating stations, transmission and distribution networks, and end-users. This division 
was developed mainly for economic reasons resulting in traditional and historical descendent power 
flows, from generating units to end-users. 
Nevertheless, Power Systems are taking a new direction that is characterized by the reorganiza-
tion of the electrical system to create conditions for open competition between different players, which 
has been called: the Liberalized World. The new conditions are incentives for consumers to install 
local generation means and the use of renewable sources. But this new paradigm introduced new prob-
lems and challenges (Hadjsaid, Canard and Dumas 1999). In order to understand the new challenges 
and why ICTs are increasingly becoming an essential part of power systems, this section briefly pre-
sents and introduction to the EPS structure, the Distributed Generation integration and the liberalized 
world. 
I.3.1 Structure of Electric Power Systems 
Traditionally, Electric Power Systems comprise: 
 Generation: Electric power is generated by 50/60 Hz synchronous rotating machines, con-
verting mechanic energy into electrical power. In France, in 2012, electrical energy was 
generated as follows: 74.8% from Nuclear Plants, 11.8% from hydroelectric plants, 8.8% 
from coal plants, and the remaining 4.6% from gas, wind generators, solar energy, and other 
renewable energies (RTE 2013). 
 Transmission: In this level, generated electric power is transmitted from generation plants to 
distribution networks. Many components are involved in the transmission networks, e.g. 
transmission lines, substations, transformers, control and protection systems, transmission 
towers, etc. Some industrial customers are supplied directly at this level. 
 Distribution: Distribution networks deliver the power directly to all consumers. 
Power flows in this typical structure are directed from generation plants to consumers. In order 
Table I:2 Events categorized by initiating and affected sector (# of events) (Luiijf, et al. 2009) 
CI Sector Initiating Sector 
No 
Sector 
Energy Financial 
Services 
Government Health Industry Internet Postal 
Services 
Telecom Transport Water TOTAL 
Education 1 1 - - - - - - - - 2 4 
Energy 515 65 - - - 4 - - 2 1 3 589 
Financial 34 5 3 - - - 3 - 15 - - 60 
Food 4 3 - - - - - - - 1 - 8 
Government 27 17 - 1- 1 1 4 - 14 1 1 67 
Health 23 11 - - 2 - - - 2 - 1 39 
Industry 12 12 - - - 1 - - - 1 1 27 
Internet 109 14 - - - - 10 - 27 - - 160 
Postal Serv. 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Telecom 170 62 - - - - 1 - 57 5 - 295 
Transport 294 98 - 1 - 3 - 1 5 15 5 422 
Water 58 14 - - - 2 - - - - 2 76 
Total 1248 302 3 2 3 11 18 1 122 24 15 1749 
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to reduce the energy lost in the large electric grid, there exist different power levels and thus different 
voltage levels, from 1200 kV (in Chinese transmission networks) to 110 V (residential voltage-level in 
some countries). A typical structure of power systems is depicted in Figure I:3. Table I:3 shows the 
voltage levels in France. 
In order to ensure the transmission of electricity, elementary components are included in the 
system (Hewitson, Brown and Balakrishnan 2005), some of them are: 
 Lines: Transmission lines and distribution lines either overhead or underground cable type. 
 Buses: are the substations of the power system, internally they are composed of several bus-
bars and/or transformers and serves to connect lines with different or same voltage levels. 
 Transmission towers/pylons: Structures that supports power lines. 
 Transformers: Interconnection and Distribution transformers. Used to raise or decrease the 
voltage or current of the original source. 
 Circuit breakers: Equipment used to switch and control electrical power. Their main pur-
pose is to clear faulty currents. 
 Measurement transformers (CT – VT): They are instrument transformers designed to trans-
form currents or voltages from high value to a value easy to handle for relays and instru-
ments. 
A description of Electric Power Systems can be found in (Hadjsaid and Sabonnadière 2009), 
(Grigsby 2007) and (W.-K. Chen 2005), which may help to better understand the work presented in 
this dissertation. 
Table I:3 Voltage levels in France according to NF C15-11 and NF C13-200 
Voltage Level Nominal AC Voltage Standard Voltages 
HTB3 High Voltage B 3 350 kV < Un ≤ 500 kV 400 kV 
HTB2 High Voltage B 2 130 kV < Un ≤ 350 kV 150, 225 kV 
HTB1 High Voltage B 1 50 kV < Un ≤ 130 kV 63, 90 kV 
HTA2 High Voltage A 2 40 kV < Un ≤ 50 kV 40.5 kV 
HTA1 High Voltage A 1 1 kV < Un ≤ 40 kV 5.5, 6.6, 10, 15 ,20, 33 kV 
BTB Low Voltage B 500 V < Un ≤ 1000 V 690 V 
BTA Low Voltage A 50 V < Un ≤ 500 V 230, 400 V 
TBT Extra-low Voltage Un ≤ 50 V 12, 24, 48 V 
 
 
Figure I:3 Typical structure of Electric Power Systems 
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I.3.2 The Liberalized World and the Distributed Generation (DG) 
Back in 1978, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was presented in the United 
States; this act determined the beginning of the deregulation process (first free-market approach) and 
promoted the research on novel and sustainable technologies, to produce electricity from renewable 
sources such as water, wind or solar power. 
Firstly, the deregulation process pursued to create conditions for free competition between dif-
ferent actors. This model is called the New Paradigm (Hadjsaid and Sabonnadière 2009). In this new 
model it appeared that sharing data among actors for economic reasons as well as for reliability rea-
sons is critical. It can only be guarantee by an available, reliable and secured communication network. 
Secondly, research on environmental-friendly technologies tried to change the paradigm of gen-
eration plants with large-scale equipment, to produce on-site and in small-scale electricity, what was 
called Distributed Generation (DG). Some of the main advantages of DG small-scale equipment are: 
they can be built in a really short time and these generating units are mostly located at the distribution 
level close to the customer or at the customer site (it then should reduce the need to transport electrici-
ty hundreds of kilometers). Among the advantages seen for DGs are: improved grid security due to the 
reduction of terrorist targets, reduced CO2 emissions with widespread use of DG technologies based 
on renewable sources, increased efficiency through the development of cogeneration technologies 
(reuse of energy that would be wasted, e.g. thermal energy) and local management of energy, contri-
bution to security of supply, etc. Figure I:4 shows the new Electrical Power System including DG. 
Nevertheless, DG technologies have social and technical disadvantages. On the one hand, the 
development of new green-technologies is expensive, which deters people from investing without 
appropriate government subsidies. On the other hand, DGs are more difficult to monitor, interconnect, 
and –in some cases– to maintain. Furthermore, they introduce new technical and economic challenges 
to the distribution system grids as they were not originally designed to integrate these local generation 
units at large scales. 
 
Figure I:4 New Electric Power System 
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I.4 ICTs for Power Systems 
Markets liberalization and distributed generation deployment led to profound modifications in 
the structure of the electric power system. That is, from ‘quasi-monopoly’ system to an open access 
offering market conditions to companies. 
Market competition requires transparency and symmetry of information. Therefore, it is manda-
tory to share real-time information and to ensure a controlled, protected and monitored system. For 
this reason, many Information and Communication Technologies were distributed in the electric pow-
er grids; these technologies are able to acquire, store, process system measures and commands 
(PSERC 2012). 
Some of the main applications of ICTs on power grids, control strategies for distribution power 
systems, control assets and critical threats to ICT and power systems are presented in this section. 
I.4.1 Control assets of EPS 
Supply of high quality electricity, in constrained power system, is difficult to achieve without a 
continuous knowledge of the state of the electric power system. For this reason, on-field instrumenta-
tion and communication technologies are used to acquire and send measurements via a telecommuni-
cations infrastructure to a control center. Control centers process the data and find the appropriate 
commands to maintain the electrical parameters within an acceptable range. Some of these assets 
comprise: Remote Terminal Units, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Intelligent Electronic De-
vices (IEDs), Human Machine Interface (HMI), and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
SCADA System (Knapp 2011), (Galloway and Hancke 2012), (Gönen 2008). 
I.4.1.1 Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) 
RTUs are data collectors that provide connectivity (on the slave side) to the SCADA network 
(on the master side), since RTUs acquire field digital and analog parameters and transmit them back to 
a Distributed Control System
vii
 (DCS) or SCADA system in a control center. RTUs are considered as 
the interface of the network buses in the physical layer with the cyber layers (Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 
2012).  
RTUs include remote communications capabilities such as wire modem, cellular data connec-
tion, radio, and/or other wide area communication capabilities. As well, RTUs use industrial network 
protocols, mostly defined by the Standard IEEE 60870-5-104. They are microprocessor powered and 
use a set of analog and digital input/output channels. These channels can be implemented through 
various physical media such as parallel-resonant circuit on power lines carriers, telephone wires, optic 
fibers, radio wave and satellite communications. 
Since RTUs are typically located in substations or in a remote location, they are extremely du-
rable and reliable in order to withstand harsh field conditions. The RTUs power supply is provided by 
a DC/DC converter and includes a battery and charger circuitry to continue operation in an event of 
long power outage. 
 
 
vii
 Distributed Control Systems used to monitor and control distributed equipment. 
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I.4.1.2 Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) 
PLCs automate functions on EPS. They are specialized computers with multiple analogical or 
numerical inputs/outputs. PLCs rely on blocks of logic code allowing them to automatically operate to 
specific signals, e.g. from a relay or a sensor. They are programmed using specialized software (e.g. 
Simatic Step 7, Unity Pro) on personal computers. PLCs include built-in communication ports such as 
series RS-232 or Ethernet, using Modbus, DF1 protocols among others, thus they can be connected to 
a computer running SCADA. They are more intelligent than RTUs and have the ability to issue con-
trols without taking direction from a Master Unit. 
I.4.1.3 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) 
An IED is any device from the RTU family with signal processing as well as control and com-
munication abilities that is equipped with a small microprocessor and is able to receive or send da-
ta/control from/to an external source. IEDs use fieldbus protocols and include functions and features 
such as self-check, diagnostics and historical data store. 
I.4.1.4 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
One of the multiple definitions of SCADA is: “SCADA is the equipment and procedures for 
controlling one or more remote stations from a master control station. It includes the digital control 
equipment, sensing and telemetry equipment, and two-way communications to and from the master 
stations and the remotely controlled stations” (Gönen 2008, 216) 
However, there are disagreements among experts. For instance, it can be found definitions like: 
“A SCADA system is a purely software layer, normally applied a level above control hardware within 
the hierarchy of an industrial network.” In fact, there is still a discussion between control engineers 
about the definition of Industrial Control System (ICS) and SCADA System (Byres 2012).  
The definition of the SCADA retained in this thesis is an information system that allows the 
transfer of remote commands, annunciation and telemetry signals necessary to the monitoring and 
control of the electric power system. 
Master Terminal Units are known as the heart of the SCADA system. MTUs are located at the 
operator’s control center facility. The data from all RTUs in remote sites are sent to the MTU to be 
processed and stored. 
HMIs are the interface between the Operator (Human) and the electric power system (machine). 
They play a vital role for systems’ automation since they allow important tasks such as control, moni-
toring, diagnosis and managing of EPS to be processed. Through HMIs, operators open and close cir-
cuit breakers, visualize current operational parameters on screens (voltages, current, and state of 
switchgears), adjust system values and other functions, etc. Usually, HMIs are connected to one or 
more PLC and RTUs. HMIs show information on text displays, graphical panels, touchscreens or web-
based interfaces. 
I.4.2 Automation of Electric Power Systems 
In the context of automation, Electrical Power Systems are generally divided into five hierar-
chical levels as shown in Figure I:5. Three levels are for Substation Automation Systems: Process 
level, bay level and station level. The other two levels are: the regional control center (RCC) level and 
the national control center level (NCC). 
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Substation Automation Systems operate, protect and monitor the substation using dedicated 
technologies, such as sensors, actuators or relays, and communication links that create interfaces to 
exchange control and protection data. Substations are divided into levels to discriminate its main func-
tions (IEC 61850 2003), (Zima and Bockarjova 2007), these levels are: process level, bay level and 
station level. 
Process level is the lowest level and its devices are sensors and actuators; sensors report the sta-
tus of switchgears, measure the voltage and currents through Voltage Transformers (VT) and Current 
transformers (CT); and actuators are used to perform the control actions, e.g. switchgears or breakers. 
Process level exchanges CT and VT data and control-data with Bay Level. 
Bay level is composed of control and protection units. Usually each unit is implemented in a dif-
ferent panel board. Each cubicle can have a CPU that interprets the data, storing devices for real-time 
computations, filters, AC/DC converters to transform analog measures into digital data, an HMI, a 
power supply module, an interface to exchange inter-bays’ information, an interface to process level, 
and an interface to station level. Bay level exchanges protection-data with external remote protection 
units, and control and protection data with station level.  
Station level consists of a station computer with a database, the operator’s workplace, interfaces 
for remote control, and peripheral devices, e.g. alarm and event printers, a GPS master. Station level 
can exchange information with Regional Control Centers (RCC) and the National Control Center 
(NCC). 
In the RCC level, operators supervise in real time the transmission network status, identify line 
faults, decide actions to recover the functionality of the transmission network and manage congestions 
in the network. Since EPS have many economic and security constraints, RCC exchanges data from 
control and protection devices with the Station level to adjust voltages at buses and current over lines. 
The NCC level is the most important because it is considered as the brain of the system (Wu, 
Moslehi and Bose 2005). The NCC supervises the whole network state, including system frequency, 
grid voltages, powers and currents among others; as well, coordinates actions during large disturb-
ances to restore the network. Both control centers are equipped with Energy Management Systems 
(EMSs). 
EMS is an operators’ decision support tool to monitor, control, coordinate and optimize the per-
formance of the system. EMSs have several supporting software applications, including on-line power 
flow, optimal power flow, voltage profile, state estimation, generation scheduling, load prediction and 
 
Figure I:5 Hierarchical conceptual levels of EPS (Tranchita, Hadjsaid, et al. 2010) 
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security analysis. EMSs have two main classes, one to manage the transmission network, the other 
one, the Automatic Generation Control (AGC), used to adjust the power generated on power plants to 
match the load (Hadjsaid 2008), (Knight 2001). 
EMS is considered as the heart of a control center, since it controls the flow of electricity 
through the system according to economic and security constraints. Economic constraints are defined 
by the Business Management System (BMS) that exchanges scheduled prices and settlements infor-
mation with the EMS to fulfill electricity market rules (Tranchita, Hadjsaid, et al. 2010). 
Figure I:6 presents the electric power system structure, including its control network, their ap-
plications and the typical communication interfaces. 
Control and protection data exchanged among levels include (Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 2012): 
 bus voltage at every substation, 
 bus frequency, 
 active and reactive powers in lines and bus, 
 positions of switchgears at every busbar, 
 position of tap changers, 
 perturbations signals and alarms, 
 regulation and parameters state, 
 load frequency control and automatic voltage regulation set point, 
 remote commands, 
 load shedding remote command, 
 power generation reduction command. 
 … 
These data are transmitted either periodically or by request and must be handled under strict 
 
Figure I:6 Electric power system and Control Network 
18 
rules of confidentiality, acquisition, coordination and usage. Security issues handling this data and 
main vulnerabilities on power systems and ICT are discussed in the next section. 
I.5 ICT and EPS Interdependencies 
I.5.1 ICT Threats on Power Systems 
As shown above, Electric Power Systems operators rely on Information and Communication 
Technologies to monitor and control the network. Nevertheless, there is still a critical question: Is the 
ICT infrastructure improving or endangering the security, the reliability and the resilience of Power 
Systems? Recent events (see Appendix B) revealed several facts. i) Failures in ICT infrastructure can 
actually affect Power Systems. ii) There is a tendency to perform targeted cyber and physical attacks. 
iii) Isolation from the internet is not an effective defense, and all power systems that are controlled by 
software are vulnerable to cyber threats. iv) Terrorists and war fighters recognized that it is more ef-
fective to attack ICT infrastructures directly, than to physically attack their targets (Chen and Saeed 
2011), (Trevorrow, et al. 2006). 
Therefore, in order to study the interdependencies and vulnerabilities of Power Systems, it is 
important to identify the main threats for ICT and how they can affect the Power System. 
In the ICT domain, information security is the process of defending information from unauthor-
ized access, use, and modification. Its main objectives, according to the ANSSI
viii
 are (ANSSI 2010): 
 Ensure the availability of data and information systems, i.e. information is available when it 
is needed; 
 Guarantee the integrity of information systems, i.e. originally sent information must stay 
unaltered; 
 Make sure that the data remains confidential, i.e. only authorized persons have access to the 
information; 
 Create practices to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate users, i.e. Authenticity; 
 Control the changes effectuated on information and trace the person that did the changes, 
i.e. Traceability. 
These objectives can be applied as well for Power Systems. Four cases show the criticality of 
these properties: 
 Availability: The regional control center requests load information to feed the state estima-
tor, but this information is unavailable due to a Trojan that attacked the EMS (Santamarta 
2011). 
 Integrity: An intruder changes the values of currents on power lines (virtually). Operators 
read on HMIs that the main transmission lines are overloaded, thus they decide to start the 
load shedding procedure, affecting the normal network condition (Liu, et al. 2012). 
 Confidentiality: A terrorist group steals sensitive documents from energy companies to plan 
a massive attack (Karpersky Laboratory 2012). 
 
 
viii
 French Network and Information Security Agency (Agence nationale de sécurité des systèmes d’information). 
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 Authenticity: An intruder, using social engineering
ix, obtains operators’ IDs and passwords 
needed for substation HMI remote desktop connection (Liu, et al. 2012). 
These are just some examples; however, many threats can affect the control system and conse-
quently the electrical power system. There are two types of threats: internal and externals. 
For instance, an internal threat can be an employee that for some reasons decides to attack the 
SCADA System, e.g. an employee from the Australian sewage system release million liters of water 
into parks of Australia (Smith 2001). Similarly, a contractor that has a temporary access to the system 
can attack it. These internal threats can be either an intentional attack or an accident (human error). 
External threats may lack of specific origin or source. For instance, when a random malware ar-
rives to the operator computers, e.g. the Nimda worm affected an EMS/SCADA system in 2001 
(CERT 2001). Or it could have a specific source, natural disasters and electric phenomena on power 
lines can damage the control system functioning, e.g. electromagnetic interferences, noise on power 
lines. Finally, the most dangerous are the targeted attacks developed by terrorist, by other nations or 
by hacktivists, these attackers have special knowledge and a clear objective, Stuxnet worm is a well-
known example (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The most common threats for ICT are: autono-
mous worms, terrorists, viruses, Trojan horses, human errors, accidents, noise on power lines, and 
improper application of software patches (Krutz 2006). 
ICT on Power Systems are vulnerable because, at the beginning, off-the-shelves technologies 
that were used in control centers and ICT for power systems lacked of information security as it was 
an insignificant requirement 30 years ago (Masera, Fovino and Vamanu 2011). 
External and internal threats can exploit different unsecured attack points, among them: Blue-
tooth and Wi-Fi connection, connections between SCADA systems and other Local Area Networks 
(LANs), corporate Web servers, email servers, internet gateways, open computer ports, poor config-
ured firewalls, and weak authentication protocols (Sridhar and Govindarasu 2012). Authors in 
(Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 2012) classify these vulnerabilities into four categories:  
i) SCADA system weaknesses: they are mainly protocol weaknesses, e.g. unauthorized com-
mand execution, SCADA denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, and worm attacks. These at-
tacks can have negative consequences on the industrial operation and by cascading on other 
infrastructures. 
ii) Process network weaknesses: they allow the control of the SCADA server to be taken, inter-
rupting communication flows or sending unauthorized commands. 
iii) Control center weaknesses: they include virus infections and attacks with false authentica-
tion on computers, mainly for HMI purposes. 
iv) Network layer weaknesses: they cover routing attack or intentional disconnection of the 
communication network. 
ICTs threats are growing for all infrastructures particularly for the energy sector. According to 
McAfee, 60 million malware programs are written every year. In only one year cyberattacks against 
federal networks have increased about 40% (Motorola 2012). According to the ICS-CERT, 41.4% of 
the cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures where against the Energy Sector, Figure I:7 shows the 
results of the study (ICS-CERT 2012). 
 
 
ix
 Social engineering is the use of cultural ploys and psychological manipulation to get confidential information 
to illegally intrude on computer systems or networks (Abraham and Chergalur-Smith 2010). 
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As such, the Power Systems Engineering Research Center (PSERC) identified new research 
challenges in order to secure the future Electric Power Systems; these challenges cover (PSERC, 
2012): 
 cyber-attack risk modeling and risk mitigation; 
 attack-resilient monitoring, protection and control algorithms; 
 defense against coordinated cyber-attacks; 
 AMI infrastructure security; 
 trust management and attack attributions; 
 simulation models, data sets, testbed evaluations. 
Furthermore, many researchers study the consequences of ICT attacks on Power Systems. 
(Bompard, et al., 2012) discussed the importance to study and to improve (even to develop) defensive 
and protective strategies in the cyber and physical layers in order to reduce the vulnerability levels. 
(Bompard, Gao, et al. 2009) proposed a method to assess the risk of malicious attacks against power 
systems. (Leszczyna, Fovino and Masera 2010) presented an approach to develop security assessment 
of critical infrastructures information systems. (Khelil, Germanus and Suri 2012) discussed new tech-
niques to secure SCADA communications.  
The following documents are strongly recommended, as they provide deeper information:  
 “ICT aspects of power systems and their security” (Masera, Fovino and Vamanu 2011). It is a 
scientific and technical report from the Joint Research Center – European Commission. This re-
port delineates ICT threats and vulnerabilities of power systems, proposes countermeasures and 
presents four cyber-attack scenarios, including PLC corruption, SCADA protocol-based Denial-
of-Service and SCADA protocol-based coordinated attack. This report highlights the need to 
develop solid and rigorous theoretical and practical cyber-security studies. 
 “Cyber-physical Systems Security for Smart Grid” (PSERC 2012). A white paper written by the 
Power Systems Engineering Research Center. This document presents the cyber-security chal-
lenges for future power grids (Smart Grids), discusses the main threats and possible solutions. 
Equally, it emphasizes the need of research efforts to explore new methods and studies to re-
duce the impact from a successful attack. 
 “Cyber vulnerability in power systems operation and control” (Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 2012). 
 
Figure I:7 Incidents by Sector – 198 Total in Fiscal Year 2012 (ICS-CERT 2012) 
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This document, which is in line with previous sections, introduces the problem of cyber vulner-
ability in power systems, exploring the control strategies, information exchanged among control 
centers, the potential cyber-attacks and countermeasures. Finally, it concludes that governmen-
tal policies and industry actions are needed, as well as effective coordination among actors to 
guarantee success of countermeasures. 
 “Vulnerable systems” (Kröger and Zio 2011). This book presents a state-of-the-art in vulnera-
bility studies of complex infrastructures. In addition, it analyses several methods to study the in-
terdependencies within infrastructures, some of these methods are discussed in this document in 
CHAPTER II. 
I.5.2 Power System threats on ICT 
It is uncommon to find publications addressing the power systems threats against ICT, for that 
reason, in this section it will be shown the most common ways to supply electric energy to the ICT 
network, which are the electrical weaknesses of ICTs. 
The substation auxiliary system supplies electric energy to auxiliary equipment, e.g. control 
panel boards, operators’ computers, PLCs, relays, and printers. This system has two main back-up 
systems in a case of an occurrence of a blackout: storage batteries and back-up diesel generators. Nev-
ertheless, these backups are configured to supply only essential devices and their autonomy is just a 
few hours (8-10). In control centers, it is common to find Uninterruptible Power Supply systems 
(UPS) to feed operators’ computer systems and computer peripherals that require AC power. Since 
most of the control devices operate on DC, auxiliary systems have AC/DC converters. Figure I:8 
shows a typical auxiliary system. In order to show the weakness of batteries, diesel plants and UPS, 
Table I:4 shows the world most critical blackouts. It is likely that neither batteries nor diesel plants can 
completely ensure a continuous power supply in these extreme cases. 
 
Figure I:8 Auxiliary systems power supply 
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I.6 Summary 
Power systems have faced several changes over their history while improving their reliability 
and availability. The end of the XX
th
 century was marked by a massive deployment of information and 
communication technologies, including computers, satellites, fiber optics, among others. Recently, 
power systems have experienced two significant changes: energy market liberalization and insertion of 
decentralized/distributed generation. Both changes require a secure, optimal, fast and bi-directional 
communication among players, these players can be at the same time consumers and producers: 
‘Prosumers.’ 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been a very positive improvement 
for power systems because they support not only the supervision and control of power systems, but 
also the operation decisions, policy making and markets regulation. 
However, deployment of ICTs in power systems added a new complexity to study the reliability 
and resilience of power systems. This new complexity is divided into multiple layers, charactering the 
different types of interdependencies within coupled infrastructures. Therefore, it is important to define 
a micro and macro vision of the interdependencies between these infrastructures, having the power 
system at the center of other infrastructures as their power supply. 
Similarly, ICT’s are vulnerable to several threats. Virus, malwares, Denial-of-service attacks are 
some of the attacks that can affect the normal operation of ICT’s and, consequently, power systems. 
Furthermore, power systems blackouts can affect ICT. 
Since Power Systems and Information and Communication Technologies are considered as vital 
for the society, they are included as Critical Infrastructures by the US-Government and the European 
Commission. Consequently, it is of high importance to study their interactions and how to protect 
them from attacks. 
  
Table I:4 Longest blackouts 
Country Date Worst Duration Case Population in-
volved 
New Zealand 20.02.1998 >1 week 70 000 
Brazil 11.03.1999 5 hours 97 000 000 
United States 14.08.2003 > 1 day 55 000 000 
Italy 28.09.2003 18 hours 56 000 000 
Indonesia 18.08.2005 > 5 hours 100 000 000 
Brazil 04.02.2011 >7 hours 53 000 000 
India 30.07.2012 > 6 hours 670 000 000 
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The specific objectives of this dissertation are: 
 To compare the different approaches to model coupled infrastructures and to identify the 
main advantages and disadvantages. 
 To analyze the different properties of Complex Networks in order to identify those that will 
allow us to model the coupled infrastructures. 
 To propose different approaches that enable the study of coupled infrastructures, including 
the different interdependencies layers. 
 To compare and analyze the main advantages and disadvantages of the proposed approach-
es. 
 To explore the feasibility of using the proposed approaches at different levels, according to 
the most recent architectures proposed for Smart Grids. 
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CHAPTER II  
Modeling Critical Infrastructures: State-of-the-art 
The need to be right is the sign of a vulgar mind. 
Albert Camus 
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Abstract 
Critical infrastructures’ modeling needs a multidisciplinary approach in order to study and understand 
their interdependencies and vulnerabilities in a complex interconnected world. This Chapter presents a state-of-
the-art on modeling methods for identifying and understanding the interdependencies among Critical Infrastruc-
tures, including: Complex Networks, Agent-based models, Bayesian Networks, Boolean Logic Driven Markov 
processes and Petri networks. Different approaches are described and a summary of main advantages, disad-
vantages and limitations are then discussed. Finally, this Chapter presents a comparison of these methods, con-
sidering the usability, the ability to handle large complex systems, the scalability, among others. 
II.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER I reveals that power systems and ICT infrastructures are highly interdependent and 
failures in one infrastructure can affect the other infrastructure. In order to tackle this difficult prob-
lem, it is important to develop modeling methods to identify possible common defaults, consequences 
of cascading failures and vulnerabilities of coupled infrastructures. 
Therefore, research efforts were addressed to study the interdependencies of coupled infrastruc-
tures. In the past, computer processing capacity restricted the development of theories and methods to 
analyze complex interdependent critical infrastructures. However, after the boost of computational 
power, computer evolution has significantly supported the development of new theories and method-
ologies. Thus, the set of theories that were formulated at the beginning of the XXth century have rap-
idly progressed. 
Nevertheless, classical methods, such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), fault 
trees, Monte Carlo or lifetime assessment (Benbow and Broome 2009), did not provide the infor-
mation and the tools required to understand complex coupled infrastructure. Therefore, many non-
classical methods have arisen to explain and to help the understanding of coupled infrastructures, in-
cluding: Agents-based modeling and simulation, Bayesian Networks, Boolean Logic Driven Markov 
Processes, Complex Networks, Combined Simulation, Petri Networks, Supply/Demand graphs and 
others. 
This Chapter presents some approaches based on the non-classical methods, followed by a dis-
cussion about the main advantages, disadvantages and limitations of each method. At the end of the 
Chapter, these methods are compared taking into account the CPU consumption, the usability, the 
ability to model large and complex systems, the scalability, the ability to perform dynamic simulations 
and the availability of robust tools to compute them. 
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II.2 Complex Networks 
A Network can be defined as a set of items with connections between them. A Graph is the net-
work mathematical representation. Networks are present in almost every aspect of life, e.g. traveling, 
calling by cell-phone, finding a job, chatting, etc. For this reason, mathematicians and experts in many 
domains have tried to find the best way to model real systems, considering the relations and depend-
encies between their components. The theory that was born from this research has been called “Graph 
Theory.” Nowadays, the application of Graph theory to study large and complex systems is called 
Complex Networks theory. This theory studies the systems’ topology and how this topology influ-
ences the vulnerabilities of every infrastructure. 
This section reviews four approaches of Complex Networks to study coupled infrastructures in-
terdependencies. 
II.2.1 Initiating event and cascade-safe operating margins 
A first application models the relations among infrastructures and the consequences of failure 
propagation (Zio and Sansavini 2011). A result of this approach was the origin of the term “Initiating 
Event,” that is the event that initiates cascade failures. This approach models cascading failures in 
order to represent the interdependencies among two similar infrastructures (as shown in Figure II:1). 
The cascading phenomenon was modeled as a load transfer between components over the inter-
dependency links upon a component failure. These links were randomly distributed among the net-
works using a Monte Carlo simulation. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it identifies cascade-safe regions, considering bi-
directional links with respect to the flow of information between the coupled infrastructures. Neverthe-
less, only two infrastructures can be modeled using this method. 
Additionally, this approach is far from real systems behavior, which is one of its limitations. For 
instance, the cascade process is supposed to model the transfer of load in the system; however, it does 
not discriminate the type of connection or interdependency between coupled infrastructures. Another 
limitation is that this study is not dynamical. Thus, this approach only evaluates the different states in 
the cascade process, as in a discrete time simulation. 
II.2.2 Global vulnerability of interdependent infrastructures 
 A Global analysis of coupled infrastructures was developed using Complex Networks. More 
 
Figure II:1 Tested topological system (Zio and Sansavini 2011) 
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specifically, this model uses the clustering coefficient, the node degree and the betweenness centrality 
indices to identify the most vulnerable nodes in the coupled system (Wang, Hong and Chen 2012). 
The results were validated using the Efficiency index. This approach was created to study the interde-
pendencies between the power grid and the water system of a major city in China (see Figure II:2). 
Despite this approach computes the common indices of complex networks, the mathematical 
representation of the interdependencies is not clear and is limited to two infrastructures. In addition, 
this approach lacks of dynamical simulations to validate the cascading. 
The main originality of this approach is that it creates some indices to identify critical infra-
structures in a coupled system, based on the input/output relationships, i.e. the nodes in one infrastruc-
ture that depends upon another infrastructure. 
II.2.3 Interdependent technical infrastructures modeling 
This approach aimed at capturing the functional and geographical interdependencies among 
several infrastructures e.g. electrical system, auxiliary power system, and railway systems, among 
others (Johansson and Hassel 2010), (Johansson 2010). The functional interdependencies were classi-
fied into: physical, cyber and logical (see Section I.2.2). In this approach, each infrastructure was rep-
 
Figure II:2 Power Grid and Water Network in China (Wang, Hong and Chen 2012) 
 
Figure II:3 Infrastructures Interdependencies (Johansson and Hassel 2010) 
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resented in terms of a network model and a functional model, the former to characterize their interde-
pendencies and the latter to simulate their behavior. Each infrastructure was modeled in a different 
dimension and their interdependencies connected the different dimensions (see Figure II:3).  
Its originality consists in incorporating more than two heterogeneous infrastructures in a single 
model. Additionally, this approach computes the consequences for each infrastructure after removing 
random nodes in every infrastructure. 
II.2.4 Rule-based complex networks 
Rule-based complex networks were developed to study coupled infrastructures (B. Rozel 2009) 
The Complex Network was divided into two dimensions, one for the electric infrastructure, the other 
for the ICT infrastructure (see Figure II:4). The electric system graph and the ICT graph were linked 
by interdependency rules. In addition, every node contained its own properties, including: a state vari-
able (true if the node is working, false if there is a failure), geographical positioning reference, its load 
and its maximum allowed load. The methodology took into account the topological condition of each 
system and its physical functioning (simulations in Python and Matlab). Overloaded transmission lines 
and communication links were identified and eliminated in order to evaluate the gravity of failures. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it can be extended to model n-infrastructures; how-
ever, the limitation is that for large complex systems it may be difficult to assign the rules for every 
link in the coupled system. 
II.2.5 Advantages – Disadvantages 
Complex Networks are able to capture the topological features of complex systems. These fea-
tures can be used to identify the weaknesses of coupled infrastructures. As well, most of the algo-
rithms to study complex networks are based on the shortest-paths. Finding shortest paths between two 
nodes is a very common task, therefore, there exists several methods to reduce the algorithm complex-
ity, fasten the computation time and reduce the memory consumption (Cohen and Havlin 2010). 
Moreover, complex networks are easy to design thanks to the graph representation. However, 
they are unable to model/simulate complicated behaviors of infrastructures and sometimes results are 
too abstract to be understood. 
Although complex networks are used in many different sciences for many applications, there is 
no dedicated software to model complex networks. However, there exists many toolboxes for several 
programming languages (Python - NetworkX, Matlab – MatlabBGL, R – igraph, C++ - SNAP), that 
contain efficient algorithms to compute the basic properties of complex networks. In addition, the 
open-source software Gephi proposes a visualization platform to explore basic networks. 
 
Figure II:4 Interdependencies Complex Network (B. Rozel 2009) 
 
30 
According to the literature, there are no methods to study the dynamic aspects of coupled infra-
structures. Nevertheless, there exist many algorithms to study dynamic systems in many other scienc-
es. For instance, SIR
10
 and SIS
11
 models to study the progress of an epidemic in a population (Barrat, 
Barthélemy and Vespignani 2012) or the information spreading in human communications (Wang, et 
al. 2011), (Cohen and Havlin 2010). 
The main advantage of Complex Networks is that they were conceived specifically to model 
large complex systems. Therefore, it is a powerful tool able to model networks of millions of nodes 
with complex interactions. 
Due to the nature of graphs, this method is suitable for modeling scalable systems. For this rea-
son, it is used in vulnerability studies to evaluate the impact of removing nodes and links in the net-
work. 
The lack of functional features is one of the main limitations of Complex Networks. That is the 
reason why many researchers have integrated this method with other more realistic (Hines, Cotilla-
Sanchez and Blumsack 2010). 
Despite many studies have shown the effectiveness of complex networks to study infrastruc-
tures vulnerabilities, up to now, this method has not been completely exploited for multiple infrastruc-
tures analysis. 
II.3 Agent-Based Model (ABM) 
Agent-Based Model (AMB) is a modular technique that allows the behavior of a complex sys-
tem agents to be modeled. Nowadays this technique is commonly used in biology and social sciences 
(Bonabeau 2002). An agent is an autonomous system located in a large-scale system with complex 
behavior patterns. This technique is considered as easy-to-use and aims at replicating the behavior of 
real-world systems. One of its main characteristics is that it is bottom-up oriented, i.e. the model start 
from the smallest components. 
In the ABM, each agent incorporates its own model. Thus, each agent individually assesses its 
situation and makes locally its own decisions on the basis of a set of rules previously defined; addi-
tionally agents are able to communicate between them. Therefore, ABM provides information about 
the dynamics of interacting rule-based agents. Moreover, ABM is useful when an individual behavior 
is governed by nonlinearities and can be described by thresholds (if-then rules). Similarly, ABM ob-
serves aggregated activities for a population of agents. Some of the most common software tools to 
model Agent-Based Systems are: Comm-Aspen, EMCAS (Electricity Market Complex Adaptive Sys-
tem), JADE (Java Agent Development Environment), JACK (Java Applet Correctness Kit), LAMPS 
(Language for Agent-based Simulation of Processes and Scenarios). 
Our research has led us to three different approaches. The first one is a hybrid modeling ap-
proach that integrates different methods with ABM to study the dynamics of coupled infrastructures. 
The second one integrates the ABM with Input-Output Interoperability models to illustrate the dynam-
ics of resources in multiple infrastructures. The last one integrates ABM with Federated simulations.  
 
 
10
 SIR : Susceptible, Infectious and Removed. It is a dynamic model for infectious diseases. 
11
 SIS: Susceptible, Infectious and Susceptible. 
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II.3.1 Object-Oriented Hybrid Modeling Approach 
Object-oriented hybrid modeling approach has combined agent-based modeling techniques with 
classical methods. For instance, (Schläpfer, Kessler and Kröger 2008) combined the ABM techniques 
with Monte Carlo Simulation. This approach integrated the highly non-linear and time-dependent ef-
fects, and non-technical factors to develop a probabilistic reliability assessment that allowed the im-
pact of load increase, and the non-supplied energy due to the operator response time to react to emer-
gency events to be quantified. Each agent was modeled by its attributes and rules of behavior. Some of 
these agents included: loads, generators, transmission line objects and grid operator.  
Another approach integrated network analyses (graph theory) for screening analysis
12
. In addi-
tion, object-oriented methods detailed the operational dynamics modeling (Eusgeld, et al. 2009). Net-
work analyses were used to identify hidden and obvious interdependencies. For this purpose, this ap-
proach used traditional indices as: path length, clustering coefficient, shortest paths, local and remote 
reliability efficiency. 
Finally, a methodology that applies the Object-oriented hybrid modeling approach to study vul-
nerabilities between SCADA system and the Systems under controls was proposed in (Nan, Eusgeld 
and Kröger 2013). This methodology is composed of five major steps in order to investigate and ana-
lyze comprehensively the vulnerabilities due to interdependencies between two infrastructures. The 
steps are: i) preparatory phase: describe the systems, study the different methods, and approach mod-
els; ii) Screening analysis: identify vulnerabilities from topological analysis and empirical investiga-
tions using networks; iii) In-depth analysis: modeling SCADA and human operator errors with high-
level architecture (HLA
13
) models, and in-depth experiments: substation, small network and whole 
network worse case levels are experimented. The main results for this step are the impact degree and 
the average service availability indices; iv) results assessment: interpretation of indices; v) Potential 
 
 
12
 Screening Analysis: It means to screen the whole system searching for vulnerable, critical or important com-
ponents to the system’s security. 
13
 HLA: High level architecture from the IEEE Standard 1516. 
 
Figure II:5 Overall SCADA model (Nan, Eusgeld and Kröger 2013) 
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technical improvements: propose several strategies to prevent the propagation of cascading failures 
due to interdependencies. Figure II:5 presents an overview of the SCADA model structure. 
The main advantage of hybrid modeling is that this approach exploits the potential of AMBs 
and integrates its results with other powerful methods, enabling many other analyses to be done, in-
cluding dynamical aspects. As well, many other infrastructures can be modeled, therefore it is not 
limited for power systems or ICT networks, but it can also model the human behavior. 
However, ABMs have complex computational workloads, which are a well-known disad-
vantage of this approach that in this case also integrates other methods, particularly simulations. Thus, 
this is a major disadvantage to model large complex systems. Additionally, the model resulting from 
these approaches is only useful for the purposed for which it was built, therefore, this approach lacks 
of flexibility. 
It is important to note that this approach highlights the need to study the topology of complex 
systems as a first step to identify critical vulnerabilities. 
II.3.2 Agent-based input-output interdependency model 
Agent-based input-output interdependency model is an integration of Input-Output Interopera-
bility models (IIM)
14
 (Haimes and Jiang 2001) and ABMs (Oliva, Panzieri and Setola 2010). This 
approach is composed of two formulations:  
i) The first formulation is a static agent-based IIM where each element interacts with other el-
ements via the production, exchange and consumption of resources without directly ex-
changing inoperability. The result of this method is an AB-IIM dependency index that repre-
sents the cumulative effect of the resources received by each element on its operativeness. 
ii) The second formulation is a dynamic agent-based IIM that engages the production, con-
sumption and transmission/transportation of different resources. 
This approach considers the production, consumption and transmission of resources (goods or 
services), therefore it can be used for a large number of infrastructures, including power systems, 
communication networks, oil distribution, among others. 
Its main advantage is that this approach quantifies the impact of infrastructures unavailability in 
the operativeness of the other infrastructures. However, this method is difficult to apply because it 
requires a large amount of data that sometimes can be confidential. That is the reason why this 
approach relies on experts or stakeholdes experience. Additionally, this approach does not evaluate the 
dynamical behavior of infrastructures. 
II.3.3 Federated Agent-Based model 
Federated Agent-Based model (FedABMS) is an integration of Agents-based modeling and 
Federated simulation (Casalicchio, Galli and Tucci 2007). The latter is a simulation technique that 
distributes the execution of the simulation model over a set of nodes. 
ABM simulations give a high level infrastructures description, and the Federated simulations 
detail the infrastructures models. This environment allows the faults and congestions in the communi-
 
 
14
 Input-output inoperability model (IIM) is a mechanism that aims at analyzing the cascading effects in critical 
infrastructures (Setola, de Porcellinis and Sforna 2009). 
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cation network to be simulated. The main indices obtained from the simulation were: time needed to 
resolve the crisis, time to rescue a wounded agent, number of rescued wounded agents, number of 
dead wounded agents, among others. 
Further approaches included macro and micro agent-based modeling and simulation 
(Casalicchio, Galli and Tucci 2010). 
 The macro agent-based modeling and simulation: represents each system as a single agent 
that offers and consumes services. Each system was simulated in a specific sector simulator. 
Each simulator shared the status and the services that it was providing or it needed. This ar-
chitecture was implemented using FedABMS.   
 The micro agent-based modeling and simulation: considers every single component or asset 
in each infrastructure to simulate the behavior of the whole system. In this simulation, every 
component was an agent. 
These simulations were used to study transportation systems. But it enables as well the study of 
catastrophic scenarios in power systems and communication networks. 
The main disadvantage of this approach is that more than a modeling approach, it is a simula-
tion tool that uses Agent-based modeling. Therefore, many parameters are needed to each infrastruc-
ture and parallel simulations are needed to cope with the study of multiple coupled infrastructures. 
However, these simulation approaches describe the dynamic of coupled infrastructures and are 
able to handle more than 3 infrastructures at the same time. 
II.3.4 Advantages - Disadvantages 
Agent-based models have been extensively used to model coupled infrastructures, as shown in 
this section. Particularly, this model has been used to complement other methods, such as Federated 
models, Monte Carlo simulations or functional simulations. 
The main disadvantage of ABM is that requires parallel processing in order to model large and 
complex systems and to reduce the computational time needed to study these systems. However, this 
method has many advantages that highlight its usefulness. 
ABM is able to model many different heterogeneous infrastructures and can include different 
factors such as natural hazards, institutional weaknesses, human behavior, physical laws, or security 
related issues. As well, it can include reliability aspects for Electric Power Systems and ICTs.  
Because ABM has been widely used, there exist many robust platforms in multiples program-
ming languages to visualize and analyze ABMs. Moreover, AMBs include time-dependent nonlinear 
phenomena into the simulation. As a result of this, ABMs demonstrates a close adherence to the reality 
of the coupled processes involved in simulations 
The bottom-up oriented modeling allows large complex systems to be modeled, including many 
parameters from the smallest component to the whole system behavior. However, sometimes it could 
be difficult to model large complex systems, because the model may require a large number of param-
eters to improve the models accuracy. 
The presented approaches reveal that ABM needs to be complemented with other methods in 
order to consider the whole behavior of coupled infrastructures. One of these proposed methods was 
the ‘Complex Network theory’, which can improve the screening analysis to identify weaknesses in 
coupled heterogeneous infrastructures. 
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II.4 Bayesian Networks (BN) 
A Bayesian Network is a compact graphical representation that supports systems modeling, in-
cluding random events, and it is based on the Bayes theorem (allows calculating the a posteriori prob-
ability as a function of a priori probabilities) (Birolini 2007). 
Bayesian Network’s nodes represent the propositional variables, and links represent the causal 
dependencies among the nodes, these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities (Pearl 
and Russell 2003). 
Two main methods were identified in the literature, the first one evaluates the cause-effect in-
terdependencies and the second one models the dynamics in coupled infrastructures. 
II.4.1 Cause-Effect interdependencies 
The structure of Bayesian Networks was used to illustrate the cause-effect interactions between 
ICT infrastructure and Power Systems (Tranchita, Hadjsaid, et al. 2010). This method mimicked cau-
sality and inference presented in both infrastructures in order to assess the power system risk as a re-
sult of cyber terrorism. The model was divided into four main phases (Tranchita 2008): 
 Identify the ICT attacking motivation: Determine whether the attack is due to a political or 
religious situation, or to a terrorist activity. The motivation was divided into High, Medium 
and Low level. 
 Identify vulnerable resources: It is important to detect the type of perpetrator, which could 
be either: an insider employee, an insider service provider, an outsider former-insider, an 
outsider professional hacker, or an outsider cybercriminal. The information availability was 
divided into: enough, regular or low, this variable is important since a terrorist with enough 
information to attack is more dangerous for critical infrastructures. 
 Quantify assets’ vulnerability: It was evaluated according to the geographical situation and 
to the physical protection of assets. This phase studied software, hardware and configuration 
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities were divided into: Highly, averagely and lowly vulnera-
ble. This phase was supported by a power flow analysis to study the system response to N-1 
contingencies. 
 Determine the consequences for the power system operation: The Power system damage 
was evaluated and classified in different levels of severity: low, medium, high and cata-
strophic. The possible functions executed to attack the infrastructures were evaluated, in-
cluding: protection, control, monitoring, measurements and management. 
This approach can be used to study power transmission and distribution systems with different 
attack scenario without considering the dynamic aspects. It can be used to quantify the consequences 
of targeted attacks to certain assets and to classify these consequences in different gravity levels. 
Even if the application of this approach is easy, taking into account the diversity of tools availa-
ble, this method relies on information that is not always available and most of the times have to be 
obtained from experts and operators experience and knowledge. 
On the other hand, usually, the computing time needed to compute this method is very short 
even if it is dealing with multiple infrastructures. Additionally, this approach can consider the impact 
of many different heterogeneous infrastructures in the risk analysis of power systems; however, it de-
pends on probabilistic information that is not always reliable and the results will be focused in only 
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one infrastructure. 
II.4.2 Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
The Dynamic Bayesian Network formalism was used to model critical infrastructures (Di 
Giorgio and Liberati 2012). The analysis was divided into three levels: atomic event level, propagation 
level and services level. Atomic level is related to the association of random variables to possible ad-
verse events. Propagation level models the interdependencies among and within infrastructures, some 
of the subsystems involved are: electric transmission network, SCADA feeder, and SCADA system. 
Services level involves the operators and control centers. A graphical representation of the Dynamic 
Bayesian Network is presented in Figure II:6. 
The proposed methodology was divided into the following steps: 
 Identification of relevant services. 
 Identification of main devices and functions needed to deliver the services to the end-used.  
 Identification of common devices among different services. 
 Localization of devices in the grid topology to study the geographical interdependencies. 
 Identification of random variables of possible events in the atomic level and evaluation of 
possible effects on propagation level. 
 Study of temporal interdependencies in the Dynamic Bayesian Network. 
Three different analyses can be performed based on this approach: reliability study, adverse 
event spreading and forecasting. Nevertheless, the main advantage of this method is that it is able to 
model different failures modes and allows the impact of those failures to be quantified, taking into 
account dynamic simulations. Additionally, this approach can be scalable to larger infrastructures. 
However, the dynamic simulations are not continuous, but static model assessments in discrete time 
steps. 
Another disadvantage of this approach is that it relies on data from literature, historical events 
or domain-experts opinion. Therefore, the accuracy of results depends on the parameters that it use, 
which may not be very reliable. In fact, in order to improve the accuracy, this approach needs a large 
number of parameters, but these parameters can increase the computational complexity. 
 
Figure II:6 Overall Dynamic Bayesian Network (Di Giorgio and Liberati 2012) 
36 
II.4.3 Advantages - Disadvantages 
Based on the studied approaches, it can be seen that Bayesian Networks are used mostly to 
quantify the consequences and the impact of failures in coupled heterogeneous infrastructures. How-
ever, one limitation is the increased computation complexity when n-infrastructures are added in the 
model and many other parameters are taken into account. But at the same time, BN can be used for 
scalable and dynamic systems. 
BN are easy-to-use and there exists many user-friendly platforms to model Bayes Networks, 
from toolboxes (BayesNET for Matlab, blearn for R, SMILE for C++) to dedicated software (Hugin, 
Netica or Elvira). Nevertheless, BN requires input data that most of the times is difficult to obtain due 
to either very restraint policies of confidentiality or lack of historical data. In such cases, only the data 
from experts opinions can be used, which affects the accuracy of results. 
II.5 Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes 
Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP) is a formalism that integrates the main ad-
vantages of fault-trees and markov models (Bouissou and Bon 2003). It, thus, allows dynamic com-
plex systems to be modeled. Its objective is to solve the problem of combinatorial explosion in the 
classic methods for complex systems modeling. Therefore, this method adds a new kind of links that 
include sequences and dependencies modeling by activating sub-fault trees. In addition, the fault-tree’s 
leaves are modeled as markov processes. Figure II:7 shows a representation of BDMP for a system 
with cascading standby redundancies. 
BDMP enables different attack scenarios to be modeled, e.g. an attack to take the ownership of 
a Remote Access Server connected to a dial-in modem (Piètre-Cambacédès and Bouissou 2010). The 
detail level of the model can be chosen. In addition, due to the dynamic property of markov models, 
many indices can be assessed. For instance, “mean time to attack step realization,” “mean time to 
breach,” “mean effort to security failure,” “unavailability rate,” and “unavailability/year,” among oth-
ers. 
 
Figure II:7 BDMP Representation (Bouisson n.d.) 
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This approach allows three fundamentals aspects to be simulated: i) power systems safety; ii) 
systems security facing attack scenarios; and iii) interactions between safety and security, thus many 
accidental and intentional attacks can be modeled (Piètre-Cambacédès 2010). 
The main advantage of this approach is that it is able to model targeted attacks on power sys-
tems taking into account dynamic aspects. For instance, BDMP was used to model the Stuxnet Attack 
(Kriaa, Bouissou and Piètre-Cambacédès 2012). This approach was implemented by EDF and the 
resulting platform is called KB3, which is a robust platform that can deal with a large number of 
parameters. Aditionally, it is largely used for industrial usage. 
However, it is not able to model the loss of elements during the simulation and presents difficul-
ties to model cyclic behaviors. In addition, there exists only one platform able to simulate the BDMP, 
therefore there is a lack of availability of tools to develop this approach. 
II.6 Combined Simulators 
Several simulation tools for power systems, communication networks, and circuits can be found 
in the market, including PSCAD, DigSILENT, PSAT, Eurostag, OMNET++ and NS3. Nevertheless, 
due to infrastructure interdependencies there is a need of more realistic simulation platforms. As a 
result, new platforms integrate power system’s behavior, control center commands, communication 
networks, information technologies and likely cyber-physical critical events. This is possible after 
integrating dedicated software tools that simulate in parallel different infrastructures. Some of these 
combined simulators are summarized in this section. Only their main properties and advantages will 
be discussed in this section, because these simulators are not open-access and in these conditions it is 
difficult to provide a deep comparison. 
II.6.1 Cosimulator for Transport and Distribution systems 
A combined simulator was proposed by (Rozel, et al. 2008) and developed by Grenoble Insti-
tute of Technology/G2ELAB - France. The combined simulator is composed of three dedicated soft-
ware tools and it is used to dynamically demonstrate the effect of failures among infrastructures, tak-
ing into account their interdependencies and interplays. Each software tool simulates the behavior of 
each infrastructure (electrical, telecommunication and information). 
Figure II:8 shows the architecture of the co-simulator for transport systems. It is composed of 
three main parts: the electrical infrastructure simulator, telecommunication infrastructure simulator 
and control center simulator (Merdassi, et al. 2012). 
 
Figure II:8 Combined Simulator (Rozel, et al. 2008) 
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The Electrical infrastructure is simulated using PSAT, which is a Matlab Toolbox for electrical 
networks analysis. The software tool simulates the power systems’ dynamic behavior, including power 
flow, optimal power flow, power compensation, dynamic stability and automatic under-frequency load 
shedding, among others. 
Telecommunication infrastructure is simulated using Simpy/Python. It sends measures data 
from the RTUs in substations and power plants to the control centers. In addition, it ensures the con-
trol data delivery from control center to RTUs and actuators. This model includes routers, links, 
bandwidths, routing tables, latency characteristics, and error rates. 
The Control Center is simulated using the numerical framework of Matlab. This control center 
provides commands according to the state of the system and likely failure events. In addition, it re-
ceives voltage alarms from the measurement system and sends commands to RTUs and other actua-
tors. 
This simulator is able to simulate the impact of failures on power systems and telecommunica-
tion infrastructures. For instance, (B. Rozel 2009) used this co-simulator to develop three scenarios: i) 
normal state system; ii) N-1 contingency case in the electrical infrastructure; iii) an N-1 electric con-
tingency caused by a telecommunication failure. 
During the SINARI Project, the Cosimulator for Distribution Systems was developed, the re-
sulting architecture is detailed in Figure II:9, this simulator integrates Matlab (for the power system), 
NS2 (for the communications network) and the control center is modeled in Java (Caire, Sanchez and 
Hadjsaid 2013). This co-simulator is able to perform the simulation of remote commands, load-
shedding commands from the control center and studies of short-circuit event (including localization, 
islanding and restoration) (Caire, Sanchez and Hadjsaid 2013). 
The main advantage of these cosimulators is that they were developed using general purpose 
programming languages in standard software. Therefore, users are capable of modifying easily the 
simulation and components parameters. 
II.6.2 Real-time Cosimulator 
This cosimulator models the real-time interactions of ICT systems with power grid and the 
transmission operator (Stefanov and Liu 2012). In addition, this simulator considers cyber-attacks at 
 
Figure II:9 Cosimulator Architecture 
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the cyber layer and quantifies the impact on the power system layer. The simulator integrates dedicat-
ed software, according to the infrastructure, including: DIgSILENT Power Factory, Matlab Simulink 
(SimEvents toolbox) and Matrikon OPC Server. 
Their modeling is divided into three steps (see Figure II:10): 
 Power grid simulation using DIgSILENT. 
 ICT system simulation for the SCADA system: It combines Matlab/Simulink with OPC and 
SimEvents toolboxes to model the SCADA system, including IEDs, RTUS, HMIs, and oth-
er control assets using the queuing theory. The power layer is simulated as a continuous 
time system and the cyber layer as a discrete time system. The transmission operator is im-
plemented with industrial software. 
 Enable the communication among layers: the exchange of information among layers is sim-
ulated using Matrikon OPC Server. 
Different attack scenarios were simulated using this co-simulator (Liu, et al. 2012). The first 
case simulated an attack by an intruder that opens a circuit breaker in two substations. The second case 
simulated the intrusion and data integrity attack. 
The main advantage of this simulator is that it takes into account a large number of parameters 
and integrates industrial software for its real-time simulations. In addition, substation and power 
transmission systems can be modeled with its corresponding ICT networks. 
II.6.3 Federate-based Simulator 
A hybrid simulator for power systems and ICT is a modular cosimulator that reflects the real-
time performance of power systems taking into account the different operation power system levels 
(bay, station and RCC) (Müller, et al. 2012). 
The Bay Level is simulated using DIgSILENT Power Factory and the OPC server using 
Matrikon OPC Server; the Substation level and control center are simulated High Level Architecture 
(HLA) federates on JAVA and their models are based on IEC 61850. The entire communication net-
work is simulated with OPNET and based on IEC 61850. 
 
Figure II:10 Cyber-physical power system architecture (Stefanov and Liu 2012) 
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The originality of this cosimulator is that it performs the simulation at different levels, accord-
ing to the IEC 61850, i.e. simulation at bay level, substation level. This discrimination of levels allows 
the smart-grids applications to be analyzed and studied through real-time simulations. 
An advantage of using HLA Federates is that this simulator can be easily adaptable to other 
models (software), for instance, to model the behavior of electric cars. 
II.6.4 Agent-based simulation tool: EPOCHS 
The Electric POwer and Communication syncHronizing Simulator integrates three simulators: 
PSCAD/EMTDC an electromagnetic simulator, PSLF and electromechanical transient simulator, and 
NS2 a communication simulator (Hopkinson, et al. 2006). However, their goal is not to develop real-
time simulations, but to build a simulator that predicts the likely behavior of power grids. 
This agent-based simulator contains five main components (see Figure II:12): a 
PSCAD/EMTDC to simulate power scenarios in continuous time with a graphical interface. A PSLF 
or Positive Sequence Load Flow software is used to simulate large electromechanical systems. NS2 
used to simulate communication protocols under stress conditions. AgentHQ is a unified environment 
 
Figure II:11 Hybrid simulator components (Müller, et al. 2012) 
 
Figure II:12 EPOCHS components (Hopkinson, et al. 2006) 
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to help components interaction. An RTI is used to control the simulation synchronization and the rout-
ing of communication between EPOCHS components. 
This simulator allows different scenarios to be tested in the power system and the communica-
tion system. In the case of power system, the tripping lines, transient instability, back-up protection, 
remote load shedding are tested. On the other hand, for the communication network the network traffic 
and the delay in routers can be simulated. 
Nevertheless, this simulator does not run real-time simulations and it could have several errors 
because NS2 is a discrete event simulator, and PSCAD is a continuous time simulator, so its accuracy 
may be affected by the selection of the time steps and the synchronization. 
II.6.5 Advantages - Disadvantages 
Cosimulator is the most accurate method to model the dynamic events on coupled infrastruc-
tures in real-time. However, it has several limitations due to interoperability challenges among dedi-
cated software. For that reason, several co-simulators are Agents-based, in order to manage the in-
teroperability and the events synchronization. 
Cosimulators can be used as a validation mean of new vulnerability methods of coupled infra-
structures, such as Agent-Based modeling, Bayesian Networks or Complex Networks modeling. 
Most of the presented approaches use off-the-shelf software that is not always available or are 
very uncommon. For that reason, several research laboratories are developing their own cosimulators 
according to their own objectives. 
Scalability, accessibility to tools and usability are closely linked to the dedicated software for 
each approach. 
II.7 Petri Networks (PN) 
Petri Network (PN) is a tool developed by Carl Adam Petri in 1962 (Petri 1962). PNs were de-
veloped to study concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel, non-deterministic, and/or stochastic 
systems (Murata 1989). PNs are widely used to model production plants, power systems (Ramos, et al. 
2010) and computer networks (Intech 2010). A PN is a bipartite graph that comprises nodes and arcs. 
Nodes are divided into places and transitions, whereas the first represents the states, the latter simu-
lates the events that allow moving from one state to another. Arcs connect places with transitions and 
vice-versa. Tokens show graphically the availability of places, they are represented by dots inside the 
places. Firing a transition consists in moving the token from one place to another. There exist several 
tools to model PNs, such as PetriNet Tool box for Matlab, CPN Tools, Artifex, among others. 
This section presents four different approaches developed to model coupled infrastructures 
based on Petri Networks. 
 
Figure II:13 Petri Net Representation 
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II.7.1 Attack/Defense modeling 
Cyber-net model integrates the attack/defense systems of cyber and power system in order to 
study the impact of a cyber-attack (directed or intelligent
15
) on SCADA systems (Ten, Liu and 
Manimaran 2008). This approach modeled the access points to SCADA Systems and the intrusions on 
SCADA systems. 
Three indices were assessed: scenario vulnerability whether the substation has or has not a load 
and generation; access point vulnerability composed of a firewall model and a password model; and 
the impact factor evaluation based on the loss of load assessment. The cyber-net based on substation 
with load and generation is presented in Figure II:14. 
The major originality of this approach is the inclusion of cyberattacks probabilities. These prob-
abilities depend on the communications network architecture in substations. In addition, it can quanti-
fy the impact of these attacks. Some of the main indices used to quantify the attacks are: loss of load 
(LOL), loss of information, economic loss and equipment damage. 
However, this approach has many disadvantages. First, computation times can easily increase 
when incorporating several substations (n-infrastructures). Consequently, this approach is not able to 
handle a large amount of data. Secondly, it studies the impact of communication networks failures on 
power systems, and not the impact of power systems failures on ICT networks. Third, this approach is 
dependent on the scenario and events evaluated. Thus, for every different scenario a whole new model 
has to be built. 
Additionally, in order to evaluate correctly the cyberattacks, it needs complete statistical data 
that does not exist yet. Finally, this approach does not include dynamic aspects. 
  
 
 
15
 Directed Attacks are attacks with short term effects; intelligent attacks are well-planned and can trigger cas-
cading effects. 
 
Figure II:14 Cyber-net of Substation (Ten, Liu and Manimaran 2008) 
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II.7.2  “High-level” and “Low-level” Petri Nets 
This approach proposed a construction method to study cyber-physical attacks on Smart Grids. 
It divides the petri net modeling in two levels: “Low level” and “High level” Petri Nets (Chen, 
Sanchez Aarnoutse and Buford 2011). The “low level” corresponds to detailed single models for spe-
cific types of attacks, e.g. physical attacks on smart meters or cyber-attacks on substations. The “high 
level” is a high level abstraction of the system. 
The first step to construct the Petri Net is to create a “low level” Petri Net for each type of at-
tack; in this step the experts’ opinion in the domain is needed. The second step consists in building the 
“High level” Petri Net, but only the places, ignoring the transitions. These transitions are defined in 
the third step. The identical places are matched between the “low level” and the “high level.” Finally, 
the fifth step uses the results from the forth step to expand the “high-level” petri net. Figure II:15 illus-
trates some of the main steps for a Substation case. 
The main originality is to create special transitions, i.e. a cyber-transition, physical transition 
and cyber/physical transition. In addition, due to the separation of levels, this model could handle large 
and complex systems. However, the model relies on data supplied by experts, which may have an im-
portant impact on the results. 
Unfortunately, this methodology has not been applied yet. Therefore, there are no proofs that 
indicate that this approach is indeed fast, reliable or accurate. 
II.7.3 SWN and SAN integration 
This model divides the functioning of power systems and information infrastructures into two 
models, one dedicated to the structure of the power system and the other one concentrates on the be-
havior of the control system (Beccuti, et al. 2012). 
Stochastic Well-formed net (SWN) is a high level Stochastic Petri Net formalism (Chiola, et al. 
1993). The tokens may have colors and the transitions could be triggered either immediately or after a 
delay. It was used to model several types of attacks, e.g. Denial-of-Service attack. 
Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) is another high level Petri Net formalism (Sanders and 
Meyer 2001). It is formed by places, activities, input gates and output gates. It was used to model the 
impact of attacks on Power Systems, e.g. the account of an electrical component loss. 
 
Figure II:15  “Hierarchical” Petri Nets (Chen, Sanchez Aarnoutse and Buford 2011) 
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Different performance indices that describe the impact of critical attacks can be created from the 
integration of both methods. Some of these indices are “Unsatisfied Demand” and “Percentage of Un-
satisfied demand.” In addition, many failures can be considered, mainly DoS attacks. 
The originality of this method lies in the integration of two high-level formalisms for Petri Nets. 
This integration allows the consequences of cyberattacks to be quantified using performance indices 
and taking into account the randomness of failure events in coupled infrastructures. A wide variety of 
scenarios can be analyzed with this approach, which is agent-based. 
The scope of this approach is the study of DoS attacks, including the spread speed and the quan-
tification of the dynamic consequences. However, the dynamic aspects are only addressed in discrete 
time simulations and a combinatorial explosion could limit the ability to model large complex system. 
II.7.4 Intrusion detection on Cyber Physical Systems 
This approach studies the effect of intrusion detection systems on the reliability of cyber physi-
cal systems, e.g. sensors, actuators and control units, in a context wherein energy replenishment is not 
possible (Mitchell and Chen 2013). This approach is based on stochastic petri nets, which models 
semi-Markov processes with a state representation. 
The main originality is that in this approach, the system’s nodes are modeled as tokens, and not 
as places. This approach is specialized in intrusion detection and response systems and allows the 
mean time to failure (MTTF) to be computed, taking into account the cyber-vulnerabilities at different 
layers. 
However it does not take into account the power system dynamics. In fact, it is mostly a com-
munication networks security analysis than a multi-infrastructure analysis. In addition, this modeling 
is exposed to the state explosion problem due to the quantity of tokens needed for large systems. 
Also, this method can be used maximum for two coupled infrastructures where one of them is 
the Communications Network. 
II.7.5 Advantages - Disadvantages 
Petri Networks are a powerful method to model complex sequential processes. However, many 
applications and developments have arisen in order to model complex dynamic systems, such as Pow-
er Systems and Computer networks. 
However, PN were not created to model large systems and its main limitation is the state explo-
sion, making it very difficult to use them to model complex coupled heterogeneous infrastructures. 
The main advantage of PN is that it can model discrete and continuous time systems, consider-
ing stochastic and timed transitions. In addition, thanks to the last developments, petri networks can be 
used as modules. Nevertheless, the level of maturity for these purposes is still very low. 
II.8 Comparison and Conclusion 
This chapter provides a comprehensive state-of-the art of modeling approaches and methods to 
solve the emerging challenges of interdependent coupled infrastructures. As the reader may notice, 
most of the explored literature is recent. When starting the SINARI project, the Sate-of-the-art that 
was prepared and published at that time was very different from the one presented in this chapter (see 
(Merdassi, et al. 2012)). 
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Agent-Based models can model dynamically multiple interacting systems with complex behav-
iors. ABMs have a high-level flexibility and describe the system from its components’ perspective. 
However this model lacks efficiency for large systems due to long computation times (sometimes 
more than 50 hours). In addition, ABMs are difficult to code, which make them difficult to use. 
Bayesian Networks model random events, which allow measuring the gravity and the conse-
quences of attacks, and the spreading of adverse events. They also offer a graphical representation of 
the modeled system. However, this model relies on accurate probability data from experts, which 
sometimes is difficult to find. 
The BDMP allows modeling attack scenarios and creating several indices to rank the attacks. It 
is mostly dedicated to perform risk analysis. In addition, it performs several combinations of failures 
in order to study the role of each component in the failure. However, BDMP presents some difficulties 
when modeling cyclic behaviors. 
The combined simulator allows modeling dynamic events on integrated infrastructures; it is the 
closest model to real systems. In fact, it could serve as a reference model to compare the other meth-
ods since it is easy-to-use due to the module property. However, it is highly resource demanding 
which should be limited to verify results and most of the studied cosimulators do not simulate in real-
time. 
The Petri Networks allow modeling cascades in dynamic systems and measuring the impact of 
the cascading events on critical infrastructures. However this model shows a lack of flexibility for 
large systems and each scenario demands a different model configuration. 
Complex Networks showed that they are capable and suitable to model and to reflect the topo-
logical properties of large complex systems; however they have not been completely exploited to 
study interdependent critical infrastructures. In the next chapters, we will introduce a novel approach, 
using Complex Networks, to model critical interdependent infrastructures. 
In summary, these methods have mainly focused on dynamic events assuming attack scenarios. 
However, it is needed to select the most critical components that could start a cascading or an emer-
gent failure that could damage the critical infrastructure, i.e. a better approximation to the screening 
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methods. Moreover, the most critical component and weakest elements in the system may emerge 
from the interface of critical infrastructures. Another disadvantage is that these methods are unsuitable 
to manage large systems to overcome the state explosion problem and there are still some processing 
capacity limitations. 
A method comparison is not completely possible, due to the unlike objectives of each model. 
Furthermore, there is not a global model that covers the complex world of interdependencies and vul-
nerabilities of Critical infrastructures. Figure II:16 plots a comparative diagram, taking into account 
six aspects: 
 CPU time: This aspect describes the computation complexity, the memory and process re-
quirement. A grade from 1 to 5, where 1 represents an expensive and slow performance and 
5 represents a fast process. 
 Usability: This aspect joints different characteristics, including the easiness to model and 
the flexibility to model heterogeneous systems. 1 for a difficult to apply method and 5 for 
an easy-to-use method. 
 Tools Accessibility: It evaluates the availability of tools that can compute or simulate heter-
ogeneous coupled infrastructures. 1 if there are no available tools and 5 if there are many 
options. 
 Dynamic simulations: This aspects gives a grade of 1 if this method is not able to model 
dynamic aspects (or it have not been applied yet), and 5 if it already considers dynamic 
events. 
 Large systems modeling: This aspect reports a grade of 1 if the method is not able to handle 
large complex systems and 5 if it is completely developed to handle these systems. 
 Scalability: It considers the ability to change in size or scale, it means, a model can be easily 
expanded to include other components or parameters without requiring a complete change 
of the model. A grade of 1 is assigned if it is not possible and a grade of 5 if the model is 
scalable across a large range of changes. 
The grades were assigned taking into consideration the exposed approaches and several state-of-
the-art found in the literature, including (Merdassi, et al. 2012), (Kröger and Zio 2011), (Galli 2010), 
(Ouyang 2013), (Cheminod, Durante and Valenzano 2013). 
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CHAPTER III  
Vulnerability and Interdependencies: Modeling 
We live in a society exquisitely dependent on science and technology,  
in which hardly anyone knows anything about science and technology 
Carl Sagan 
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Abstract 
Power systems and ICTs interdependencies request innovative and revolutionary methods, built on new 
ideas that aim at identifying weaknesses and critical components that can fail and create many other failures 
either by cascading, common-mode or escalating. One possible approach to understand critical infrastructures’ 
vulnerabilities is to study their topologies and to quantify their physical and cyber interdependencies. This chap-
ter presents an introduction to Complex Networks and proposes two approaches to model coupled infrastruc-
tures’ interdependencies: a topologic-driven approach and an eigensystem analysis. The former evaluates com-
plex-weighted graphs to assess the main topological indices. The latter, evaluates the adjacency matrix as a 
Hermitian Matrix in the Hilbert Space to study the Eigenspectral of the coupled system. Few simple examples 
are shown to exemplify its use. 
III.1 Introduction 
Electric Power Systems (EPS) and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) reveal 
strong interdependencies among their components as explored in CHAPTER I. For that reason, many 
methods and algorithms have been developed to study these interdependencies and to ensure high 
levels of reliability, availability and security of critical infrastructures. Some of these methods are 
summarized in the state-of-the-art presented in CHAPTER II. One of the main outcomes in CHAP-
TER II is that there is either a need for a strong improvement and upgrade of these methods or a need 
for a new one. This Chapter aims at solving this challenge using ‘Complex Networks Theory’, consid-
ering that a major and critical objective is to identify failure initiating events on interdependent cou-
pled infrastructures, i.e. the identification of components that are very likely to initiate a failure.  
‘Complex Networks’ (or graph theory) is a very promising method according to different publi-
cations (Merdassi, et al. 2012), (Kröger and Zio 2011). In this dissertation, it is strongly believed that 
the topology of coupled infrastructures influences on their behavior of the whole system. Therefore, 
the study of the structure of coupled infrastructures may help to understand the way each component 
affects the function of the whole coupled system. These beliefs are supported by several studies in 
different sciences. For instance, the study of the WWW topology (Albert, Jeong and Barabasi 2000), 
the Internet (Yook, Jeong and Barabasi 2002), the cellular networks (Jeong, et al. 2000), among others 
(Albert and Barabasi 2002). 
The final objective of this Chapter is to answer the question: How to construct a common-model 
for coupled infrastructures, taking into account their topological characteristics, enabling to differenti-
ate their own communication patterns (the modes of communication), but at the same time being flex-
ible in the way it could be used to study n-infrastructures’ interdependencies. 
Power Systems are known to be very robust; the origin of this robustness was identified thanks 
to the use of complex networks theory. (Barabási and Bonabeu 2003) discovered that most of the 
complex systems have a scale-free characteristic that increase their robustness against random attacks 
or random failures. However, the Achilles’ heel of complex systems is that most of them rely on few 
nodes (called Hubs), it has already been demonstrated that the removal of key hubs generates a general 
failure of the system (Wang and Guanrong 2003). In the case of Electric Power Systems, it has already 
been demonstrated that the breakdown of a single targeted components is sufficient to collapse the 
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entire system (Cruccitti, Latora and Marchiori 2004). 
This Chapter proposes and analyzes two main approaches: a topologic-driven analysis and an 
Eigenspectral Analysis. The former modifies the main properties of ‘Complex Networks’ to study the 
structure of coupled infrastructures. The latter applies the theory of Hermitian Matrices in the Hilbert 
Space to study the spectrum of multi-level ‘Complex Networks.’ The basis of the proposed approaches 
will be explained in detail throughout this Chapter and the application of the proposed approaches is 
presented in CHAPTER IV. These approaches are considered as “High level” description models, 
CHAPTER V will present the “Low level” description model. 
This Chapter is organized as follows: 
 Section III.2 briefly introduces the Complex Networks and their relations with graph theory. 
 Section III.3 presents some notions on complex networks that support the proposed ap-
proaches. It includes the definition of terms such as: node-degree, betweenness centrality, 
efficiency, Graph Spectra, Hilbert spaces and Hermitian matrices. 
 Section III.4 introduces the topologic and spectral approaches developed in order to evalu-
ate the interdependencies of coupled infrastructures. 
 Section III.5 presents a summary of the Chapter, highlighting the advantages and disad-
vantages of the proposed approaches. 
III.2 From Graph Theory to Complex Networks 
It is common to misuse the terms Graph Theory and Complex Networks. Even if the term 
Network exists in graph theory, Network is referred as any real system that can be described by means 
of graphs. Thus, the term Graph is used whenever talking about mathematical properties. Graph Theo-
ry is the body of principles and theorems that revolve around graphs. Complex Networks is the field 
that describes, using the Graph Theory, the networks whose structure is irregular, complex, and dy-
namically evolving in time, e.g. Social and biological Networks (Caldarelli 2007). 
The history of Complex Networks (and Graph Theory) begins in the 18
th
 century, when Leon-
hard Euler solved the enigmatic seven bridges of Königsberg problem using what is called the ‘foun-
dations of the Graph Theory’ (Euler 1741). The problem was born in the capital of East Prussia: Kö-
nigsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia), where people wondered if all seven bridges connecting the town 
could be traversed, without passing any of them twice. In order to solve this problem, Euler emphasiz-
es the topological structure importance, he realized that this problem could be represented and simpli-
fied into a graph, with nodes (parts of the town) and arcs (the bridges), as in Figure III:1. It was the 
 
Figure III:1The 7 bridges of Königsberg 
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first time that a scientist introduced the notions of Graphs. 
Since its origin, the Graph Theory has been evolving thanks to the computerization of data ac-
quisition and the availability of high computing power. Figure III:2 shows the Evolution of Complex 
Networks and the Evolution of Computers, it can be seen that it was until the computing power was 
developed, the Graph theory evolved significantly. 
In 1959, the Hungarian Mathematicians Paul Erdös and Alfred Rènyi developed the Random 
Graphs Theory (Erdös and Rényi 1959). Nevertheless, at this time the Computer Science was unable 
to develop complex simulations and to verify their hypothesis. They endeavored to find the typical 
systems structure at a given stage of evolution (Erdös and Rényi 1960), so they suggested that such 
networks could be modeled by connecting their nodes with random distributed links. Paul Erdös and 
Alfred Rènyi found that, in this random graph, the node-degree followed a Poisson distribution with a 
bell shape (Barabási and Bonabeu 2003). However, this theory fails to describe many real-world net-
works, such as Internet, Power Grids, and Social communication networks. Even Erdös and Rènyi 
remarked the following: 
“…Of course, if one aims at describing such a real situation, one should replace the hypothesis 
of equiprobability of all connection by some more realistic hypothesis.” 
– (Erdös and Rényi 1960) 
 
Figure III:2From Graph Theory to Complex Networks vs. Computers Timeline 
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Nevertheless, their studies motivated a great amount of work on the field. One of them made by 
Watts and Strogatz; they introduced the Small-World Network concept (Watts and Strogatz 1998). In 
order to understand this concept, it is important to be acquainted with the Milgram Experiment, devel-
oped in 1967 by the American psychologist Stanley Milgram, who aims at answering the question: 
“Starting with any two people in the world, what is the probability that they will know each other?” In 
order to solve it, he sent hundreds of letters to people in Nebraska asking them to forward the corre-
spondence to acquaintances that might be able to shepherd it closer to a target recipient: a stockbroker 
in Boston. The result of this experiment was that there is a mean distance of six people between the 
first person in Nebraska and the stockbroker in Boston, i.e. six degrees (Milgram 1967). This experi-
ment corroborates the original idea of Frigyes Karinthy, a Hungarian author who mentioned this hy-
pothesis in one of his stories: Chains (Làncszemek) and called it: ‘Six-degrees of Separation.’ 
Another concept was created at the end of the XX
th
 century by Albert-Lazlo Barabási and Reka 
Albert: the scale-free networks (Barabási and Albert 1999). These networks are characterized by hav-
ing few nodes that have many connections (hubs) and many nodes have very few link connections 
(Wang and Guanrong 2003). For instance, Erdös is one of the largest hubs in the mathematics com-
munity, especially in the networks science community. In fact, the well-known Erdös Number was 
created to describe the distance between any person and Erdös, measured by papers’ authorship. 
Therefore, one of the main characteristics of scale-free networks is its robustness against acci-
dental failures but, at the same time, a significant vulnerability to coordinated attacks (Barabási and 
Bonabeu 2003). For instance, Figure III:3 shows three different cases. Firstly, a random network 
where there is a random failure, the connectivity in this case is not affected. The second figure shows a 
scale-free graph where a random attack does not impact the whole system. However, the third case 
shows a targeted (and successful attack) where the system is divided in two sub-systems. 
Additionally, Scale-free networks have another property: the preferential attachment character-
istic, which means that new nodes are more likely to create a link with the hubs in the network. In 
social networks this preferential attachment is influenced by the reputation or by the popularity. A 
person with high reputation is more likely to have an influence in the network. 
Nowadays, ‘Complex Networks’ are used in many areas and deeper investigations have led to 
many more questions about the nature of complex systems and the use of ‘Complex Networks’ to 
model large systems. Consequently, many laboratories are dedicated to study their properties and how 
to effectively model complex systems. Some of these laboratories are: 
 Barabasilab - USA: www.barabasilab.com 
 ISI Foundation – Italy: www.isi.it 
 Réseau National des Systèmes Complexes – France: http://www.rnsc.fr  
 Complex Systems and Networks lab - Spain : http://cosnet.bifi.es 
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Figure III:3 Robustness of Random and Scale Free Networks (Barabási and Bonabeu 2003) 
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III.3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
This section summarizes the ‘Complex Networks’ theory needed to understand the proposed 
approaches, including definitions, algorithms and usages. Extra-information is provided in Appendix 
A. Additionally, the networks in Figure III:4-i and Figure III:4-ii will be used in order to illustrate this 
theory. 
III.3.1 Notations of Complex Networks 
Complex Networks are composed of vertices (or nodes) and edges (or links). The former repre-
sents system’s elements such as buses, routers, airports or people. The latter represents the connec-
tions, dependencies or relations between vertices; these connections can be physical, logical or func-
tional. Some common edges include: power lines, optical fibers, flight itineraries and friendship. 
A graph G is a pair of sets (V,E). Let V ≡ {v1, v2, v3,…, vn} be the set of vertices and n the num-
ber of vertices. While E ≡ {e1, e2, e3,…, em} is the set of edges between the vertices and m is the num-
ber of edges. 
A graph can be directed or undirected. If edges have an associated direction, the graph is called 
directed graph, otherwise the graph is called undirected graph. Additionally, both graphs are assumed 
to lack of self-loops and multiple parallel edges (see Figure III:5). 
III.3.1.1 Adjacency Matrix 
A graph can be represented by an n×n matrix A, called adjacency (or connectivity) matrix; 
where every row and column represents a vertex in the graph. For undirected graphs, its entry ahj is 1 
if there exists an edge between the hth and jth vertices and 0 otherwise, in this case the A matrix is 
symmetrical (ahj=ajh). For directed graphs the entry ahj is 1 if there exists an edge from h to j, and 0 
otherwise, in this case, the A matrix is asymmetrical. 
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For the case of the graph in Figure III:4-i the adjacency matrix is presented in (III.2). 
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Figure III:4 Demonstration graphs 
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Also, for the case of the graph in Figure III:4-ii, the adjacency matrix is presented in (III.3). 
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III.3.1.2 Weight Matrix 
There is also a so-called n×n Weight matrix W, whose entry whj is the weight associated to the 
edge connecting nodes h and j. This weight represents the capacity, the influence, the importance or 
the intensity of the connections. For instance, for Electric Power Systems this weight could be associ-
ated to the admittance of each line, or for transportation systems the weight could be the transport 
capacity. It is largely used to solve NP-complete or NP-hard problems in Operations Research disci-
pline (Chvatal 1983). In graph theory, it is used to assess the shortest paths or the optimal paths. 
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III.3.1.3 Path length, Geodesic and Diameter 
Path length is the number of hops or the distance between two nodes. A geodesic path (hj) is 
defined as the shortest or optimal path between two vertices and depends on whether the graph is 
weighted or not. The geodesic is assessed using the W matrix if the graph is weighted and its shortest 
path is called the optimal path; otherwise, the geodesic is calculated using the A matrix. Many algo-
rithms were developed to find the geodesic paths, including Dijkstra and Bellman, among others 
(Cormen, et al. 2001). The path length is considered the base of the graph theory and the linear pro-
gramming transport problems. 
The diameter is the maximum value of hj h,j V. It characterizes the system and could quan-
 
Figure III:5 Undirected and Directed graphs 
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tify the vulnerability of the system. For instance, a power grid that has the source and the load far from 
each other is more vulnerable than one with the source close to the loads, as analyzed in Section I.3.2. 
For the case of the graph in Figure III:4-i, the diameter is 3. Also, the diameter is 3 for the graph in 
Figure III:4-ii. 
III.3.1.4 Node Degree 
The node importance (or prestige for Social Networks) is characterized by the node degree (or 
connectivity) that is the number of inbound and outbound connections. The degree kh of a node h is 
defined in terms of the adjacency matrix A, for undirected graphs, as shown in (III.5) (Boccaletti, et 
al. 2006). Node degrees for the undirected graph presented in Figure III:4-i are shown in Table III:1. 
 


Vj
hjh ak  (III.5)  
For directed graphs, the node degree has two components: In-degree (kh
in
) and Out-degree 
(kh
out
). The former is the number of ingoing links. The latter is the number of outgoing links. Mathe-
matically these degrees are assessed using (III.6) and (III.7), respectively. In the case of the graph in 
Figure III:4-ii, results are shown in Table III:2. 
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The degree distribution P(k) exposes the network statistical properties, the structure of the graph 
and the probability that a node has a degree k or the fraction of nodes having degree k. For directed 
graphs there are two distributions, one for each component P(k
in
) and P(k
out
). 
III.3.1.5 Betweenness Centrality 
The network nature influences the importance of the edges and/or vertices in the network. Such 
nature is influenced by the topological position of each component in the network with reference to its 
connectivity. Centrality indices quantify this importance (Cohen and Havlin 2010). One of these indi-
ces is the Betweenness Centrality, given by (III.8). This index is used in urban growth, resilience, so-
ciology and other studies; in addition, it recognizes bottlenecks and important edges/vertices in a net-
work (Freeman 1977). 
 
Table III:1 Node degrees undirected graph 
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 
kh 1 3 2 1 3 2 
 
Table III:2 Node degrees directed graph 
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 
kh
in 0 1 1 1 2 1 
kh
out 1 2 1 0 1 1 
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 (III.8)  
hj is the total number of shortest paths between h and j, and hj(l) is the number of shortest 
paths between h and j that passes through the node l. 
In comparison with the node degree, the betweenness Centrality not only assigns a high im-
portance level to hubs, but also identifies critical interconnecting nodes and edges. For instance, ac-
cording to the node degree the nodes 5 and 7 are the most important nodes in the graph presented in 
Figure III:6. However, it is clear that node 6 is vital for the communication of the two clusters. Thus, 
after assessing the Betweenness Centrality, node 6 is almost as important as nodes 5 and 7. In Figure 
III:6 the node size represents the Betweenness Centrality value. 
In addition, there exists the Edge Betweenness Centrality, defined in (III.9). Let hj(e) be the 
number of geodesics between h and j that passes through the edge e. 
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 (III.9)  
This index is important since it emphasizes the importance and the centrality of each node/edge 
in the system according to its topological position. 
Table III:3 Node Betweenness Centrality 
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b(l) (Undir) 0 10 2 0 10 2 
b(l) (Dir) 0 4 2 0 4 2 
 
Table III:4 Edge Betweenness Centrality 
Edge 1-2 2-3 3-6 2-5 5-4 6-5 
b(e) (Undir) 10 8 6 12 10 8 
b(e) (Dir) 5 4 3 4 5 4 
 
 
Figure III:6 Betweenness Centrality example 
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III.3.1.6 Efficiency 
For this dissertation, the Efficiency is an index that aims at identifying important nodes. The 
concept of Efficiency was introduced in (Latora and Marchiori 2001). It is used to evaluate and meas-
ure how efficiently a node exchanges information with other nodes. This index assumes that the effi-
ciency is inversely proportional to the shortest distance, its mathematical representation is presented in 
(III.10). Let dhj be the shortest path length between h and j, and n the number of nodes in the system. 
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The methodology presented in Figure III:7 is used in order to assess the impact according to the 
drop of global efficiency ΔE(Y) (according to (III.11)) after removing each node (or edge). 
Afterwards, the nodes that caused the highest impact are considered as important and critical for the 
system. 
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E(Y-1) represents the global efficiency after removal of a node (Bompard, Wu and Xue 2011). 
In addition, this index can be used to assess the impact on the system after removing edges. 
Figure III:8 presents the results for the proposed demonstration system. It can be seen that the 
Efficiency of the system drops after removing the nodes. Specifically for the case of node 2 and 5 
there is a significant lower, which highlights then the most central nodes. The nodes with a lower im-
pact are the nodes 1 and 4, these nodes are not central and do not affect the interconnectivity in the 
system. This analysis can be developed to study the impact on the system after removing edges.  
 
Figure III:7 Efficiency assessment methodology 
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III.3.2 Eigenspectral Analysis 
Eigenspectral analysis is the study of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of system’s representa-
tive matrices. It has been largely used to study the topology and dynamic of complex systems (Van 
Mieghem 2011), in this section a brief introduction of this method will be presented. In addition, the 
Hilbert Space and Hermitian Matrices are introduced to reinforce and justify the proposed approaches. 
III.3.2.1 Spectral Analysis 
As seen before, graphs can be represented by a matrix (Adjacency Matrix A). This matrix can 
be represented by points in the space that define a vector, which is directed from an origin to an end. 
This vector can be transformed to other vectors in the same space after a rotation, an escalation or a 
translation. The resulting vectors are called eigenvectors and the proportionality strengths or escalating 
factors are called eigenvalues. Therefore, the eigensystem (set of eigenvectors and eigenvalues) char-
acterizes the graph and is called the spectrum of the matrix or eigenspectrum. 
The determination of the eigenvalues λ and eigenvectors x of the Adjacency matrix A is done 
using (III.12). 
 
Figure III:8 Efficiency for the test System 
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 xx A  (III.12)  
Therefore, 
 0 x)I(xx  AA  (III.13)  
x=0 is a trivial solution to the eigenvalue equation. Thus, to find a non-zero solution for the ho-
mogeneous linear system, the matrix A-λI has to be singular16 (III.14). 
 0det  )I( A  (III.14)  
The matrix spectrum theory has been largely studied in many sciences. Particularly in graph 
theory, it has been used to develop the partitioning theory or spectral bisection. (Fiedler 1793) found 
that the second smallest eigenvalue of the graph’s Laplacian matrix L is a measure of the graph’s con-
nectivity. The Laplacian matrix is defined in (III.15). Let D be a diagonal matrix of degrees. (Rozel, 
Caire, et al. 2009) applied this theory to study the potential cuts of large interconnected networks. 
 ADL   (III.15)  
In addition, the spectrum of the matrix can provide topological information about the system. 
III.3.2.2 Hilbert Space 
Hilbert Space is defined as a complete, normed and inner product vector space (Hoser 2005). 
The following properties have to be followed in a vector space V; where x and y are vectors. These 
properties will be used to justify the use of Hermitian Matrices in next section. 
 VV  y,xyx  (III.16)  
 V z,y,x)zy(xz)yx(  (III.17)  
 V y,xxyyx  (III.18)  
 V xxx 00  (III.19)  
 V xxx11  (III.20)  
 V x)x(x)( 01  (III.21)  
 V x,aVax C  (III.22)  
 V xb,a)bx(ax)ab( C,  (III.23)  
 V y,x,aayax)yx(a C  (III.24)  
 V xb,abxaxx)ba( C,  (III.25)  
The inner product is defined in (III.26). 
 xxx   (III.26)  
And the following equations have to be hold in a Hilbert Space: 
 0 ifonly  and if0with0  xxxxx  (III.27)  
 
 
16
 A Matrix is singular if its determinant is zero. 
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 C ayxayax  (III.28)  
 C ayxaayx  (III.29)  
III.3.2.3 Hermitian Matrices 
A matrix is defined as a Hermitian Matrix if and only if accomplishes the equation (III.30)
17
. 
 *HH   (III.30)  
Where, 
 lkkl hh   (III.31)  
The main interest on Hermitian Matrices in the Hilbert Space is that their Eigenvalues, assessed 
with (III.32), are all reals ( kk  ). This property enables the important or more prestigious nodes 
to be classified and ranked. 
 λxx H  (III.32)  
An example of a Hermitian matrix is shown in (III.33). 
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The eigenvalues from this matrix are presented in (III.34), it can be seen that they are real val-
ues and the eigenvectors, in (III.35), are complex numbers. 
  6171687910172266810 ....λ   (III.34)  
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 H* is the conjugate transpose of H. 
Proof of kk   (Hoser 2005): 
a. λxx H  
b. xxλxλxxx H from (III.28) 
c. xxλλxxxx H from (III.29) 
d. Since *HH  , then xxxx HH   
e. xxλxxλ   
f.    
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III.4 Vulnerability and criticality analysis 
Multi-infrastructures modeling has been shown in CHAPTER II. Many challenges were discov-
ered, such as the need of a better screening method for multi-infrastructure studies and a better exploi-
tation of Complex Networks to the study of vulnerability and interdependencies of multiple critical 
infrastructures. 
This section presents the use of complex networks’ properties to study the vulnerability of Elec-
tric Power Systems (Section III.4.1). Afterwards, it proposes different approaches to model interde-
pendent coupled infrastructures. 
The first approach aims at expanding the complex networks theory from one-dimension analysis 
to two-dimension analysis (Section III.4.2). This expansion adds flexibility in two degrees: Firstly, it 
allows the ICT and Power system infrastructures to be modeled in a single model, thus conserving 
their own characteristics. Secondly, this model can be used not only for these infrastructures, but can 
be used to model the interdependencies of other critical infrastructures as well. 
The second approach (Section III.4.3.3) is inspired on sociology methods and algorithms that al-
low the modeling of different interdependency layers among multiple infrastructures and also, the 
incorporation of symmetric communication patterns analysis among heterogeneous infrastructures. 
III.4.1 Electricity infrastructure topology analysis 
Many topological indices from the graph theory have been used to study the vulnerability of 
power systems. For instance, the node degree has been used as the first step in the assessment of the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructures. The node with the higher degree (the largest connected compo-
nent) is the most important in the system. Then, an important node is highly vulnerable to a coordinat-
ed attack and/or to a random failure, according to scale-free networks’ properties. 
The betweenness centrality is used to understand how connected the components are in a sys-
tem, i.e. to identify the most used components. Finally, the efficiency is used to assess the impact of 
node or edge removal in the global system behavior. 
In order to illustrate these indices, Table III:5 shows the main characteristics of several known 
test power systems and their corresponding direct graphs
18
 are shown from Figure III:9 to Figure III:18. 
The size of the nodes depends on their Betweenness Centrality value and their color on the degree. It 
is important to note that the G2ELAB 14-Bus system is a radial distribution grid, which is the reason 
why its average path length is smaller than for the mesh networks. This system will be presented in 
more detail in the next sections. 
 
 
18
 The edge direction is selected according to the power flow direction. 
Table III:5 Graph properties for several systems 
System N. Nodes N. Edges Av. Total Degree Diameter Av. Path Length 
G2ELAB 14-Bus 14 13 1.86 7 2.95 
IEEE 9-Bus  9 9 2.00 2 1.40 
IEEE 14-Bus 14 20 2.86 4 1.96 
IEEE 24-Bus 24 34 2.83 6 2.81 
IEEE 39-Bus 39 46 2.36 7 2.66 
IEEE 118-Bus 118 179 3.03 10 2.94 
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Transmission power systems are characterized by having few hubs. For instance, Figure III:21 
shows the degree distribution for the IEEE 118-bus (see Figure III:20). The degree distribution provides 
topological information such as if the system is vulnerable to random or targeted attacks, and if the 
system is a radial or loop network. In this case, most of the nodes have a in-degree and out-degree of 
1, and only a few ones have a degree higher than 6 (those are the hubs). In Figure III:19 these hubs 
have a bigger-size node. 
There are other obvious observations, such as, the larger the system is, the larger the average 
path length and diameter are. That is the reason why many researchers used these indices to quantify 
component failure impact in the system, according to the diameter variation. 
The topology or structure of transmission power systems is more robust than distribution sys-
tems, since nodes are more interconnected and closer. This characteristic is similar to the properties of 
Scale-free networks as shown before in Figure III:3. 
 
  
 
Figure III:9 G2ELAB 14-Bus Graph 
 
Figure III:10 G2ELAB 14-Bus System 
 
Figure III:11 IEEE 14-Bus Graph 
 
Figure III:12 IEEE 14-Bus System 
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Figure III:13 IEEE 9-Bus Graph 
 
Figure III:14 IEEE 9-Bus System 
 
Figure III:15 IEEE 24-Bus Graph 
 
Figure III:16 IEEE 24-Bus System 
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Figure III:17 IEEE 39-Bus Graph 
 
Figure III:18 IEEE 39-Bus System 
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Figure III:19 IEEE 118-Bus Graph 
 
Figure III:20 IEEE 118-Bus System 
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For the case of distribution networks, as the system in Figure III:10, the node degree and be-
tweenness centrality were computed (results presented in Table III:6). They show that the node 2 is the 
most important. Thus, in order to verify this result, this node was removed from the grid and the power 
flows were computed. However, the simulation finished without convergence due to the loss of con-
nectivity in the system. The betweenness centrality shows as well that the node 2 is the most important 
in the system. Additionally, the node 1 is important according to the Betweenness Centrality index and 
the node degree, which is expected since this node represents the main source in the system.  
 
Figure III:21 Nodes Degree Distribution, IEEE 118-bus 
Table III:6 Graph properties 
Node Degree Betweenness Centrality 
01 3 50 
02 4 53 
03 2 12 
04 2 30 
05 1 0 
06 2 22 
07 1 0 
08 1 0 
09 2 12 
10 2 12 
11 2 22 
12 2 12 
13 1 0 
14 1 0 
 
 67 
III.4.2 The topology-driven Approach 
The study of the structural complexity of critical infrastructures’ topology allows the pattern of 
interactions among these infrastructures to be described. Consequently, the nature of connections and 
the complex behaviors can be understood. The first approach aims at describing the interactions be-
tween power systems and ICT systems, using complex-weighted graphs. 
In order to evaluate the physical and cyber interdependencies within the coupled system, it is 
important to classify the interdependencies for both infrastructures (EPS and ICT). These interdepend-
encies or connections (edges or links) are classified into four types: 
 Type 1: From an electrical node to another. This edge represents the normal power flow in 
the Power System. 
 Type 2: From an ICT node to another. This edge represents the normal data flow from one 
router to another. 
 Type 3: From an electrical node to an ICT node. Basically, it is the energy supply for an ICT 
infrastructure. 
 Type 4: From an ICT node to an electrical node. This edge is used to send commands or to 
request information to/from the electrical component. 
These edges can be modeled and represented in the Adjacency Matrix A by assigning a differ-
ent value for each type of connection. In order to preserve the characteristics of each infrastructure, 
complex values have been assigned to the edges, where the real component represents the Electrical 
edges and the imaginary component represents the ICT edges. Thus, the complex-valued adjacency 
matrix is built according to (III.36), for undirected graphs. Type 3 and 4 are in the same group because 
this group represents the mutual interdependencies among both infrastructures. 
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Additionally, direct graphs are used to take into account the direction of the information and 
electricity flow in the model. In fact, directed graphs support the representation of the relation between 
the source (operators) and the load (end-users), where the first is offering a service to the second. En-
try ahj is defined as in (III.37). This definition allows creating a Mixed Graph with some edges with a 
double direction to represent the energy supply from the Power Distribution Networks and the data 
from the ICT. 
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This representation emerges after evaluating multiple possible solutions, e.g. the use of negative 
complex numbers and hypercomplex numbers. However, the proposed model allows the main com-
plex networks’ indices to be assessed, e.g. node-degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency. The 
properties of complex-weighted graphs are analyzed in the next sections. 
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The graphs presented in Figure III:22 will be used to exemplify the elaboration of the adjacency 
matrices. 
In the case of Figure III:22-i the edges e1 and e2 are type 1, edges e5 and e6 are type 2, and ver-
tices e3 and e4 are type 3 and 4. For the Figure III:23-ii the edges e3 and e4 are type 3 and vertices e7 
and e8 are type 4. Therefore, the corresponding adjacency matrices according to (III.36) and (III.37), 
for the undirected and directed graph respectively are shown in (III.38) and (III.39). 
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(III.39)  
III.4.2.1 Complex-valued Node Degree 
In order to identify the vulnerabilities of coupled infrastructures, this thesis attempts to identify 
the most important nodes in the system, the term ‘importance’ is intended to qualify the role that the 
presence and location of the node plays with respect to the average global and local properties of the 
whole network, as in (Kröger and Zio 2011). The Node Degree is one of the most common character-
istics of Complex Networks used to identify the node role in the Network. In this case, it is divided 
into two components: 1) the Electrical Node Degree (keh), which is the number of electrical edges 
incident with the node; and 2) the ICT Node Degree (kch) which is the number of ICT edges incident 
with the node (III.40). 
These components help to measure the influence of each infrastructure on other infrastructures. 
For instance, a node h having keh > kch has a higher influence in the Electric Power System than in the 
ICT Infrastructure. It is also expected that Electric nodes have a higher Electrical node degree than 
ICT node degree. 
 hh ce
Vj
hjh kikak 

 (III.40)  
 
Figure III:22 Test system 
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Degree indices, in-degree (III.6) and out-degree (III.7), are composed of an electrical compo-
nent and an ICT component, see (III.41) and (III.42), respectively. This division helps to clarify the 
dependencies among infrastructures, that is, to acquaint whether it is supplying or is supplied by the 
node h. 
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In order to exemplify the use of these equations, the matrix (III.39) is used to assess the in-
degree and out-degree of the graph Figure III:22-ii. 
 
III.4.2.2 Betweenness Centrality for multi-infrastructures 
The betweenness centrality index can give insights about the interplays among infrastructures, 
showing the most used nodes and edges for the communication between and within infrastructures. 
The shortest paths are calculated for each infrastructure based on the edges types, which is similar to 
an analysis of two layers, as in Figure III:23. 
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Electrical betweenness centrality and ICT betweenness centrality quantify the centrality of eve-
ry node in each infrastructure. That is, a measure of electrical and communication interactions of each 
node in the interdependent system, it can be interpreted as an index to identify bottlenecks in the sys-
tem as well. 
The global Betweenness Centrality describes the total use of nodes in order to create a common 
index for both infrastructures, taking into account the influence of each node in each infrastructure. 
 
Table III:7 Node out-degree 
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 
k
out
h 1 2 1 1i 2i 1i 
k
out
eh 1 2 1 0 0 0 
k
out
ch 0 0 0 1 2 1 
 
Table III:8 Node out-degree  
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 
k
in
h 0 1+1i 1+1i 0 1+1i 1+1i 
k
in
eh 0 1 1 0 1 1 
k
in
ch 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
70 
 )l(b)l(b)l(b ceglobal
22   (III.45)  
The Edge Betweenness Centrality can be divided into electrical and ICT indices as well. These 
indices highlight the centrality of each edge in the system according to its topological position. 
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In the case of the graph in Figure III:22-ii, the betweenness Centrality indices for the nodes are 
presented in Table III:9. These results highlight the nodes 2 and 3 for the Electric Power System and 
the nodes 5 and 6 for the ICT infrastructure. 
 
III.4.2.3 Electrical and ICT Efficiency 
Efficiency index gives some insights about the impact of removing a node (either from the ICT 
or from the EPS), topologically speaking. Equations (III.48) and (III.49) allow assessing the efficiency 
for both infrastructures where ne is the number of electrical nodes, and nc the number of ICT nodes. 
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Table III:9 Betweenness Centrality Results 
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 
be(l) 0 3 2 0 0 0 
bc(l) 0 0 0 0 3 2 
bglobal(l) 0 3 2 0 3 2 
 
 
Figure III:23 Demonstration graph 
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A low index means that dhj is higher; it means that the system is less efficient and therefore the 
removed node plays an important or critical role for the system behavior. 
As a mode of example, the graph in Figure III:22 can be divided in two layers as in Figure 
III:23, and two distance matrices can be assessed, one for the electric paths and one for the communi-
cation paths, these matrices are shown in (III.50) and (III.51), the entries of these matrices are the dis-
tances between two nodes, i.e. dhj. 
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(III.51)  
 
In this case, ne = 3 and nc = 3. Therefore, Ee = 0.37 and Ec = 0.37 for the base-case, the Table 
III:10 presents the results after applying the algorithm presented in Figure III:7. It can be seen that the 
node 2 is the most critical for the electric system and the node 5 for the Communication system. 
 
III.4.2.4 Partial Conclusions 
This approach presents a first insight about the structural properties of the interconnected sys-
tem, in such way that the node degrees, betweenness centrality and efficiency can be assessed. 
Additionally, the use of complex numbers improves the modeling of coupled infrastructures, 
because it takes into account the different infrastructures in the same model, but at the same time, sev-
eral indices for each infrastructure can be assessed. 
However, one of the main disadvantages of the topological approach is that it does not consider 
the bi-directional communications. For instance, for ICT infrastructures it is important to send and to 
receive acknowledge signals, destination confirmation, which in graphs should be a bi-directional 
edge. 
The Eigenspectral analysis improves this representation by describing the bi-directional com-
munication pattern in ICT networks and the mono-directional communication pattern for Power Sys-
tems.  
Table III:10 Efficiency Results 
Node Base 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ee 0.37 0.277 0.11 0.17 0.37 0.204 0.17 
Ec 0.37 0.37 0.204 0.17 0.277 0.111 0.17 
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III.4.3 Eigenspectral Analysis 
It is clear that Power Systems and ICT infrastructures have asymmetric patterns, that is, both in-
frastructures differ in the way they share information. This sort of communication patterns is found in 
social networks where people interact according to some social rules and use different communication 
channels, such as computers or smartphones. This section applies Eigenspectral analysis to study the 
structure of asymmetric directed weighted graphs to reveal the vulnerabilities among and within Elec-
tric Power Systems and ICT networks. 
(Hoser 2005) proposed a method to evaluate asymmetric patterns in computer mediated com-
munications, using linear operators in the Hilbert Space and Hermitian matrices, this method is ex-
plained in Section III.4.3.3. This section proposes to use this theory to the study of coupled infrastruc-
tures. As a first step, it is proposed to distinguish the system’s layers, where each level represents a 
different interdependency, as in Figure III:24. In this way, the proposed approaches can be used to 
study the different layers included for in the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) (CEN-
CENELEC-ETSI 2012), which will be presented and analyzed in Section V.4. 
 
III.4.3.1 Complex-weighted Adjacency Matrix 
The matrix A can be constructed, for each layer, according to (III.52). Let w be the number of 
outbound links from node h to node j, and x the number of inbound links from node h to node j. The 
graph G(V,E) represents the coupled system, where V={V
e
,V
c
}, the electric and ICT nodes, respec-
tively. 
Thus,  
 xiwahj   (III.52)  
Figure III:25 presents a demonstration graph in order to illustrate how to build the Adjacency 
Matrix A, the resulting matrix is shown in (III.53). 
 
Figure III:24 Four-layer analysis 
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This formulation allows assessing the node degree, but most importantly creating the spectral 
system of the Adjacency Matrix, as in Section III.4.3.3. 
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III.4.3.2 Complex-valued node degree 
The degree k
h
 is a complex number (III.54) where y is the out-degree and z the in-degree. 
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As for the first approach, this degree allows the dependency of each node to be quantified. That 
is, a node h can know how many nodes depend on it (number of links that depart from this node) and 
in how many nodes the node h depends on (the number of links that are pointed towards the node h). 
The higher the node degree is, the more nodes depend on it / or it depends on many other nodes.  
Therefore, a ranking of the higher node degrees can be done and the first nodes are the most 
critical for the coupled system. 
Table III:11 presents the complex-valued node degrees for the graph in Figure III:25. From this 
table, it can be seen, for instance, the node v6 that have 2 out-going links (to nodes v3 and v5) and 1 
in-going link (from node v3). In addition, nodes v2 and v5 are the most important, based on the node-
degree. 
III.4.3.3 Eigenspectral Centrality 
Eigenspectral analysis allows identifying the weakest connections in the interconnected system. 
As discussed before, the Eigenspectral analysis on complex-valued adjacency matrices can be devel-
 
Figure III:25 Demonstration graph for Spectral Analysis 
 
Table III:11 Complex-valued node degree 
Node v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 
k 1 2+2i 1+2i 1i 2+2i 2+1i 
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oped thanks to the use of Hermitian Matrices in the Hilbert space. 
Therefore, the Adjacency matrix has to be a Hermitian Matrix in the Hilbert Space. Since the 
adjacency matrix has the characteristic presented in (III.55), the Hermitian matrix can be constructed 
according to (III.56). 
 jhhj aia   (III.55)  
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
 AH  (III.56)  
 
As an example, using the Adjacency Matrix presented in (III.53), its corresponding Hermitian 
Matrix is presented in (III.57). 
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Finally, the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the Hermitian matrices are computed according to 
(III.32) for each interdependency adjacency matrix. The most important node in the system is identi-
fied according to the highest absolute value in the eigenvector under inspection. 
Continuing with the example, the eigenvalues are presented in (III.58), which are all real-values, 
as expected. 
  32.144.044.032.147.247.2   (III.58)  
In this case, the highest eigenvalue is 2.47, its corresponding eigenvector is presented in Table 
III:12. According to these results, the node v2 and v5 are the most critical in this system, since they 
have the highest absolute value (|X|=0.535). 
Proof (Hoser 2005): 
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Next Chapter presents the application of these approaches in a real test distribution system and 
many other results interpretations will be presented. 
III.5 Summary 
This Chapter proposes new approaches to study the interdependencies among critical infrastruc-
tures based on Complex networks theory. 
A topology-driven analysis was proposed as a first approach. It uses the main properties of 
graphs, applying complex-weighted Adjacency Matrices. The use of complex numbers is adopted in 
order to expand the classical real-weighted adjacency matrices to a two-dimensional matrix that re-
flects the double interdependencies among infrastructures (ICT link and Power System supply). The 
assessed properties are: Node degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency, all supported by the 
shortest path calculation. 
The main advantage of the first approach is the identification of bottlenecks in the system as 
well as the identification of critical edges and vertices to the efficiency of the system. However, it fails 
to reproduce the asymmetrical communication pattern presented in the interplays among and within 
infrastructures. 
Eigenspectral analysis aims at reproducing those asymmetrical patterns using Hermitian Matri-
ces in the Hilbert Space, which allows real-value eigenvalues to be obtained using complex adjacency 
matrices. This new index for critical infrastructures detects the most central component in the system. 
The central component is considered as the most important and the most critical one in the coupled 
infrastructure. The main disadvantage of this method is the lack of dynamical analysis and/or cascad-
ing failure simulations. 
The proposed approaches will be applied on a typical French distribution network in the next 
chapter. Additionally, it will be explained how to elaborate the model for a real system, how to obtain 
the results and how to interpret them. 
 
Table III:12 Demonstration graph eigenvectors 
Node v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 
|X| 0.217 0.535 0.409 0.217 0.535 0.401 
φ -1.026 -0.240 0.409 0.785 0 0.409 
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CHAPTER IV  
Vulnerability and Interdependencies: Application 
The perplexity of life arises from there being too many interesting  
things in it for us to be interested properly in any of them 
 Gilbert Keith Chesterton 
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Abstract 
This chapter applies the mathematical approaches proposed in the previous chapter on a typical French 
distribution system, including the topology-driven analysis and the Eigenspectral analysis. The results obtained 
from these approaches allow the identification of components and connections that have an important topologi-
cal role in the coupled system. In addition, the approaches provide important indices that are used as a quantifi-
cation of weaknesses in the system. Finally, results from both approaches are compared an analyzed. 
In the previous chapters we have presented a real problematic that emerge from the interactions 
and interplays among critical infrastructures, including Power Systems and ICT systems. The state-of-
the-art in CHAPTER II reveals the need for new tools to study interdependencies and vulnerabilities 
among critical infrastructures. In response to these problems, two approaches are proposed in CHAP-
TER III, using complex networks theory and several indices and methodologies are proposed. This 
Chapter focuses on the application of the proposed approaches in order to exemplify their utilization 
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on power distribution networks. 
This Chapter is organized as follows: 
 Section IV.1 presents the chosen test system. 
 Section IV.2 applies the topology-driven analysis approach. 
 Section IV.3 applies the Eigenspectral analysis approach. 
IV.1 Test System 
The test system is a micro distribution network. The Power Grid has 14 power buses, 17 lines, 7 
distributed generation sources, 9 loads, and 3 transformers HV/MV, as shown in Figure IV:1.  
Aside from this network, there is a considerable supporting ICT infrastructure, 1 Wimax BS and 
5 multiplexers, 23 links including ADSL, PSTN/ISDN, Optic Fiber and Ethernet technologies. There 
is also a private LAN-Giga Ethernet connecting the electrical buses 2, 3 and 4 (represented by node 
23). This communication network (benchmark) was developed during the SINARI Project, it can be 
either a private or a public network. 
This system has already been presented in several papers (McDonald, et al. 2013), (Sanchez, 
Caire and Hadjsaid 2013), thesis (B. Rozel 2009) and European Projects (Integral (Stahl, et al. 2010)). 
It is also the system emulated within the PREDIS experimental platform (Caire, Sanchez and Hadjsaid 
2013). This system can be reconfigured by tripping the circuit breakers.  
 
Figure IV:1 Complete 14-Bus Tests System 
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IV.2 Topological Approach Results 
In this Section, the Complex-valued degree, the betweenness centrality index and the efficiency 
index results for the test system are presented. The assessment was completely developed using 
MATLAB scripts. 
In order to create the graph for the test system, power system’s buses and routers are modeled as 
nodes and, power lines and communication links are modeled as edges. Figure IV:2 presents the undi-
rected graph; green nodes are the power system buses and violet nodes the routers. Similarly green 
edges represent the power lines, red edges the ICT links and blue edges the interdependency commu-
nication/electricity supply among power and ICT nodes. 
Figure IV:3 shows the directed graph, in addition to the red (type 2) and the green (type 1) edg-
es, the blue edges represent the electricity supply to ICT nodes (type 3), and orange edges represent 
the communication links to power system’s nodes (type 4). The directions of green edges were chosen 
according to the flow of the real-power in the power system (power flow computation).  
 
Figure IV:2 Undirected Graph for the 14-bus Test system 
 
 
 
Figure IV:3 Directed Graph for the 14-bus Test system 
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IV.2.1 Adjacency Matrix 
The adjacency matrices for undirected and directed graphs are presented in Figure IV:4 and Fi-
gure IV:5. These figures show four different sections, one for each type of connection (see §III.4.2). 
This representation describes the coupled system in many ways. For instance, how sparse it is, 
the number of total connections and the topological interdependencies. It is important to note that the 
undirected graph takes into account the bi-directional flow of connection in the ICT infrastructures. 
However, the directed graph is better suited for the Electric system, since it takes into account the real 
power flow direction.  
 
Figure IV:4 Adjacency Matrix – Undirected Network 
 
 
Figure IV:5 Adjacency Matrix – Directed Network 
Type 1 Type 3 
Type 2 Type 4 
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IV.2.2 Complex-valued Node Degree 
The node degree values calculated according to equation (III.40), for undirected graphs, are pre-
sented in Table IV:1. These results highlight the importance of nodes 2, 3, 4, 12 and 20 for the Electric 
infrastructure, and the 16 and 20 for the ICT infrastructure. In this specific test case, node 20 has a 
high connectivity with both infrastructures. 
This index does not highlight the importance of node 1 (the base of the functioning of the entire 
system). But it highlights the importance of node 20 which is a central router. This results show that 
the use of undirected graphs is more appropriate for ICT communications. 
Figure IV:6 shows that most of the nodes have a node-degree of 2 or 3. Furthermore, it can be 
seen that there are nodes with no-dependency of first degree, e.g. node 1 and 19. Figure IV:7 high-
lights the important Hubs in the system, nodes with 5, 6 or even 7 connections. The histogram present-
ed in Figure IV:8, shows that most of the nodes that have a low ICT degree are distributed in every 
electric node-degree. There is a peak in ke=6 and kc=7, it corresponds to node 20, which is clearly a 
hub for both systems. 
  
Table IV:1 Node Degree – Undirected Graph 
Node kh keh kch 
1 3 3 0 
2 6 + 2 i 6 2 
3 4 + 2 i 4 2 
4 4 + 2i 4 2 
5 2 + 1i 2 1 
6 3 + 1i 3 1 
7 1 + 1i 1 1 
8 2 + 1i 2 1 
9 3 + 1i 3 1 
10 2 + 1i 2 1 
11 3 + 1i 3 1 
12 4 + 2i 4 2 
13 3 + 2i 3 2 
14 3 + 2i 3 2 
15 1 + 2i 1 2 
16 3 + 5i 3 5 
17 1 + 2i 1 2 
18 1 + 2i 1 2 
19 4i 0 4 
20 5 + 7i 5 7 
21 2 + 4i 2 4 
22 3 + 4i 3 4 
23 3 + 3i 3 3 
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Figure IV:6 Probability Degree Distribution 
 
 
Figure IV:7 Cumulative Degree Distribution 
 
 
Figure IV:8 Multiple infrastructure Degree distribution 
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The node-degrees according to equations (III.41) and (III.42), for directed graphs, are presented 
in Table IV:2. In-degree presents how dependent are the nodes to each infrastructure. The Out-degree 
shows the importance of each node for each infrastructure. In this case, nodes 2 and 14 are highlighted 
as the most important electric nodes, and nodes 20 and 16 as the most important for the ICT infrastruc-
ture. On the other hand, node 19 is the most dependent node in the ICT infrastructure. However, node 
2 has dependencies in both infrastructures. For that reason it is considered as the most critical node for 
the ICT and Electric Infrastructure. 
Figure IV:9 shows that there are no-critical hubs since the highest in-degree is 3 for the ICT in-
frastructure and 2 for the Electric Infrastructure. In addition, according to Figure IV:10, most of the 
nodes have a degree 1. In fact, Figure IV:11 shows that most of the nodes have only one connection 
with the electric and the ICT infrastructure. 
Figure IV:12 and Figure IV:13 show that in the ICT infrastructure there are important hubs, 
having out-degrees of 5 and 6. On the contrary, Electric system has a clear tendency to have only one 
connection. It is due to the topological properties of Distribution Power Systems. 
Figure IV:14 helps to understand the dependencies among and within infrastructures, for in-
stance, there is a local maximum for the out-degree 6, but this node has a 0 electric out-degree.  
Table IV:2 Node Degree – Directed Graph 
Node kh
in
 keh
in
 kch
in
 kh
out
 keh
out
 kch
out
 
1 2 2 0 1 1 0 
2 2 + 2 i 2 2 3 3 0 
3 1 + 2 i 1 2 1 1 0 
4 1 + 2 i 1 2 1 1 0 
5 1 + 1 i 1 1 1 1 0 
6 1 + 1 i 1 1 1 1 0 
7 1 i 0 1 1 1 0 
8 1 + 1 i 1 1 2 2 0 
9 1 + 1 i 1 1 1 1 0 
10 1 i 0 1 2 2 0 
11 1 + 1 i 1 1 1 1 0 
12 1 + 2 i 1 2 1 1 0 
13 2 i 0 2 1 1 0 
14 2 i 0 2 3 3 0 
15 1 1 1 2 i 0 2 
16 1 + 1 i 1 1 4 i 0 4 
17 1 1 1 2 i 0 2 
18 1 1 1 2 i 0 2 
19 1 + 3 i 1 3 1 i 0 1 
20 1 + 1 i 1 1 6 i 0 6 
21 1 + 1 i 1 1 3 i 0 3 
22 1 + 1 i 1 1 3 i 0 3 
23 0 0 0 3 i 0 3 
 
84  
 
Figure IV:9 Probability Distribution – IN Degree 
 
 
 
Figure IV:10 Cumulative Distribution – IN Degree 
 
 
 
Figure IV:11 Multi-infrastructure Distribution – IN Degree 
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Figure IV:12 Probability Distribution – OUT Degree 
 
 
 
Figure IV:13 Cumulative Distribution – OUT Degree 
 
 
 
Figure IV:14 Multi-infrastructure Distribution – OUT Degree 
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IV.2.3 Betweenness Centrality Analysis 
Table IV:3 presents the nodes’ Betweenness Centrality for undirected and directed graphs. As 
expected before, the nodes 1 and 2 are highlighted as important nodes for the electric infrastructure.  
This is because of its centrality in the electric infrastructure, as it was previously mentioned. However, 
there is a very important node in the ICT infrastructure, node 19, which has an important role for the 
information communication. In the whole system, nodes 3 and 4 are identified as important for both 
infrastructures due to their interdependencies within the Electric infrastructure and with the ICT infra-
structure. Finally, as for the node degree, the node 16 is identified as important for the ICT infrastruc-
ture. 
There are clear differences between the undirected and directed graph results. For instance, 
nodes 5, 7, 10 and 13 have a betweenness centrality index of 0 for the undirected graph, that is, they 
are end-users. However in the directed graph node 5 becomes a supply node. On the other hand, nodes 
15, 17, 18, 22 and 23 are end users in the directed graph, but they have a role in the undirected graph. 
It highlights the relevance of analyzing electric infrastructures as directed graphs and ICT infrastruc-
tures as undirected graphs. 
Table IV:3 Node Betweenness Centrality – Undirected and Directed Graph 
 
Undirect Graph Direct Graph 
Node be bc bglobal be bc bglobal 
1 144 0.0 144.0 48 0 48 
2 130 16.7 131.1 63 0 63 
3 72 38.3 81.6 9 0 9 
4 72 23.0 75.6 27 0 27 
5 0 0.0 0.0 10 0 10 
6 28 0.0 28.0 8 0 8 
7 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 
8 28 0.0 28.0 22 0 22 
9 52 0.0 52.0 30 0 30 
10 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 
11 52 0.0 52.0 20 0 20 
12 28 0.0 28.0 11 0 11 
13 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 
14 54 0.0 54.0 0 0 0 
15 0 20.0 20.0 0 0 0 
16 0 133.3 133.3 0 14 14 
17 0 38.0 38.0 0 0 0 
18 0 38.0 38.0 0 0 0 
19 0 210.7 210.7 0 35 35 
20 0 158.0 158.0 0 36 36 
21 0 178.0 178.0 0 20 20 
22 0 1.0 1.0 0 0 0 
23 0 45.0 45.0 0 0 0 
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Figure IV:15 presents the edges Betweenness Centrality for the Undirected Graph. This figure 
shows the symmetry of the undirected graph and the most critical edges in the coupled system. In this 
specific case, the most critical nodes are within the ICT infrastructure (edges 16-21, 19-20 and 19-21).  
The betweenness in the interconnection -edges up-right and bottom-left side- does not highlight 
specifically any edge, in comparison with the within each system. Figure IV:16 shows the results for 
the Directed Graph, which identifies critical edges within the electrical infrastructure and the ICT in-
frastructure, but not specifically for the interconnection of edges.  
 
Figure IV:15 Edges Betweenness Centrality – Undirected Graph 
 
 
 
Figure IV:16 Edge Betweenness Centrality – Directed Graph 
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IV.2.4 Efficiency 
Table IV:4 presents the efficiency results after removing each node in the coupled test system. 
The nodes 1, 2, and 20 are identified as critical nodes within their own infrastructures. However, nodes 
15 and 19 are recognized as important nodes for both infrastructures, having an impact in the efficien-
cy of both infrastructures. Figure IV:17 and Figure IV:18 show the same results for a better interpreta-
tion. 
The highest impact for the undirected graph is 60% (node 2) and 57% for the directed graph 
(node 2 as well). That means that even in the case N-1, there are still topological paths to ensure the 
continuity of service. This does not mean that physically the system will continue to work, but that 
there are options to reconfigure the system. Nodes 8, 9 and 14 are identified, for the first time, as criti-
cal within the Electric infrastructure. 
  
 
Table IV:4 Vertices efficiency Undirected and Directed Graph 
 
UNDIRECTED GRAPH DIRECTED GRAPH 
Electric Efficiency ICT Efficiency Electric Efficiency ICT Efficiency 
Node Ee ΔEe Ec ΔEc Ee ΔEe Ec ΔEc 
Normal 
State 0.2327 
 
0.4062 
 
0.1473 
 
0.2533 
 1 0.1384 41% 0.4062 0% 0.0991 33% 0.2533 0% 
2 0.0927 60% 0.3729 8% 0.0635 57% 0.2374 6% 
3 0.1717 26% 0.3639 10% 0.1333 10% 0.2220 12% 
4 0.1919 18% 0.3688 9% 0.1237 16% 0.2308 9% 
5 0.1862 20% 0.3792 7% 0.1185 20% 0.2454 3% 
6 0.1864 20% 0.3782 7% 0.1289 12% 0.2414 5% 
7 0.2247 3% 0.3751 8% 0.1394 5% 0.2388 6% 
8 0.1637 30% 0.3792 7% 0.0912 38% 0.2454 3% 
9 0.1678 28% 0.3762 7% 0.1071 27% 0.2299 9% 
10 0.1922 17% 0.3782 7% 0.1316 11% 0.2414 5% 
11 0.2053 12% 0.3782 7% 0.1315 11% 0.2414 5% 
12 0.2160 7% 0.3722 8% 0.1377 7% 0.2220 12% 
13 0.2250 3% 0.3722 8% 0.1429 3% 0.2220 12% 
14 0.1652 29% 0.3722 8% 0.1252 15% 0.2220 12% 
15 0.1914 18% 0.3669 10% 0.1166 21% 0.2202 13% 
16 0.2026 13% 0.2943 28% 0.1394 5% 0.1865 26% 
17 0.1993 14% 0.3505 14% 0.1185 20% 0.2321 8% 
18 0.2026 13% 0.3505 14% 0.1193 19% 0.2321 8% 
19 0.2026 13% 0.2664 34% 0.1193 19% 0.1759 31% 
20 0.2027 13% 0.2481 39% 0.1394 5% 0.1362 46% 
21 0.2247 3% 0.3087 24% 0.1394 5% 0.1931 24% 
22 0.2027 13% 0.3598 11% 0.1394 5% 0.2295 9% 
23 0.2327 0% 0.3573 12% 0.1473 0% 0.2295 9% 
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Even if the results for undirected and directed graphs differ in scale, the same nodes are identi-
fied as important for each infrastructure. 
Table IV:5 and Table IV:6 present the edges electric and ICT efficiency, respectively, for the 
undirected and directed graphs. These results highlight the edges around nodes 1 (1-2, 3-1, 4-1), 2 (1-
2, 2-5, 2-9 and 2-15) and 20 (20-14, 20-3, 20-12 and 20-13). This is coherent with the results of node 
efficiency. Figure IV:19 and Figure IV:20 show the same results for a better understanding. 
The interface among both infrastructures has critical edges, as for the Electric Efficiency edges 
8-18, 8-19, 2-15 and for the ICT efficiency edges 16-10, 21-4, 20-3, 20-9 and 16-6. However they 
have a lower impact in the coupled system. 
 
Figure IV:17 Vertex Electric Efficiency 
 
 
Figure IV:18 Vertex ICT Efficiency 
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IV.2.5 Results Analysis 
The different indices proposed for the undirected and undirected graphs, using complex-valued 
weights, serve to identify critical nodes and edges in multi-infrastructures systems from a topological 
point of view.  
The three indices (node degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency) give consistent results, 
identifying as critical nodes the main buses in the Power System and the main routers in the ICT infra-
structure. But in addition, they identify critical edges that serve in the interface between both infra-
structures and that should be an object of study. 
This approach gives a “High level” description of coupled infrastructures and should serve as a 
first step to identify the hidden interdependencies. 
A conclusion from these results is that it is important to take into account the flow direction 
(communication flows and electrical flows) and that a more flexible model should be required to in-
corporate both heterogeneous communication patterns. 
  
Table IV:5 Edges Electric Efficiency – Undirected and Directed Graphs 
    
UNDIRECTED 
GRAPH DIRECTED GRAPH 
From To Ee ΔEe Ee ΔEe 
 Base Case 0.2327   0.1473   
1 2 0.1291 45% 0.0807 45% 
3 1 0.1509 35% 0.1097 26% 
4 1 0.1509 35% 0.1097 26% 
2 5 0.1151 51% 0.0635 57% 
6 2 0.1291 45% 0.0807 45% 
2 9 0.1151 51% 0.0635 57% 
9 8 0.1796 23% 0.1071 27% 
10 6 0.1922 17% 0.1316 11% 
14 3 0.1652 29% 0.1252 15% 
11 4 0.2053 12% 0.1315 11% 
12 11 0.2160 7% 0.1377 7% 
13 12 0.2250 3% 0.1429 3% 
7 21 0.2247 3% 0.1394 5% 
10 16 0.1922 17% 0.1316 11% 
5 17 0.1993 14% 0.1185 20% 
8 18 0.1726 26% 0.0912 38% 
8 19 0.1726 26% 0.0912 38% 
14 20 0.1652 29% 0.1252 15% 
2 15 0.1151 51% 0.0635 57% 
14 22 0.1652 29% 0.1252 15% 
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Table IV:6 Edges ICT Efficiency – Undirected and Directed Graphs 
    
UNDIRECTED 
GRAPH DIRECTED GRAPH 
From To Ec ΔEc Ec ΔEc 
Base Case 0.4062   0.2533   
15 16 0.3669 10% 0.2202 13% 
15 2 0.3446 15% 0.2123 16% 
20 14 0.2599 36% 0.1283 49% 
21 7 0.3327 18% 0.1931 24% 
16 10 0.3109 23% 0.1865 26% 
17 5 0.3505 14% 0.2321 8% 
18 8 0.3505 14% 0.2321 8% 
16 21 0.3109 23% 0.1865 26% 
16 11 0.3109 23% 0.1865 26% 
21 19 0.2623 35% 0.1667 34% 
21 4 0.3088 24% 0.1852 27% 
23 2 0.3347 18% 0.2216 13% 
23 3 0.3299 19% 0.2061 19% 
23 4 0.3288 19% 0.2149 15% 
17 19 0.2870 29% 0.1878 26% 
18 19 0.2870 29% 0.1878 26% 
19 20 0.3625 11% 0.1759 31% 
20 3 0.2459 39% 0.1283 49% 
20 12 0.2599 36% 0.1283 49% 
20 13 0.2599 36% 0.1283 49% 
20 22 0.2679 34% 0.1362 46% 
22 14 0.3643 10% 0.2061 19% 
22 13 0.3643 10% 0.2061 19% 
22 12 0.3643 10% 0.2061 19% 
20 9 0.2679 34% 0.1362 46% 
16 6 0.3109 23% 0.1865 26% 
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Figure IV:19 Edges Electric Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV:20 Edges ICT Efficiency 
 
 
 93 
IV.3 Eigenspectral Approach Results 
The second approach is applied using the same test system than the one used in section IV.1, the 
resulting graph is presented in Figure IV:21, which gives a “High level” description of the 14-bus 
Distribution test system. In this case, the system is composed of two layers, one for the electrical in-
terdependencies and another one for the cyber interdependencies. A different adjacency matrix A is 
computed for each layer, using equation (III.52). In this case, the model for the Power System takes 
advantage of the directed graph method and the ICT infrastructure is modeled as a bi-directional infra-
structure in order to highlight the inner properties of communication networks and to emphasize the 
asymmetric pattern presented in the multi-infrastructure systems, as mention in previous section. 
In this section, the complex-valued degree results are presented again in order to compare the 
results with those obtained from the last section. Afterwards, the Eigenspectral analysis of the Adja-
cency matrices and its corresponding results interpretations are presented. Results should be similar 
than those obtained in the first approach. 
CHAPTER V includes more levels, according to the interdependency types (see section I.2.2), 
in order to study other interdependencies on Smart Grids. 
As it can be seen, this approach is significantly different to other multi-dimensional approaches 
(Johansson and Hassel 2010), (B. Rozel 2009) in the sense that the physical components are at the 
same level, and the layers describe the interdependencies (see Figure II:3). The advantage of this de-
scription is that in the worst case this model will have maximum 5 Adjacency matrices (physical, 
cyber, logical, geographic and social interdependencies). In addition, each layer can exploit the capa-
bility of Complex Networks to connect a large number of nodes.  
 
Figure IV:21 Two layers graph 
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IV.3.1 Complex-valued Node Degree 
Table IV:7 presents the node-degree results. These are the same results than those obtained in 
the Table IV:2, but they are more understandable since the complex numbers are representing the dou-
ble dependency of each node (see equation (III.54)). Basically, nodes 2 and 14 are highlighted for the 
power system and the nodes 16 and 20 for the ICT network. 
It can be seen that the results are more symmetric for the ICT system than for the Electric Sys-
tem, which is because the bi-directional communication among nodes in the ICT system are modeled. 
On the contrary, since power systems are unidirectional, this pattern is maintained in the model. 
A main advantage of this method is its flexibility. For instance, for future networks or the so-
called ‘Smart-grids,’ where consumers may play producers (prosumers) role as well, distribution grids 
will exhibit a bi-directional behavior (as in the case of ICT networks). Thus, the proposed approach 
can be easily adapted to these new networks, which is the main disadvantage of classic methods that 
relies on power flow computations.  
Table IV:7 Complex-Valued Node Degree 
Node khe khc 
1 2 + 1 i 0 
2 2 + 3 i 2 + 2i 
3 1 + 1 i 2 + 2i 
4 1 + 1 i 2 + 2i 
5 1 + 1 i 1 + 1i 
6 1 + 1 i 1 + 1i 
7 1 i 1 + 1i 
8 1 + 2i 1 + 1i 
9 1 + 1i 1 + 1i 
10 2 i 1 + 1i 
11 1 + 1i 1 + 1i 
12 1 + 1i 2 + 2i 
13 1 i 2 + 2i 
14 2 i 1 + 1i 
15 1 2 + 2i 
16 1 5 + 5i 
17 1 2 + 2i 
18 1 2 + 2i 
19 1 4 + 4i 
20 1 6 + 6i 
21 1 4 + 4i 
22 0 4 + 4i 
23 0 3 + 3i 
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IV.3.2 Prestige Analysis 
Prestige analysis (for social networks) or eigenvector centrality should provide important infor-
mation about the relative importance of components and communication means, represented by nodes 
and links, in the coupled system. 
After calculating the Hermitian Matrix, using Equation (III.56), the eigensystem is calculated 
using Equation (III.32). The eigenvalues are presented in Figure IV:22 and Figure IV:23. These fig-
ures show the symmetry in the spectrum. Eigenvalues are organized from the higher to the lower val-
ues. 
The main differences between both figures are the number of nodes having their eigenvalue 
equal to zero or close to zero. It highlights the disassociation of nodes in the system due to the linear 
independence of eigenvectors.  
 
Figure IV:22 Eigenspectrum of the Electric connections matrix 
 
 
Figure IV:23 Eigenspectrum of the ICT connections matrix 
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Table IV:8 presents the highest eigenvalues from the Adjacency matrix for the Electric interde-
pendencies. It can be seen that there are two eigenvalues (λ=2.52) of the same absolute value but with 
different sign. This is the characteristic of the adjacency matrix of a star graph, i.e. a network with a 
single hub and several nodes connected to it. 
The node 2, which has the highest absolute value in the eigenvector, is the most important for 
the network. Note that this value has no shift in phase between eigenvector 1 and 2. This is the most 
central and prestigious member in the system. This result is coherent with the outcomes from the first 
approach. 
Node 1 has the second highest value in the eigenvector 1. This result is important, because as it 
was said in Section IV.2.2, node 1 is the base of the functioning of the whole system. 
Also, nodes that have a zero-value in the eigenvector are distinguished. That is the case of nodes 
7, 20, 21, 22. It can be seen in Figure IV:21 that those nodes are separated of the whole coupled sys-
tem. This technique can lead to the identification of sub-systems in the coupled system.  
Table IV:8 Highest Eigenvalues Electric System 
 
ID : 1 ID : 2 ID : 3 ID : 9 ID : 10 
 
λ = -2.52 λ = 2.52 λ = -1.82 λ = 1.82 λ = 1.63 
ID |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ 
1 0.39 2.36 0.39 -0.79 0.32 -2.36 0.32 0.79 0.02 -2.36 
2 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.11 -1.57 0.11 -1.57 0.17 1.57 
3 0.19 -1.57 0.19 -1.57 0.31 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.04 3.14 
4 0.19 -1.57 0.19 -1.57 0.38 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.18 -3.14 
5 0.28 -2.36 0.28 0.79 0.09 2.36 0.09 -0.79 0.17 2.36 
6 0.29 2.36 0.29 -0.79 0.11 0.79 0.11 -2.36 0.26 0.79 
7 0.00 -1.07 0.00 -2.96 0.00 -2.95 0.00 1.95 0.00 1.98 
8 0.18 1.57 0.18 1.57 0.37 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.54 0.00 
9 0.31 -2.36 0.31 0.79 0.26 2.36 0.26 -0.79 0.23 -0.79 
10 0.14 -1.57 0.14 -1.57 0.08 3.14 0.08 3.14 0.25 0.00 
11 0.09 0.79 0.09 -2.36 0.37 2.36 0.37 -0.79 0.26 2.36 
12 0.04 3.14 0.04 3.14 0.29 -1.57 0.29 -1.57 0.26 1.57 
13 0.02 -0.79 0.02 2.36 0.16 0.79 0.16 -2.36 0.16 0.79 
14 0.09 0.79 0.09 -2.36 0.25 2.36 0.25 -0.79 0.03 2.36 
15 0.24 -2.36 0.24 0.79 0.06 2.36 0.06 -0.79 0.11 2.36 
16 0.05 2.36 0.05 -0.79 0.05 0.79 0.05 -2.36 0.15 0.79 
17 0.11 1.57 0.11 1.57 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 -3.14 
18 0.07 -0.79 0.07 2.36 0.20 -2.36 0.20 0.79 0.33 0.79 
19 0.07 -0.79 0.07 2.36 0.20 -2.36 0.20 0.79 0.33 0.79 
20 0.04 -1.57 0.04 -1.57 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.02 3.14 
21 0.00 1.79 0.00 -3.07 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.61 0.00 -2.68 
22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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The results in Table IV:9 present a different behavior between both types of structures, in com-
parison with Table IV:8. This difference is characterized by the existence or not of pairs of eigenval-
ues with the same absolute value and different signs. This mathematical difference reveals the struc-
ture of the network. For instance, the power system has many pairs of eigenvalues, which is a charac-
teristic of radial networks. 
In this case, the node with the highest value in the eigenvector is the node 20, which is a central 
router, as mentioned in Section IV.2.2 for the first approach. 
Additionally, the only node with a zero-value in the eigenvector is the node 1, which has no ICT 
–connection in the test system. The lowest values, after zero, are for the nodes 6 and 10, which are the 
less central nodes in the system. This information can be confirmed thanks to the Efficiency index 
calculated and presented in Table IV:4, where nodes 6 and 10 have a minimal impact on the system 
efficient from a topological point of view.  
Table IV:9 Highest Eigenvalues ICT System 
 
ID : 1 ID : 3 ID : 2 ID : 6 ID : 4 
 
λ = 4.43 λ = -3.91 λ = 3.58 λ = -3.2 λ = 2.63 
ID |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.054 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.234 -3.142 
3 0.218 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.002 3.142 0.204 3.142 0.109 3.142 
4 0.096 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.009 0.000 
5 0.035 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.055 -3.142 0.200 0.000 
6 0.034 0.000 0.128 -3.142 0.209 0.000 0.221 3.142 0.131 3.142 
7 0.058 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.105 0.000 
8 0.035 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.055 -3.142 0.200 0.000 
9 0.180 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.065 3.142 0.205 -3.142 0.012 3.142 
10 0.034 0.000 0.128 3.142 0.209 0.000 0.221 3.142 0.131 3.142 
11 0.034 0.000 0.128 3.142 0.209 0.000 0.221 3.142 0.131 -3.142 
12 0.316 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.152 3.142 0.180 3.142 0.113 3.142 
13 0.316 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.152 3.142 0.180 3.142 0.113 3.142 
14 0.136 0.000 0.023 -3.142 0.086 3.142 0.026 0.000 0.101 3.142 
15 0.052 0.000 0.179 3.142 0.278 0.000 0.275 3.142 0.257 -3.142 
16 0.108 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.243 3.142 
17 0.110 0.000 0.172 -3.142 0.080 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.373 0.000 
18 0.110 0.000 0.172 -3.142 0.080 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.373 0.000 
19 0.309 0.000 0.414 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.229 3.142 0.494 0.000 
20 0.564 0.000 0.386 -3.142 0.165 3.142 0.465 0.000 0.023 3.142 
21 0.182 0.000 0.413 -3.142 0.438 0.000 0.197 -3.142 0.196 0.000 
22 0.426 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.219 3.142 0.058 3.142 0.188 3.142 
23 0.117 0.000 0.211 3.142 0.161 0.000 0.003 3.142 0.180 3.142 
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IV.4 Conclusions 
This Chapter presented the application of the approaches proposed in CHAPTER III to model 
coupled infrastructures, in this case a Distribution Network with its surrounding Communication net-
work. 
The first approach studies the topology of the system supported by a modification of the classi-
cal properties of graph theory, such as node-degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency. The modi-
fication consisted in the application of complex-weighted adjacency matrices and two-layer analysis, 
according to the interdependencies. These indices served to identify critical nodes and edges in multi-
infrastructures systems from a topological point of view. 
Results give coherent results, identifying as critical nodes the main buses in the Power System 
and the main Routers in the ICT infrastructure. But in addition, they reveal critical edges that serve in 
the interface between both infrastructures. In addition, these results highlight the importance to model 
coupled systems as undirected and directed graphs, in order to evaluate the heterogeneous communica-
tion patterns in each infrastructure. 
The second approach, analyzes the Eigensystem of the complex-weighted adjacency matrix that 
represent the coupled infrastructures. In order to facilitate the interpretation of results, the complex-
weighted adjacency matrix is transformed to the Hilbert Space using Hermitian matrices. As a result, 
eigenvalues from this system are all real-values, where the eigenvectors from the highest eigenvalue is 
interpreted as an index of importance and relevance of the node in the coupled system. 
This approach improves some weaknesses of the first approach, such as the bi-directional com-
munication in each infrastructure. Therefore, both systems can include bi-directional edges, which 
should serve to study different types of infrastructures. 
Some of the main advantages of the proposed approaches are:  
 The application of complex numbers added flexibility to the classical definitions and prop-
erties of complex networks. Therefore, new indices can be developed to perform vulnerabil-
ity assessment and interdependencies modeling of coupled infrastructures, despite their in-
herent differences. 
 These approaches can be applied to a wide range of coupled heterogeneous systems. 
 Even if this Chapter depicts and analysis taking into account physical and cyber interde-
pendencies, many other interdependencies types can be applied, which will be explored in 
CHAPTER V. 
 Due to the availability of fast algorithms to study Complex Networks, the CPU Time re-
quired to model large coupled infrastructures is very low. 
 Scalability is possible using complex networks and generally it will not affect the computa-
tional processing time. 
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CHAPTER V  
System-of-Systems vision of Coupled Infrastructures 
The secret of all victory lies in the organization of the non-obvious 
Marcus Aurelius 
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Abstract 
System-of-Systems approach aims at studying as a whole the different components of multiple infrastruc-
ture systems. This has been called as well: Global Vision of Systems. This analysis is very relevant in order to 
understand the behavior of complex systems, particularly, future power distribution systems or ‘Smart Grids’. 
SGAM is a standardized model proposed by Siemens and standardized by CENELEC and the European Com-
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mission in order to set a common vision of these grids. This chapter proposes a “Low level” system description 
analysis and an integration with “High level” system description analysis in order to create a methodology for 
modeling Smart-Grids, based on the SGAM reference. 
V.1 Introduction 
System of Systems (SoS) Engineering is a discipline that focuses on multiple integrated com-
plex systems (Keating, et al. 2003), including cross-system interdependencies. In other words, this 
discipline studies the Big Picture of Critical Infrastructures. It is believed that it was originated from 
the System thinking theory (Boardman and Saucer 2008) and evolved due to the rapidly increasing 
complexity of coupled infrastructures (Gorod, Sauser and Boardman 2008). 
Nowadays, this theory has evolved to a Global Systems Science (Jaeger, et al. 2013) that de-
fines the complex systems as: Systems that are composed of different heterogeneous parts that include 
hierarchies, their different parts are coupled and their parts represent different space scales and evolve 
at different time scales. 
It is important to differentiate Systems-of-Subsystems and Systems-of-Systems. On the one 
hand, in a System-of-Subsystems there is a centralized control, the connectivity is platform-centric, i.e. 
high connectivity within subsystems and low connectivity among subsystems, and its different parts 
are homogeneous and have a hierarchy. On the other hand, System-of-Systems is composed of hetero-
geneous, autonomous and independent systems, with a decentralized control, and most of the behav-
iors are not foreseen (Sauser, Boardman and Gorod 2008). 
Critical Infrastructures are seen as a large System-of-Systems, where security issues demands a 
study of their interdependencies in its entirety (Zolesio 2010). CHAPTER III and CHAPTER IV pre-
sented an analysis of two layers physical and cyber of a distribution network, this analysis is called 
“High level” system description analysis since it describes the system as a whole. However, in that 
approach some nodes represented a whole system, e.g. a substation. Therefore, in order to expand the 
proposed approach and to include a “Low level analysis,” this Chapter demonstrates the application of 
“Low level” system description analysis and applies the Eigenspectral analysis to study the substation 
interdependencies as an example. 
Finally, in order to have the big picture of the whole coupled system; it is proposed a methodol-
ogy to model Smart Grids, based in the SGAM reference (Smart Grid Architecture Model). SGAM 
was developed in 2012 to define the different layers that compose a Smart Grid and to describe their 
interplays (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012). The proposed methodology in this dissertation integrates 
several interdependency types. As a result, a new model to study the vulnerabilities and interdepend-
encies of power systems, including substations and distributed energy resources is obtained. 
The main body of this chapter is divided into four parts; Section V.2 presents the “Low Level” 
system description analysis as an approach to the System-of-Systems Engineering view of Distribution 
Networks. In this section the PREDIS Platform is presented as a test system. Section V.3 describes de 
integration of “Low level” system description and “High-level” system description. Section V.4 intro-
duces the SGAM definition and the resulting methodology to model the interdependencies of Smart 
Grids. Finally, Section V.5 summarizes and concludes. 
  
 101 
V.2 “Low-level” System Description Analysis 
Previous Chapters showed several approaches to model and identify weaknesses of coupled in-
frastructures using Complex Networks in a “High Level” system description. However, some of the 
nodes are complex systems, composed of different heterogeneous components with multiples interde-
pendencies. Therefore, this sections aims at describing the individual components, that is, to model in 
detail the nodes as presented in Figure V:1. The definition of “High level” system description and 
“Low level” system description reveals the scalability and flexibility of proposed approaches to ana-
lyze power systems at different levels. 
Substations are key components of Power Distribution and Transmission systems. Previous 
Chapters assumed these substations as a single bus and consequently a single node in the Complex 
Networks approach. However, they are autonomous systems composed of multiple devices with mul-
tiple connections as described in (IEC 61850 2003). For that reason and according to the System-of-
Systems Engineering, substations are modeled as complex networks and the Eigenspectral approach is 
used to identify critical components within the substation. 
V.2.1 Test system – HV/MV Substation 
The 14-bus distribution test system from CHAPTER IV is used in this section to exemplify the 
analysis. This test system is part of the PREDIS platform, which is a center of innovation and educa-
tion for Smart grids, particularly for distributed energy located at G2ELAB/Grenoble INP. It provides 
a demonstration tool for smart energy management with a physical power grid complying with indus-
try standards. It particularly allows different energy sources to be connected to different users through 
a reconfigurable physical grid and a supervisory control system. This testbed allowed different studies 
to be performed, including Self-healing on distribution networks with distributed generators (Le-
Thanh, et al. 2009), to test fault location algorithms and different means for improving resilience in an 
coupled system (Stahl, et al. 2010) and to test high level functions relied on advanced ICT systems 
(Hadjsaid, Le-Thanh, et al. 2010). 
During the SINARI Project (McDonald, et al. 2013) this platform was improved and an emula-
tion of a Control Center and a Substation were included, with the corresponding SCADA system and 
the Communication Network.  
 
Figure V:1”Low Level” & “High Level” description 
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According to the results presented in CHAPTER IV, the bus 2 is the most important and critical 
in the 14-bus test system (see Figure V:2); however, this bus is a substation, the architecture of this 
substation is presented in Figure V:3. Figure V:4 shows the Communication Network and Figure V:5 
presents the possible supply system for auxiliary systems, such as relays, router, HMI, and printers. 
The auxiliary system was included in this dissertation and is not a part of the original Platform. 
SINARI Project used the standard IEC 61850 to define the communication protocols between devices 
within the substation.  
 
Figure V:3 Substation diagram including Control devices 
 
 
Figure V:2 Complete 14-Bus Tests System 
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The control system has a protection Schneider S40, 3 protections Schneider S80. In this disser-
tation another relay S80 was included in order to exemplify the impact of auxiliary systems,. These 
protections have several functions, including overvoltage, under voltage, and breaker failure, among 
others. 
The communication network is an Ethernet-based system, relays are with IEC 61850 protocol. 
Additionally, it includes a local controller, a network printer (not included in the PREDIS platform) 
and a gateway to communicate with other substations. 
Auxiliary system is composed of Back-up diesel generator and battery storage. Relays are DC 
loads and computers, printers and routers are AC loads. 
 
Figure V:4 Substation Communication Network 
 
 
Figure V:5 Auxiliary Control supply system 
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V.2.2 Complex-networks modeling methodology 
The methodology to design the graph is the same than in CHAPTER IV. But in this case, not 
only the bus-bars are modeled as nodes, but as well the circuit breakers, bay protection relays, trans-
formers and controller computers. The resulting graph of the substation is detailed in Figure V:6. 
Links within the communication network (ICT and Control) are bidirectional according to the 
nature of communications in this network. On the other hand, for the power supply, links are unidirec-
tional. However, for further applications (Smart grids and future networks) these links can be modeled 
as well as bi-directional connections. 
This network clearly has four clusters, each one with a central hub (nodes 5, 18, 21 and 24). 
Therefore, it is expected that the Eigenspectral analysis will highlight these nodes as important, but 
most importantly, that it will quantify their importance in the network. 
Even if this level is called “Low level” system description, it is important to mention that there 
are “lower levels” (and “higher levels”), and it depends on the user the level degree at with the cou-
pled system will be modeled. 
Additionally, the resulting substation model can be used as a generic model of substations. That 
is, as a black-box with inputs and outputs that can be connected in the “high level” system description 
model in order to integrate both levels and obtain a SoS vision of coupled infrastructures. 
  
 
Figure V:6 Substation graph 
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V.2.3 Results “Low level” description 
Table V:1 and Table V:2 list the highest eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors. For 
the power system, the results suggest that nodes 21, 19 and 18 are the most critical in the system. 
These nodes correspond to the loads bus-bar in the auxiliary system and the AC/DC converter. These 
results highlight the importance of the auxiliary system in power grids. 
At first glance, these results are showing an uncommon vulnerability. However, it is clear that 
in the coupled system, auxiliary systems are in the interface of the power systems and the ICT system. 
Moreover, without node 21, all communication components will be disconnected and the consequenc-
es might be catastrophic.  
Table V:1 Eigenanalisis Substation System - Ae 
 
ID 1 ID 2 ID 3 ID 4 ID 5 
λ = 3.079 λ = 2.676 λ = 2.459 λ = -3.074 λ = -2.626 
|x| φ |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ 
1 0.000 -1.772 0.005 -0.231 0.031 3.142 0.000 -1.237 0.005 0.431 
2 0.001 -0.987 0.013 0.555 0.077 -2.356 0.000 2.690 0.013 -1.925 
3 0.002 -0.202 0.031 1.340 0.159 -1.571 0.001 0.333 0.029 2.002 
4 0.006 0.584 0.069 2.125 0.313 -0.785 0.003 -2.023 0.062 -0.354 
5 0.016 1.369 0.153 2.911 0.610 0.000 0.009 1.904 0.135 -2.711 
6 0.026 2.155 0.142 -2.587 0.296 0.785 0.015 -0.452 0.112 1.216 
7 0.006 2.155 0.067 -2.587 0.297 0.785 0.003 -0.452 0.060 1.216 
8 0.006 2.155 0.067 -2.587 0.297 0.785 0.003 -0.452 0.060 1.216 
9 0.006 2.155 0.067 -2.587 0.297 0.785 0.003 -0.452 0.060 1.216 
10 0.002 2.940 0.025 -1.802 0.121 1.571 0.001 -2.808 0.023 -1.140 
11 0.002 2.940 0.025 -1.802 0.121 1.571 0.001 -2.808 0.023 -1.140 
12 0.002 2.940 0.025 -1.802 0.121 1.571 0.001 -2.808 0.023 -1.140 
13 0.064 2.940 0.226 -1.802 0.117 1.571 0.037 -2.808 0.158 -1.140 
14 0.056 -2.914 0.182 -1.282 0.031 3.076 0.031 2.733 0.102 -2.275 
15 0.116 -2.321 0.275 -0.715 0.078 -0.686 0.103 0.747 0.261 2.259 
16 0.119 -2.391 0.292 -0.852 0.037 -0.210 0.105 0.823 0.286 2.445 
17 0.098 -2.356 0.209 -0.785 0.081 -0.535 0.094 0.785 0.230 2.356 
18 0.303 -1.571 0.559 0.000 0.200 0.251 0.289 -1.571 0.603 0.000 
19 0.304 -0.785 0.095 0.785 0.054 1.036 0.303 2.356 0.121 -2.356 
20 0.206 -0.785 0.114 -2.356 0.027 -2.105 0.209 2.356 0.109 0.785 
21 0.634 0.000 0.304 -1.571 0.068 -1.320 0.644 0.000 0.286 -1.571 
22 0.098 -0.785 0.209 0.785 0.081 1.036 0.094 2.356 0.230 -2.356 
23 0.098 -0.785 0.209 0.785 0.081 1.036 0.094 2.356 0.230 -2.356 
24 0.098 -0.785 0.209 0.785 0.081 1.036 0.094 2.356 0.230 -2.356 
25 0.206 0.785 0.114 -0.785 0.027 -0.535 0.209 -2.356 0.109 2.356 
26 0.206 0.785 0.114 -0.785 0.027 -0.535 0.209 -2.356 0.109 2.356 
27 0.206 0.785 0.114 -0.785 0.027 -0.535 0.209 -2.356 0.109 2.356 
28 0.206 0.785 0.114 -0.785 0.027 -0.535 0.209 -2.356 0.109 2.356 
29 0.206 0.785 0.114 -0.785 0.027 -0.535 0.209 -2.356 0.109 2.356 
30 0.206 0.785 0.114 -0.785 0.027 -0.535 0.209 -2.356 0.109 2.356 
31 0.206 0.785 0.114 -0.785 0.027 -0.535 0.209 -2.356 0.109 2.356 
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For the ICT system, there is an unequivocal evidence that node 24 is the most central and im-
portant node in the coupled system. In this case, the result was very clear before the computation of 
the eigensystem, because of the structure of the communication network.  
Additionally, results evidence a star-network topology, as mentioned before in CHAPTER IV. It 
is well known that this type of topologies has several advantages, including a high-performance, easi-
ness to create larger networks, adding a new host (new component) to the network, does not mean that 
the hosts already connected will get a bad performance (Peterson and Davie 2003). Nevertheless, this 
topology is highly dependent on the central hub, which is the case of this network.  
Table V:2 Eigenanalisis Substation System - Ac 
 ID 1 ID 2 ID 5 ID 6 
λ = 4.402 λ = -4.402 λ = 1.414 λ = -1.414 
|x| φ |x| φ |x| φ |x| φ 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.037 -3.142 0.475 3.142 
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.101 -3.142 0.160 3.142 
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.137 3.142 0.020 0.000 
7 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.633 0.000 0.161 0.000 
8 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.229 3.142 0.471 0.000 
9 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.130 3.142 0.018 -3.142 
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
22 0.219 0.000 0.219 3.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.142 
23 0.219 0.000 0.219 3.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.142 
24 0.681 0.000 0.681 0.000 0.000 -3.142 0.000 0.000 
25 0.244 0.000 0.244 -3.142 0.101 -3.142 0.160 0.000 
26 0.244 0.000 0.244 -3.142 0.137 3.142 0.020 3.142 
27 0.244 0.000 0.244 3.142 0.633 0.000 0.161 3.142 
28 0.244 0.000 0.244 -3.142 0.229 3.142 0.471 -3.142 
29 0.244 0.000 0.244 -3.142 0.130 3.142 0.018 0.000 
30 0.244 0.000 0.244 -3.142 0.037 -3.142 0.475 0.000 
31 0.219 0.000 0.219 3.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.142 
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V.3 Integration of “Low level” and “High level” system description 
CHAPTER III and Section V.2 presented a methodology to model coupled infrastructures in a 
“High level” and a “Low level” system description. Both descriptions can be integrated in a single 
model, which is a SoS vision of coupled infrastructures. In this section, the “Low level” system de-
scription is added to the “High level” system description. As a result, it is obtained a model that in-
volves all components of coupled infrastructures, as displayed in Figure V:7. 
V.3.1 Methodology 
In order to create a standardized model to describe coupled infrastructures, taking into account 
the “High level” and the “Low level” system descriptions, this Chapter proposes a 3-steps methodolo-
gy, as detailed in Figure V:8. 
 Step 1: Build the “High Level” System Description, black-boxes interdependencies. 
o Define the main systems involved in the coupled infrastructures. 
o Define the interdependency types to be modeled. 
o Define the systems’ interconnections and relationships. 
 Step 2: Build the “Low Level” System Description, description of black-boxes. 
o Description of every system involved in the “High Level” system description, taking 
into account the same interdependency types. 
o Definition of inputs & outputs that interface the system with other systems. 
 Step 3: Integration, SoS vision of coupled infrastructures. 
o Interconnect the systems according to the architecture built in the “High level” system 
description and the input & output configurations from “Low level” system descrip-
tion. 
o Resulting model can be used to identify the critical components after applying the ap-
proaches proposed in CHAPTER III. 
 
Figure V:7 Integration of “Low level” and “High level” description 
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V.3.2 Test case 
In order to demonstrate how to build the SoS model, the graph obtained in CHAPTER IV (see 
Figure IV:21) will be used for the Step 1. The substation model from Figure V:6 describes the “Low 
level” of substations, i.e. nodes 2 (substation 1), 3 (substation 3) and 4 (substation 2). It is taken as a 
general purpose substation; it means that the same model will be taken for all substations. Table V:3 
presents the nodes correspondence between “High level” model and “Low level” model. For instance, 
the node 10 (Substation Bay 1) corresponds to the node 6 in the “High level” graph (see Figure V:2) 
for the Substation 1. 
After integrating both levels, the resulting model has two layers, one for the electric interde-
pendencies (Figure V:9) and one for the ICT interdependencies (Figure V:10). 
 
 
Figure V:8 Methodology to elaborate the SoS Model 
Table V:3 Nodes correspondence between “High level” and “Low Level” system description 
General Substation 
model 
Substation 1  
Correspondence 
Substation 2 
Correspondence 
Substation 3 
Correspondence 
1 1 1 1 
10 6 11 14 
11 5 - - 
12 9 - - 
24 15 23 23 
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Figure V:9 Graph Electric Interdependencies Global model 
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Figure V:10 Graph ICT Interdependencies Global model 
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The resulting two-layer model can be used to compute the two approaches proposed in CHAP-
TER III. For instance, for the Eigenspectral analysis the main results are shown in Table V:4 for the 
electric layer and in Table V:5 for the ICT layer. 
It was expected beforehand that substations play an important role in the coupled infrastructure. 
Table V:4 and Table V:5 reveal that the most critical nodes of the coupled infrastructure are located at 
substations 1, 2 and 3. In fact, the most critical nodes are components of the auxiliary system. This 
result is evident since the auxiliary system supply the electricity to the control and monitoring system, 
that is, the auxiliary system is located at the interface of both systems, as mentioned in previous sec-
tions. 
In addition, the Ethernet network (represented by node 23) is identified as the most important 
ICT component for the coupled system. This result is consistent with the results obtained in CHAP-
TER IV. 
This model has revealed the weakest components in a system-of-systems, which allows the de-
velopment of defense strategies either for the coupled system of for every system.  
Table V:4 Results Eigenspectrum Electric Interdependencies 
   ID 4 - λ = 3.12 
Node Correspondence Zone |x| φ 
68 21 Substation 1 0.399 0.000 
97 21 Substation 2 0.399 0.000 
65 18 Substation 1 0.293 -1.571 
94 18 Substation 2 0.293 -1.571 
66 19 Substation 1 0.222 -0.785 
95 19 Substation 2 0.222 -0.785 
 
Table V:5 Results Eigenspectrum ICT Interdependencies 
   ID 2 - λ =6.3 
Node Correspondence Zone |x| φ 
23 - Distribution 0.690 0 
49 31 Substation 1 0.172 0 
103 28 Substation 3 0.163 0 
71 25 Substation 2 0.163 0 
72 26 Substation 2 0.163 0 
73 27 Substation 2 0.163 0 
74 28 Substation 2 0.163 0 
75 29 Substation 2 0.163 0 
76 30 Substation 2 0.163 0 
77 31 Substation 2 0.163 0 
100 25 Substation 3 0.163 0 
101 26 Substation 3 0.163 0 
102 27 Substation 3 0.163 0 
104 29 Substation 3 0.163 0 
105 30 Substation 3 0.163 0 
106 31 Substation 3 0.163 0 
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V.4 Smart-Grids: A SGAM-based System-of-Systems vision 
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to explore the feasibility of using the proposed ap-
proaches at different levels, according to the most recent architectures proposed for Smart Grids. Pre-
vious Chapters and sections proposed different methods (or a vision) to model coupled infrastructures, 
from a “high level description” and from a “low level description.” This Section aims at describing the 
Smart Grids Architecture model (SGAM) and proposes a general methodology to model Smart Grids’ 
interdependencies. 
In order to better understand the SGAM, it is important to define a Smart Grid. According to the 
European Commission “a Smart grid is an electricity network that can integrate in a cost efficient 
manner the behavior and actions of all users connected to it - generators, consumers and those that do 
both - in order to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high 
levels of quality and security of supply and safety” (EU Commission Task Force for Smart Grids 
2010) 
However, even if there is an official definition of Smart Grid, apparently each enterprise and re-
search center is developing its own Smart Grid model and definition. There are some researchers that 
call it the “Smarter Grid,” signaling that current grids are smart as well, but in a lower level (ABB Inc 
2009). 
Therefore, in order to fulfill the tasks of mandate M/490 (see Appendix C) and to create a con-
sensus on Smart Grids Architectures, the SGAM was created (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012). 
V.4.1 Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM)  
(CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012) identified three major problems in the development of Smart 
Grids today. 
 How to compare the different Smart Grids Architectures proposed? 
 How to choose a Smart Grid Standard? Taking into account that there are several standards 
 
Figure V:11 SGAM Framework (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012) 
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with many limitations, gaps and overlaps. 
 How to migrate to Smart Grid from an architectural point of view? 
According to them, a Smart Grid is a “complex system of systems for which a common under-
standing of its major building and how they interrelate must be broadly shared.” For that reason, in 
order to create a standardized architecture model, three main aspects were evaluated: domains, zones 
and interoperability layers. These aspects are described in next subsections. 
V.4.1.1 SGAM: Domains 
“Domains” describe the energy conversion chain, that is, a description of main actors in the 
Smart grid. These domains were selected according to the NIST Smart Grid Standard (NIST 2012). 
Additionally, the DER (Distributed Energy Resources) Domain was included. Therefore, the main 
domains of Smart Grids are: 
 Generation: The bulk generation, e.g. fossil, nuclear, large scale solar power plants, hydro 
power plants and off-shore wind farms. 
 Transmission: The infrastructure that transports electricity over long distances. 
 Distribution: The infrastructure that distributes electricity to customers. 
 DER: Small-scale power generation, from 3kW to 10MW. 
 Customer: End-users (consumers), but they have the possibility to produce electricity, i.e. 
prosumers. 
V.4.1.2 SGAM: Zones 
“Smart Grids” are divided into six zones: 
 Process: This zone includes all types of energy transformation, e.g. physical, chemical or 
spatial. In addition, it includes the physical equipment. 
 Field: It contains all the equipment used to control, protect and monitor the processes within 
the Smart Grid. 
 Station: This zone includes the aggregators of all fields’ equipment. 
 Operation: It hosts the power system control operation, including DMS, EMS, and others. 
 Enterprise: It covers all the commercial and organizational processes, services and infra-
structures for enterprises. 
 Market: It reflects the market operations possible in the energy conversion chain. 
V.4.1.3 SGAM: Interoperability Layers 
The interoperability layers cover the different interdependencies between domains in many 
zones. This is very close to the vision proposed in CHAPTER 3 (see Figure III:23 and Figure III:24). 
SGAM proposes five layers: 
 Component: It represents the physical layer, including all participating components in the 
Smart Grids. For instance, power systems equipment, protection/control devices or network 
infrastructure. 
 Function: It describes the functions and services including their relationships. 
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 Information: It contains all the information that is used and exchanged between functions, 
services and components. 
 Communication: It describes the protocols and mechanisms used to exchange the infor-
mation. 
 Business: It represents all business capabilities and processes to support business executives 
in decision making processes. 
V.4.1.4 SGAM: Architecture 
The resulting architecture that puts all the domains, zones and layers together is detailed in Fi-
gure V:11. This representation enables the understanding of the relationships in the Smart Grid. In 
addition, this architecture can be used to describe the interoperability between two (or more) systems, 
taking into account the component, communication, information, function and business layers, which 
are called the “cross-cutting issues.” 
V.4.2 Complex Networks modeling 
This section proposes a standardized methodology in order to model Smart Grids, based in the 
Smart Grid Reference Architecture and the integration of “High level” and “Low level” descriptions. 
Following the methodology detailed in Figure V:8, the three steps are described in the following 
subsections. 
V.4.2.1 Step 1: High level system Description 
 Define the main systems involved in the coupled infrastructures. 
At this step, 8 systems are identified: Markets, Operations, Service provider, Transmission net-
work, Distribution Network, Customer, Bulk generation and Distributed Energy Resources. 
 Define the interdependency types to be modeled. 
Considering the interdependencies types presented in Section I.2.2 (physical, cyber, geographic 
and logical) and taking into account the interoperability layers, four interdependency levels were de-
fined: physical level is composed of electrical interdependencies between components of SGAM 
Component level. Cyber level is composed of communication interdependencies between components 
at the SGAM Component level. This layer can be supported as well by the Information layer. Geo-
graphic level according to the zones proposed in the SGAM framework. Logical level composed of 
function relationships, from the function layer in the SGAM framework. 
 Define the systems interconnections and relationships. 
The NIST model (NIST 2012) and the SGAM Reference architecture (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 
2012) presented the interconnections between the actors (or domains) in the Smart Grid. Figure V:12 
presents the interconnections between these domains and their interdependency levels. Dotted lines 
were added in order to take into account the electrical dependency of markets, operation and service 
provider. 
V.4.2.2 Step 2: Low Level system Description 
 Description of every system involved in the “High Level” description, taking into account 
the same interdependency levels. 
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The components of each system are described for all zones (process, field, station and opera-
tion). In addition, the interdependencies within the system are modeled using the same procedure than 
for the distribution system in CHAPTER IV. 
V.4.2.3 Step 3: SoS vision of Smart Grids. 
 Interconnect the systems according to the architecture built in the “High level” description 
and the input & output configurations from “Low level” description. 
The final step integrates both levels, as presented in Section V.3. It is important to make clear 
that thanks to the integration of description levels, each system can be modeled as detailed as needed. 
For instance, the distribution system model can be described as in the CHAPTER III, or it can include 
as well the model of substation and lines, among others. 
The proposed methodology should serve to model Smart Grid interdependencies and to identify 
the weakest connections and components within the System-of-systems. 
V.5 Summary 
This chapter proposed a “Low level” system description analysis of power systems and as a test 
case it was used a substation system developed during the SINARI Project and emulated in the PRE-
DIS platform. Later, it proposes an integration methodology of “High level” and “Low level” system 
descriptions, in order to analyze the whole System-of-systems interdependencies. Finally, based on the 
Smart Grid Architecture Reference Model, it was proposed a methodology to model Smart Grids and 
to identify the weakest components in a SOS vision of coupled infrastructures. 
The definition of “High level” description and “Low level” system description reveals the 
scalability and flexibility of proposed approaches to analyze power systems (and in general Critical 
 
Figure V:12 Smart Grid “High level” description 
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infrastructures) at different levels taking into account multiple interdependencies. 
The main result of this Chapter is a methodology that aims at identifying the vulnerabilities and 
interdependencies of power systems facing the wide deployment of Information and Communication 
technologies, including substations and distributed energy resources. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
There is no real ending. It’s just the place where you stop the story. 
Frank Herbert 
 
 
Power Distribution Systems demand a continuous research to ensure high levels of reliability, 
availability and security. As a consequence, new equipment has been created to support the supervi-
sion, control and protection of Power Distribution Systems. This new equipment relies on fast, secure 
and efficient communication networks. 
However, last years have been marked by high deployment of Information and Telecommunica-
tion Technologies on many infrastructures, making a whole complex network of coupled heterogene-
ous infrastructures, creating a huge System-of-Systems. 
As well, power systems face other challenges, such as the beginning of a liberalized marked and 
the insertion of decentralized generation. Yet these two challenges highly rely on ICT networks. 
Generally speaking, ICT deployment has been very positive and has improved the supervision 
and control, supported the operation decision making process, policy making and markets regulation. 
Nevertheless, recent events have shown that there are new vulnerabilities that emerge from the interac-
tions and interplays among Critical infrastructures, e.g. Stuxnet worm, Ohio Davis-Besse nuclear plant 
attack or the 2003 US – Canada Blackout. 
This dissertation described some of the main interplays and interdependencies among critical in-
frastructures. Particularly, it investigated and described the interdependencies among power distribu-
tion networks, information and communication infrastructure and the different control and supervision 
hierarchical levels, to better understand the studied problem. 
Among the multiple interdependencies between infrastructures, this dissertation explored those 
that are capable of creating cascading effects from one infrastructure to the other. 
In this context, the US Homeland Security Department and the European Commission have ad-
dressed this problem, and new policies are being created in order to ensure the continuity of service of 
Critical Infrastructures. As well, many projects have been developed in order to understand these 
complex interactions, one of them: the SINARI Project, sponsored by the ANR-France. This thesis 
was developed as part of this project. 
This context opened a new research direction with new challenges and goals. One of them is the 
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need of new tools and methods to understand, to identify and to quantify the interdependencies and 
vulnerabilities that can emerge from the interconnection of critical infrastructures from micro and 
macro visions. The study of several methods to model critical infrastructures show the many aspects 
covered by researchers around the world to understand complex systems. 
This dissertation reviews many popular methods, including Agent-Based models, Bayesian 
Networks, Boolean Logic driven Bayesian Networks, Combined Simulators, Petri Networks and 
Complex Networks. However, these methods have unlike objectives, making impossible to compare 
their results. Instead, a sum of these methods can help to understand the dynamics on critical infra-
structures, to design adequate protections and to plan adequate emergency actions against attacks and 
failures. 
Among these methods, Complex Networks showed that they are capable and suitable to model 
and to reflect the topological properties of large complex systems. This dissertation is based on the 
idea that Power Systems are one of the most complex modern networks and there is little understand-
ing of their structure and properties. Thus, to understand this complex system it is needed to map out 
its interactions and interdependencies in a network-based model. 
Two “High-level” models (or macro-vision models) were proposed, these models aim at de-
scribing the asymmetrical communication patterns that can be found in heterogeneous infrastructures. 
In order to create these models, the classic theory of complex networks was modified and a new math-
ematical dimension was introduced in the characteristic adjacency matrix. As well, this adjacency 
matrix was transported to the Hilbert Space using Hermitian Matrices to obtain the Eigen-system that 
characterizes the interdependent infrastructures. 
The significance and originality of this dissertation lays in its ability to bridge two infrastruc-
tures in a single model, conserving their own characteristics and highlighting the interconnections 
among them. As well, because of the flexibility and scalability of the model, it is not limited to the 
type of infrastructure to model; moreover n-infrastructures can be studied in a multi-dimensional mod-
el. 
Therefore, the proposed methods tailor the complex networks to the study of critical infrastruc-
tures vulnerabilities, developing a networks-based representation of the interacting infrastructures that 
allows treating the interdependencies problem in a more unified fashion. 
Throughout the course of this dissertation many difficulties (or challenges) were found, includ-
ing the little understanding of power distribution systems, information and communication networks 
and control systems working as a whole coupled system. Since each infrastructure represents a large 
complex domain, it is complicated to assemble a set of definitions, procedures and component of het-
erogeneous systems. But at the same time, this notoriously difficult problem highlights the novelty of 
this dissertation, because it shows a slight headway in the field of modeling of interdependent infra-
structures. Another major difficulty was the lack of data and tools to validate the models. 
The main disadvantage of the presented approaches is that they are purely topological. Howev-
er, this study can be considered as the foundation of further work dealing with vulnerability studies of 
interdependent infrastructures. As well, some indexes reflect somehow the flow of data and electricity 
within the networks, e.g. Betweenness Centrality and Efficiency metrics. 
A “Low level” (or micro-vision) model is proposed to identify the vulnerabilities in a deeper 
level. This model was integrated with the “High level” model in order to have a complete analysis of 
coupled infrastructures and as result of this integration, a 3-steps methodology was obtained to analyze 
coupled infrastructures at different description levels. 
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Finally, this dissertation proposed a methodology to model Smart Grids, based in the Smart 
Grid Architecture Model (SGAM). This methodology exploits the “High level” and “Low level” sys-
tem description in order to create a model that considers all the domains, zones and interdependencies 
between components in a Smart Grid. However, it is clear than on a complex system like a Smart 
Grid, it is not possible to consider all aspects that define their interdependencies. Although it is true, 
the proposed methodology should serve as a first step to identify weaknesses in Smart Grids and 
should inspire future work. 
Therefore, further work should be focused on dynamic networks that will represent the dynam-
ical behavior of infrastructures. However, it is a very complex endeavor and since deeper investiga-
tions lead to more questions, further work has to be realized by a multi-disciplinary team including not 
only electrical and systems engineers, but also mathematicians, sociologists and economist in order to 
represent the real behavior of coupled heterogeneous infrastructures. 
Some of the proposed research challenges include: 
 Continue the modeling of coupled infrastructures using Complex-weighted complex 
networks. As it was mention, the proposed approaches are a first step to model multi-
dimensional interdependencies between critical infrastructures. This work could be extend-
ed in order to consider many other infrastructures’ interdependencies. Then, it is possible to 
integrate cross disciplinary interdependencies. For instance, gas and water transport interde-
pendencies with the generation units in the “Low level” description. 
 Smart Grids modeling. Last Chapter proposed a methodology to model Smart Grids and to 
identify weaknesses that emerge from the integration of multiple components located at dif-
ferent domains and zones. This methodology should serve to compare different architec-
tures and to identify potential vulnerabilities. 
 Develop (reinforce) self-healing algorithms using complex networks. Thanks to the 
scalability and flexibility of proposed approaches. They can be used to evaluate optimal 
configuration after a failure, from a topological viewpoint. It could either reduce the number 
of options (new architectures) or propose new architectures that might not be evident using 
other methods. 
 Create a test case of interdependent critical infrastructures. One of the main limitations 
during this research was the lack of complete test cases. Therefore, an important and critical 
research line is the development of test cases in order to validate new methods and models 
that include coupled infrastructures. Some of this research is already being developed at 
G2ELAB. 
 Development of failure detection/prediction algorithms. Since topology-driven analysis 
reveals several weaknesses of coupled infrastructures, this analysis can be used to reinforce 
or to develop new failure detection/prediction algorithms. 
 System-of-Systems Engineering & Global vision of Systems. As a short-term research 
line, many “Low-level” general purpose models can be created in order to identify optimal 
architectures. For instance, create black-boxes for all types of substation configuration that 
can be easily included in the “High-level” model. 
 Multiple infrastructure planning: It includes the development of tools to address multiple 
heterogeneous infrastructures in the planning process. 
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Appendix A  
COMPLEX NETWORKS: ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATION 
Whereas the twentieth century was seen as the century of physics, the twenty-first is 
often predicted to be the century of biology. A decade ago it would have been tempting 
to call it the century of the gene. Few people would dare say that any longer about the 
century we have just entered. It will most likely be a century of complexity. 
Albert Barabasi 
 
This Appendix aims at unifying definitions, algorithms and codes to allow other researcher to 
repeat the algorithms and work in this area of research. For the sake of this dissertation, three main 
references were used: [1], [2] and [3]. 
A.1. Toolbox definition 
All codes developed during this dissertation were done in Matlab. In order to compute the com-
plex-weighted complex networks, a Toolbox was developed using object-oriented codes. 
1. Graph, Nodes and Links 
The Graph is defined as a class and its properties are: 
properties 
      edges = [];%Vector of Edges class elements 
      vertices = [];%Vector of Vertices class elements 
      nedges = 0; %Total number of edges 
      type = 0; %Type of Graph 0->Undirected, 1->Directed 
      nvertices = 0; %Total number of Vertices 
      idxvertices = []; %Vector used to find vertices 
      valvertices = []; %Vector used to find vertices 
      diameter = 0; %Graph Diameter 
      distances = []; %Matrix containing the distances among nodes 
      avdistance = 0; %Graph Average Distance 
      avclustering = 0; %Graph Average Clustering 
      avdegree = 0; %Average Degree (in-degree for Directed graphs) 
      avdegreeout = 0; %Out-Degree 
      density = 0; %Graph Density 
      A = []; %Adjacency Matrix 
      C = []; %Cost matrix 
2 
      Cim = []; %Cost matrix imaginaire 
      AdjList = [];%Adjacency List 
      ShortestPaths = {}; %List of shortest paths 
      UnitShortestPaths = {}; 
      NShortestPaths = 0; 
end 
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2. Shortest Path : Dijkstra 
Shortest path or geodesic path is the shortest path from one node to another. The methodology 
used to compute the shortest path was developed by Dijkstra, and the optimal algorithm was taken 
from [4]. Which is: 
Dijkstra (G, w, s) 
1: for each vertex w ∈ V[G] 
2:       do d[v] ← ∞ 
3:             π[v] ← NIL 
4: d[s] ← 0 
5: S ← ø 
6: G← V[G] 
7: while Q ≠ ø 
8:        do u ← Extract-Min(Q) 
9:              S ← S ∪ {u} 
10:              for each vertex v ∈ Adj[u] 
11:                       if d[u] > d[u] + w(u,v) 
12:                           then d[v] ← d[u]+w(u,v) 
13:                                  π[v] ← u 
 
Personal application in Matlab: 
function [D PI] = Dijkstra(V,E,Adj,W); 
    [nE temp] = size(E); 
    nV = length(V); 
 
    w = zeros(length(V)); 
    for i = 1:nE 
        w(E(i,1),E(i,2))=W(i); 
    end 
    D=[];PI=[];     
    for s = 1:nV 
        d = zeros(1,length(V)); 
        pi = zeros(1,length(V)); 
        [d pi]= init_source(V,s,d,pi); 
        S = []; 
        Q = V; 
        while ~isempty(Q) 
            [u Q] = extractMin(s,Q,S,d); 
            S = [S u]; 
            nAdj = length(Adj(u).adj); 
            tempAdj = Adj(u).adj; 
            for j = 1:nAdj 
                v = tempAdj(j); 
                [d pi]= relax(u,v,w,d,pi); 
            end  
        end 
        D = [D;d]; 
        PI = [PI;pi]; 
4 
    end 
end 
 
function [d pi]= init_source(V,s,d,pi) 
    nV = length(V); 
    for i = 1:nV 
        d(i)=inf; 
        pi(i)= -1; 
    end 
    d(s)=0; 
end 
 
function [d pi]= relax(u,v,w,d,pi) 
    if d(v) > d(u)+ w(u,v); 
        d(v) = d(u) + w(u,v); 
        pi(v) = u; 
    end 
end 
 
function [u Q] = extractMin(s,Q,S,d) 
    if isempty(S) 
        u = s; 
        Q(s)=[]; 
    else 
        [minD minIDX]=min(d(Q)); 
        u = Q(minIDX); 
        Q(minIDX)=[]; 
    end 
end 
A.2. Centrality Indexes 
1. Betweenness Centrality 
This index aims at answering the question: “What is your importance in the Network?” [1]. This 
index was widely used in this dissertation. Even if the equation presented in Section III.3.1.5 is simple, 
it is not so evident to compute. Authors in [5] proposed an optimal algorithm called “A Faster algo-
rithm for betweenness centrality,” which was used by the developers of GEPHI19 software and the 
library “matlab_bgl”20, the two tools used for the purpose of this dissertation.  
2. Spectral Centrality 
The Spectral Centrality was computed in Matlab, using the follow code: 
function [VecELEC, ValELEC, VecICT, ValICT, kinelec, koutelec,kinict, koutict, 
ELECVectores, ICTVectores]=Spectral_Prestige(dataElec, dataICT) 
clc 
disp('SPECTRAL ANALYSIS - CHAPTER 3') 
nodes = (1:23)'; 
nnodes = 23; 
 
 
19
 Gephi is an interactive visualization and exploration platform for all kinds of graphs. More information: 
https://gephi.org/ 
20
 MATLAB_BLG is a library for Matlab that provides a set of algorithms to work with graphs, was developed 
by David Gleich. More information: http://goo.gl/77Obn 
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[nlineElec temp]=size(dataElec); 
[nlineICT temp]=size(dataICT); 
outcomes = zeros(nnodes,3); 
outcomes(:,1) = (1:nnodes)'; 
elecNodes = (1:14)'; 
commNodes = (15:23)'; 
test = 0;       
         
%% CALCUL  
disp('ELECTRIC NETWORK') 
From = dataElec(:,1); 
To = dataElec(:,2); 
Weights = diag(ones(nlineElec)); 
Aelec = adjacencyMatrixELEC(From, To,nnodes,nlineElec,Weights); 
 
kinelec = sum(Aelec,1); 
koutelec = sum(Aelec,2); 
  
%WE ROTATE A BY MULTIPLYING A WITH e^(-i*pi/4) 
Helec = Aelec * exp(-1i*pi()/4); 
  
%EIGENSPECTRAL ANALYSIS 
[VecELEC, ValELEC] = eig(Helec); 
ValELEC = diag(ValELEC) 
[THETAelec,RHOelec] = cart2pol(real(VecELEC),imag(VecELEC)) 
  
ELECVectores = []; 
for i = 1:23 
   ELECVectores = [ELECVectores RHOelec(:,i) THETAelec(:,i)]; 
end 
  
valores = sort(real(ValELEC),'descend'); 
plot(valores,'*') 
  
disp('ICT NETWORK') 
From = dataICT(:,1); 
To = dataICT(:,2); 
Weights = diag(ones(nlineICT)); 
Aict = adjacencyMatrixICT(From, To,nnodes,nlineICT,Weights); 
   
kinict = sum(Aict,1); 
koutict = sum(Aict,2); 
   
%WE ROTATE A BY MULTIPLYING A WITH e^(-i*pi/4) 
Hict = Aict * exp(-1i*pi()/4); 
   
%EIGENSPECTRAL ANALYSIS 
[VecICT, ValICT] = eig(Hict); 
ValICT = diag(ValICT) 
   
[THETAict,RHOict] = cart2pol(real(VecICT),imag(VecICT)); 
ICTVectores = []; 
for i = 1:23 
    ICTVectores = [ICTVectores RHOict(:,i) THETAict(:,i)]; 
end 
figure() 
valores2 = sort(real(ValICT),'descend'); 
6 
plot(valores2,'*') 
   
res1 = [ValELEC';VecELEC]; 
res2 = [ValICT';VecICT]; 
end 
 
function A = adjacencyMatrixELEC(From, To,nnodes,nline,Weights) 
A = zeros(nnodes); 
for i = 1:nline 
    A(From(i),To(i))=A(From(i),To(i))+Weights(i); 
    A(To(i),From(i))=A(To(i),From(i))+(Weights(i)*1i); 
end 
end 
  
function A = adjacencyMatrixICT(From, To,nnodes,nline,Weights) 
A = zeros(nnodes); 
for i = 1:nline 
    A(From(i),To(i))=A(From(i),To(i))+Weights(i)+(Weights(i)*1i); 
    A(To(i),From(i))=A(To(i),From(i))+Weights(i)+(Weights(i)*1i); 
end 
end 
 
A.3. More information 
Many more information about small-world [6], scale-free networks [7]  can be found in the lit-
erature. This information is important, since it allows knowing other properties of complex systems, 
about their structure and topology. M. Newman published a Survey con Complex Systems [8], which 
emphasizes the papers with the highest impact in this subject. 
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Appendix B  
RECENT ATTACKS AND ICTS FAILURES 
Quis custodied ipsos custodies 
Decimus lunius luvenalis 
 
Every day it is likely to find sensationalist headlines as: “.S. Power and water utilities face daily 
cyber-attacks” (in Homeland Security News Wire, Published on 6 April 2012), “Russia says many 
states arming for cyber warfare” (in Reuters, Published on 25 April 2012), “Hacker could take over 
traffic and rail-road control systems using back-door” (in Magazine “Info-Security,” Published on 26 
April 2012). But, does this news show a reality or just a paranoia state? This appendix summarizes the 
main and recent attacks to Power System facilities worldwide, as well as, some failures on information 
and communication systems that have been remembered as historical events due to their great impact 
on the life of hundreds of citizens. 
B.1. Recent Attacks against industrial control systems 
1. Flame – 2012 
Flame malware (also known as Flamer or sKyWIper) was discovered in 2012 by the MAHER 
Center of Iranian National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [1], Karspersky Lab [2] and 
CrySyS [3]. The origin of this malware is unknown, but it has been used for targeted cyber espionage 
in Middle Eastern countries. 
This malware attacks computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system (including 
Windows XP, Vista and 7), and its main objective is to impact on SCADA Security Systems [4]. It 
performs network sniffing, collects a list of vulnerable passwords, transfers saved data on control 
servers, and it has the ability to record audio, screen-shots, keyboard activity and network traffic. It is 
transferred over a local network (LAN) via USB stick or via file sharing. 
2. Worm W32.Duqu – 2011 
On 1st September 2011, the computer worm Duqu was discovered by the Laboratory of Cryp-
tography and System Security (CrySys) in Hungary. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland, 
the Worm Duqu is an information-gathering threat that targeted specific organizations, including in-
dustrial control systems (ICSs) manufacturers [5]. According to the reports, the code appears to look 
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for information such as design documents that could be used to launch a future attack against a facility 
under the control of an ICS -including electric generation, water/wastewaters treatment, oil and gas 
production/distribution/refining, chemical/petrochemical processing, transportation systems, and 
building automation systems. 
3. Stuxnet – 2010 
It is a computer sophisticated worm discovered in July 2010 in Iran [6] and has been recognized 
as one of the most complex threat ever found. It was primarily written to target industrial control sys-
tems which have the Siemens SIMATIC WinCC/Step 7 controller software installed, and its final goal 
was to reprogram industrial control systems (ICS) by modifying the code on programmable logic con-
trollers (PLCs) to make them work in a very specific manner, the attacker intended to hide those 
changes from the operator of the equipment. Most of the victims were located in Iran, Indonesia, and 
India, it was reported 14 power plants infected (among them the Bushehr Nuclear Power plant in Iran) 
and more than 50000 Windows computers. However, there is no record of mortal consequences. 
The worm exploited unknown windows vulnerabilities that allowed it to spread from computer 
to computer via USB stick and thus infect computers and networks that are not normally connected to 
the Internet. It had two specific characteristics, it get more complex over time (it has four  zero-day 
exploits) and it has a deadline on 24
th
 June 2012, date when it will stop spreading and delete itself [7], 
[8]. According to several publications, USA and Israel are the most common suspects, however it re-
mains highly speculative and it will remain a mystery [9], [10]. Authors in [11] study how Stuxnet 
infects and propagates using a typical (but hypothetical) security model. 
4. The Night Dragon – 2009 
Since November 2009, hackers have stolen confidential data to companies from the energy sec-
tor in the United States, this series of attacks was called “The Night Dragon” since it was originated 
from several locations in China [12]. 
This coordinated attack was conducted against global oil, energy and petrochemical companies, 
and against individual and executives of such enterprises. Each attack was divided into five steps, ac-
cording to McAffe: 
1. Attack through SQL-injection on extranet web servers to allow remote command execution. 
2. Gained access to sensitive internal desktops and servers. 
3. Accessed additional usernames and passwords. 
4. Enabled direct communication from infected machines to the Internet. 
5. Exfiltrated email archives and other highly sensitive documents. 
Attackers used a “mix of hacking techniques” including SQL-injection and spear-phishing that 
compromised corporate VNP accounts. Despite this kind of attacks are common in Computer Net-
works; it is the first time this kind of attacks was focused against the Energy Sector [13]. 
5. Daimler-Chrysler plants - Zotob Worm – 2005 
In August 2005, 13 assembly lines of Daimler-Chrysler US auto manufacturing plants (located 
at Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, Delaware and Michigan) went offline for almost one hour due to 
several PC outages caused by the infection of Zotob, RBot and IRCBot worms. These viruses exploit-
ed a hole in the PnP (Plug-and-play) of computers running Windows 2000 [14]. The estimated cost 
impact was US$14 million [15]. 
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6. Ohio Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant – 2003 
On January 25, 2003 the worm MS SQL Server 2000 attacked several computers in the Ohio 
Davis-Besse Nuclear plant. This computer blackout caused data overload in the site network and 
therefore the computers were unable to communicate with each other. Fortunately the plant control 
and protection functions were not affected [16]. However, the safety monitoring system was offline for 
5 hours. 
Even if the plant network is well protected by a firewall, the worm by-passed the access controls 
through a T1 Connection line used by a consultant. 
7. Nimda worm – 2001 
The Nimda worm, widely spread in the world in 2001, reached in September 2001 the internal 
network of a major EMS/SCADA vendor and then attacked the EMS/SCADA networks of all its cus-
tomers via the support network [17]. 
This worm affected mainly system running Microsoft Windows 95/98, ME, NT and 2000 and 
propagated through email arriving as a multipart/alternative message. In the host computer, the Nimda 
worm caused denial-of-service conditions on networks affecting the internal network [18]. 
8. Code Red II Worm – 2001 
Code Red II Worm was released on August 4 2001, this worm created a back-door to allow at-
tacks on vulnerable systems. It exploited a security hole in Microsoft web server software. This worm 
affected the internal network of a company that provides services to numerous electric utility compa-
nies. Although the infected networks were protected and not exposed to the Internet, the worm used 
the private frame relay network connected to the service company [18]. 
9. Australian Sewage System – 2000 
On February-April 2000, Vitek Boden realized a series of electronic attack on the sewage con-
trol system in Queensland – Australia, causing millions of liters of raw sewage to spill out into local 
parks and rivers [19]. He is an expert on SCADA systems and radio-controlled sewage equipment, and 
at that time he was applying for a job at the sewage control system, but his application was rejected, 
the reason why he revenged against the enterprise. 
In the Australian Sewage System, each pumping station is able to receive commands from a 
Control Center by means of dedicated analog two-way radio system, using different frequencies. Vitek 
Boden installed some of these communication systems at the Australian Sewage System and the day 
he was captured in his car, police found in his laptop specialized software for accessing and control-
ling sewage management systems, as well as radio-equipment compatible with those used at the sew-
age system [20]. 
At the control center, engineers recognized that they were under attack after the detection of an 
increased radio traffic, that pumps were not responding under demand, some alarms were not reporting 
to the control center and the loss of communication between the control center and several pumping 
stations [21]. 
This attack demonstrated that intentional and targeted attacks by a knowledgeable person are re-
al and may be catastrophic. As well, that this was just one attack by one person against a single sys-
tem, therefore terrorist or even enemy nations can attack vulnerable infrastructures easily and in a 
much higher scale. 
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B.2. Information and Communication system failures leading to 
blackouts 
10. Power Distribution in Rome – 2004 
In January 2004 a flooding of a Telecom Italia major telecommunication node (node Laurenti-
na) occurred in Roma. As a consequence, part of the wired and wireless services fell down. The cause 
of the blackout was the failure of the air conditioner in the communication room, which caused the 
overheated of telecommunication devices. Many other infrastructures were affected, including the 
ACEA Power Distribution Network, which lost two communication links (main and reluctant) among 
the Flaminia Control Center and the Ostiense Control Center, these two control centers did not have 
the chance to exchange alarms, signals nor commands for more than one hour, i.e. a total loss of moni-
toring and controlling systems. However, the Power Distribution System did not need to exchange 
alarms nor signals [22]. 
Other involved infrastructures were: Fiumicino airport, ANSI print agency, post offices and 
banks, the communication network (GARR), connecting the main Italian research institutions. 
11. U.S. and Canada Blackout – 2003 
On August 14, 2003 the Midwest and Northwest of the United States and Ontario in Canada 
were affected by a historical blackout, impacting on an estimated 50 million people and 70000 MW of 
electric loads, which represented losses between US$ 4 billion and 10 billion. The power was restored 
only after 4 days in some parts of the United States [23]. 
That day, at 14h14 (local hour) the control room operators lost the alarm function that provided 
visual and audible indications when an equipment is in a problematic condition. This was caused by an 
overflow in the alarm function. This created a loss of awareness of the system’s conditions. Conse-
quently, after a few minutes some remote EMS (Energy Management System) terminal ceased opera-
tion and this caused as well the loss of the primary server hosting the alarm processing and the Auto-
matic Generation Control (AGC) function hosted in the servers. 
However, it was not the initial incident of the blackout. It was at 14h27 that the Star-South Can-
ton 345 kV line triggered and reclosed, but operators did not notice this event. After other lines trig-
gered because of overgrowing trees, but the Control center operators did not take any action because 
 
Figure B - 1Black-out phases [23] 
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they did not realize these events caused by the lack of alarms. This caused a cascade effect on many 
lines. It is important to mention that the control center lacked of alarm failure detection systems. 
This blackout had a negative impact on the cellular communication network since at the backup 
power at the cellular sites the generators ran out of fuel. 
Figure B - 1 presents the time line of the main phases of the Blackout. This figure shows that 
the blackout was originated by a combination of errors and failures in the power grid, the ICT network 
and the human behavior. 
More information can be found in [24], [25] and [26]. 
12. Ertan Hydro Station – 2000 
On October 13 2000, the control system of ERTAN hydro station in China received unexpected 
signals that almost cause the collapse of the Sichuan Power System [27]. 
13. Hydro-Quebec – 1988 
A remote load-shedding system failed to operate due to a communication system's failure in the 
control center, which led to a sequence of line trips followed by line overloading, tripping of generat-
ing units, and the loss of dc interconnections. 
B.3. Conclusions 
Recent events reveal several facts: 
 Failures in ICT infrastructure can actually affect Power Systems. 
 There is a tendency to perform targeted cyber and physical attacks, and these advanced 
threats now can target people as well through social engineering, using fake emails and oth-
er manipulation methods. Therefore, it is needed to improve the users’ education and 
awareness to succeed against external targeted threats. 
 Isolation from the internet is not an effective defense and all power systems that are con-
trolled by software are vulnerable to cyber threats because internal networks can be attacked 
via usb keys or service networks. 
 Terrorists and war fighters recognized that it is more effective to attack ICT infrastructures 
directly, than to physically attack their targets. 
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APPENDIX C 
PROJECTS INCLUDING COUPLED INFRASTRUCTURES 
We may brave human laws, but we cannot resist natural ones 
Jules Verne 
 
This appendix summarizes several projects that have worked on Critical Infrastructures analy-
sis, including modeling and simulation. As well, some of the standards that present guidelines to build 
these complexes coupled systems. 
C.1. Projects  
1. SINARI Project  
Name: Sécurité des Infrastructures et Analyse de Risques 
Website: http://www.sinari.org  
Dates: 2010 - 2013 
Project type: French - ANR 
Originalities: Creation of a test platform that integrates power system emulation, communica-
tion network and SCADA simulation and real automatisms. 
Objectives: The SINARI Project objectives are: to identify the hazards and risks inherent in in-
tegrated infrastructures, to develop necessary ICT defenses, to test the most representative of these 
defenses and finally to evaluate their effectiveness [1]-[2]. 
2. SEESGEN-ICT 
Name: Supporting Energy Efficiency in Smart GENeration grids through ICT” 
Website: http://seesgen-ict.rse-web.it 
Dates: 2009 - 2011 
Project type: European 
Originalities: Proposition of policy recommendations for the introduction of ICT into the smart 
distributed power generation grids. 
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Objectives: It proposed policy recommendations for policy makers, including the Commission, 
Energy regulators and standardization bodies. Their main findings include the detection of barriers, 
such as lack of agreement about smart metering, lack of commercialized smart appliances and lack of 
standards. Therefore, they proposed a Demand Side Service Platform (DSSP) as a operational tool for 
policy agents [3]. 
3. VIKING 
Name: Vital Infrastructure networks information and control systems management project 
Website: http://www.vikingproject.eu 
Dates: 2008 - 2011 
Project type: European 
Originalities: Evaluation of the Social Cost of cyberattacks. 
Objectives: Investigate the vulnerability of SCADA systems and assess the cost of cyberattacks 
and develop strategies to mitigate the vulnerabilities [4]. 
4. MICIE 
Name: 
Dates: 2008 - 2011 
Project type: European 
Originalities: Proposition of alerting systems to assist the CI operator to reduce risk of failure. 
Objectives: “MICIE alerting system,” which is able to identify le level of possible threats on 
ICTs. Its main objective was to define the main priorities to effectively introduce ICT into the Smart 
Distributed Power Grids [5]-[6]. 
5. CRUTIAL 
Name: Critical Utility Infrastructural Resilience 
Website: http://crutial.rse-web.it 
Dates: 2006 - 2009 
Project type: European  
Objectives: propose models and architectures that cope with the scenario of openness, heteroge-
neity and evolvability endured by electrical utilities infrastructures; analyze of critical scenarios in 
which faults in the information infrastructure provoke serious impacts on the controlled electric power 
infrastructure; investigate distributed architectures enabling dependable control and management of 
the power grid [7]. 
6. IRRIIS 
Name: Integrated Risk Reduction of Information based Infrastructure Systems 
Website: http://www.irriis.org 
Dates: 2006 - 2009 
Project type: European  
Objectives: Determine security needs of ICTs, develop a communication platform for automat-
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ed information sharing between critical infrastructures; build a simulation environment to study criti-
cal infrastructures interdependencies, disseminate novel and innovative concepts to other information-
based infrastructures [8]. 
7. GRID 
Name: A coordination action on ICT vulnerabilities of Power Systems and the relevant defense 
methodologies.  
Project type: European 
Originalities: Detection of main challenges in near, mid and long term,  
Objectives: The main purpose of this project was to establish a consensus on the key issues in-
volved in power systems vulnerabilities [9]. 
C.2. Standards 
Some cyber security standards for Power Systems are presented in [10] and [11]. 
1. ANSI/ISA 99 
“Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: Concepts, Terminology and models.” 
Divided in 4 parts, this standard address the Industrial Automation and control systems, de-
scribes the elements of a cyber-security management system, guides the application of these elements 
and presents how to operate correctly a security program. Finally, compares the industrial automation 
and control systems with other information systems. 
2. IEEE Std 2030/2011 
“Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology op-
eration with the Electric Power System (EPS), End-Use Applications, and Loads.” 
This standard takes into account the integration of communications, power systems and infor-
mation technology architectures to define design frameworks and strategies. As well, describes the 
interfaces within these infrastructures on Smart Grids. 
3. IEC 62443/2010 
“Industrial communication networks – Network and system security.” 
Presents security guidelines and processes that industrial operators must follow. As well, some 
requirements for data integrity and confidentiality. 
4. IEC 61850/2006 
“Communications networks and systems in substations.” 
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Standard IEC 61850 was created because before its application, specific proprietary communi-
cation protocols were developed by each manufacturer, this caused the need of complicated and ex-
pensive protocol converters in order to use IEDs from different vendors. Therefore, this standard was 
designed to unify and provide a single protocol for a complete substation, to facilitate object modeling 
of data requirement in the substation, to define the basic services required to transfer data using differ-
ent communication protocols and to allow the interoperability between IEDs from different vendors 
[12]. This Standard is divided into 10 parts: 
5. IEEE Std 1686/2007 
“IEEE Standard for Substation Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) Cyber Security Capabili-
ties.” 
Describes the requirements for Substation Intelligent Electronic Devices to secure the lo-
cal/remote access and thus secure the substation. As well, it proposes features to develop a defensive 
procedure. 
6. Mandate 490 - 2011 
“Standardization Mandate to European Standardisation Organisations to support European 
Smart Grid Deployment.” 
The main objective of this mandate is to develop and/or update standards that deal with the in-
tegration of Information and Communication Technologies on Smart Grids. 
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APPENDIX D 
PUBLICATIONS 
Our virtues and our failings are inseparable, 
 like force and matter. When they separate, man is no more. 
Nikola Tesla 
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VULNERABILITE, INTERDEPENDANCE ET ANALYSE DES RISQUES DES POSTES SOURCES ET 
DES MODES D’EXPLOITATION DECENTRALISES DES RESEAUX ELECTRIQUES 
 
Résumé ─  Au vu de l’utilisation croissante des technologies de l’information et de la 
communication dans les réseaux électriques, il est indispensable d’étudier l’étroite liaison 
entre ces infrastructures et d’avoir une vision intégrée du système couplé. Cette thèse porte 
ainsi sur la modélisation des systèmes multi-infrastructures. Cela inclut les interdépendances 
et les trajectoires de défaillances de type modes communs, aggravations et cascades. Il est en 
effet nécessaire d’identifier les points de faiblesse qui peuvent déclencher une ou de multiples 
défaillance(s), se succéder en cascade au travers de ces infrastructures liées et ainsi entrainer 
des défaillances inattendues et de plus en plus graves dans des autres infrastructures. Dans 
cette optique, différents modèles basés sur la théorie des Réseaux Complexes sont développés 
afin d’identifier les composants les plus importantes, et pourtant critiques, dans le système 
interconnecté. Un des principaux verrous scientifiques levé dans cette thèse est relatif au dé-
veloppement d'un modèle mathématique « unifié » afin de représenter les comportements des 
multiples infrastructures non-homogènes qui ont des interdépendances asymétriques. 
 
Mots clés : Infrastructures critiques, Interdépendances, Réseau électrique, Réseau de communication, 
Réseaux complexes, Systèmes couplés, Technologies de l’information et de la communication, Vulné-
rabilités. 
 
 
 
 
VULNERABILITY, INTERDEPENDENCIES AND RISK ANALYSIS OF COUPLED  
INFRASTRUCTURES: POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK AND ICT 
 
Abstract ─ In view of the increasing use of Information and Communication Technol-
ogies in power systems, it is essential to study the interdependencies between these coupled 
heterogeneous systems. This thesis focuses on the modeling of multi- infrastructure systems. 
This includes interdependencies and the three major failures families: common mode, escalat-
ing and cascading. It is indeed necessary to identify the weaknesses that can trigger one or 
multiple failure(s) and cascade through these interdependent infrastructures, causing unex-
pected and increasingly more serious failures to other infrastructures. In this context, different 
approaches, based on the theory of Complex Networks, are developed to identify the most 
critical components in the coupled heterogeneous system. One of the major scientific barriers 
addressed in this thesis is the development of a unified mathematical model to represent the 
behavior of multiple heterogeneous systems with complex asymmetrical communication pat-
terns. 
 
Keywords: Critical infrastructures, Interdependence, Power grid, Secure operation, Vulnerability. 
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